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AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND CONDUCT
OF THE PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS

HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY SERIES

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The historically interesting works reprinted in this series helped to prepare the way for the science of psychology. Most of these books are long forgotten, but their relevance to the field is unmistakable. Many of the writings on mental and moral philosophy, published before the dawn of scientific procedures, have much to commend them to present-day scholars. These books serve as groundwork for a fuller account of the background from which the field emerged, and they should be attractive to students who seek in the past for hints of the future direction that certain types of research can take. Each work will have an Introduction stating the provenance and significance of the book and will add appropriate biographical information.

ROBERT I. WATSON

General Editor

University of New Hampshire

An Essay
ON THE
Nature and Conduct
OF THE
Passions and Affections
WITH
ILLUSTRATIONS ON THE MORAL SENSE
(*Third Edition, 1742*)
BY
Francis Hutcheson

A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION
WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY
Paul McReynolds

GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA
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Introduction

The book presented here in facsimile, though not widely known, is one of the more important works on psychology and ethics produced during the first half of the eighteenth century. Its author, Francis Hutcheson, was a leading moral philosopher of that period, and his works exercised a considerable influence on developments in ethics, economics and the psychology of human motivation during the remainder of his century. Further, there are anticipations in his works of a number of current conceptions in psychology and ethics. Hutcheson's writings are thus of considerable historical significance.

Hutcheson's first book, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, was published in 1725, and the present volume, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, first appeared in 1728. Both books went through several editions; it is the third (and final) edition (1742) of the *Passions* which is reproduced here. These two volumes together formed the basis of Hutcheson's system of thought—even though this underwent considerable elaboration later—and Hutcheson himself thought of them as jointly making up an integrated whole. Each book contains two treatises, and he referred to these as treatises I through IV (p. xx). The two works in the present volume (numbers III and IV in the overall ordering) were, respectively, on the Passions and Moral Sense; the two treatises in the earlier book (I and II in the overall ordering) were, respectively, on Beauty and Virtue. All four of the treatises have frequently been referred to in the critical literature, but for many years only the second one, on Virtue, has been generally available in complete form (in Selby-Bigge, L. A. (Ed.), *British Moralists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897, Vol. 1). Currently, the first treatise, on Beauty, is being reproduced in its entirety (McReynolds, Paul, ed., *Four Early Works on Motivation*,

Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1969), and the present volume makes the other two available.

I have noted that Hutcheson's works are relevant both to ethics and to motivational psychology. In current scholarship these two fields are, of course, quite separate, but this was not the case in Hutcheson's day. Thus, though the book reproduced here includes discussions of both moral and motivational issues, these are intermingled in such a manner that it is often difficult to separate them. Essentially, of course, ethics is concerned with the way people *should* behave, with the *rightness* or *wrongness* of acts, whereas motivation is concerned with the way people actually *do* behave, with the incitements and inhibitions to given acts. Ethics is interested in the *criteria* of moral behavior; motivation, with the *determinants* of actual behavior. Since the time of Aristippus and Democritus, in ancient Greece, there has been a tendency to confuse these two worlds of discourse, and it is only in modern times that the distinction between them has been formally and explicitly recognized. As we will see later, Hutcheson, despite his inconsistency in this regard, was one of the first—even before Hume—to attempt such a division.

The two fields are, of course, necessarily interdependent. Thus, the moral standards that a person holds, and the strength with which he holds them, are important motivating conditions in his on-going behavior. Further, broad considerations of morality necessarily involve the question of what "causes" or motivates a person to behave in a moral manner: i.e., discussions of ethical principles or criteria presuppose, in a sense, some motivation on the part of persons to follow, or at least to be influenced by, these standards. Such motivation is obviously worthy of study in its own right. Hutcheson, as we have noted, was interested in both ethical and motivational questions, and his concern with motivation—or with the "springs of action," to use the vernacular of his time—extended considerably beyond the role of motives in moral behavior. Other eighteenth-century philosophers who wrote on both motivational and moral issues include Hume and Bentham.

Before proceeding, let me comment briefly on Hutcheson himself. He was born in 1694, in Drumalig, Ireland. Both his father and his paternal grandfather, who had immigrated originally from Scotland, were Presbyterian ministers. It is reported that Francis was a favorite of this grandfather, who is supposed to have said to him at the age of three, "Francis, I predict thou wilt one day be a very eminent man" (W. R. Scott, *Francis Hutcheson*. Cambridge,

University Press, 1900, p. 6). In 1717 Hutcheson completed his own theological training, at the University of Glasgow, and in 1721 or 1722 he became head of a new private Academy in Dublin. In 1724, or possibly 1725, Hutcheson was married to a Mary Wilson. During the courtship, and while he was still organizing the new Academy, he was working also on his first book, the *Inquiry* referred to above. The *Essay on the Passions* (I will use this short term, or simply the *Essay*, to refer to the entire book reproduced here) then appeared, as already noted, in 1728. These books received considerable critical acclaim, and in 1729 Hutcheson was elected to the position of Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, his alma mater.

His best known works, then, were written before he returned to Glasgow. Here he was evidently a warm, dynamic, and conscientious teacher, and seems to have been esteemed and even loved by a wide circle of associates, students, and friends. In short, it appears that he practiced in his own life the benevolence and goodwill that he commended to others. Most prominent among his students was Adam Smith. The influence of Hutcheson on Smith was especially great, not only with regard to the latter's moral philosophy (Smith, A., *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Edinburgh: John D. Lowe, 1849; originally published 1759), but also with respect to his economic theory (*An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. New York: Modern Library, 1937. Originally published 1776). The relation between Hutcheson and Smith has been traced by Scott (*op. cit.*) and W. L. Taylor (*Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as Predecessors of Adam Smith*. Durham, N. C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1965).

At Glasgow, Hutcheson, though not as prolific and innovative as before, continued to write, along with his teaching and administrative duties. In addition to bringing out subsequent editions of the *Inquiry* (4 editions) and the *Essay on Passions* (3 editions), he wrote, between 1734 and 1737, *A System of Moral Philosophy*—which he used for class lectures, and which was not published until 1755. In 1742 he published, in Latin, his *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*; this was translated into English and published under the title *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, in 1747. These are the major works of Hutcheson: for a complete bibliography the reader is referred to Scott (*op. cit.*, pp. 143-5). Hutcheson died in 1746, in his fifty-third year. His son, also named Francis, brought out the *System* in 1755, as already noted. This work also includes an account of Hutcheson's life, by William Leechman, who had been a

colleague of Hutcheson's at the University of Glasgow. This work is one of the basic biographies for Hutcheson scholars. The others are those by Thomas Fowler (*Shaftesbury and Hutcheson*, London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1882) and Scott (*op. cit.*). The writings of Hutcheson were popular not only in England but in the American colonies as well (*Fiering, N. S. Moral Philosophy in America from 1700 to 1750, and its British Context*, unpublished manuscript, 1968, lent to me by the author).

Let us consider now something of the historical background of the *Essay on Passions*, and of the cultural context in which it was written. I will comment first on the concept of "the passions" in psychology. Though the term "passion" is no longer used as a technical psychological term, it was widely used in and before Hutcheson's time to refer to strong, overpowering affects, and included some of the meanings of both contemporary "emotion" and "motive." The term, historically, is one of the most hallowed concepts in the long course of psychological thought. Inaugurated originally by Plato (Levi, A., *French Moralists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), it represented for some 2,000 years a major, continuing strain of psychological theory, and was the primary subject of affective and motivational taxonomies. There has, in fact, been no unifying concept in psychology which served longer than that of "the passions," and beside it today's concepts are the merest infants. After Plato's distinction between what came to be termed the irascible and the concupiscent passions—a dichotomy also followed by Aristotle—Zeno, Chrysippus and other Greek Stoics further developed the concept, suggesting four fundamental passions: pleasure, pain, desire, and fear. From the Stoics the theory passed on to Cicero, who apparently was one of the main influences on Hutcheson. From Cicero and Saint Augustine the doctrine was transmitted to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote at length on the passions, which by now had attained a highly complex taxonomy. In the late Renaissance the early Spanish pedagogist, Juan Luis Vives, developed a somewhat different conception of the passions in his *De Anima et Vita* (1538), as did de la Chambre, the early French psychologist, in his *Les Caractères des Passions* (1648). De la Chambre's work was contemporary with that of René Descartes, whose *Les Passions de l'Âme* (1649) was extremely influential. Malebranche, Spinoza, and Hobbes also wrote extensively on this topic.

At the time Hutcheson wrote, then, the concept of passion was the primary means for expressing dynamic psychological functions.

The long reign of the usefulness of the concept of “passion” was, however, nearing its end: Hutcheson’s was perhaps the last major book to use this term in its title. After it Hume, in his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1740), included a major section on the passions, but by the time of Bentham’s *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), other concepts, in particular “motive” and “affection,” were coming into general use.

Hutcheson lived in an age when there was tremendous interest in ethical questions. The moral superstructure that had lent stability throughout the long medieval period had lost its effectiveness some time before, and the need in his time was to discover, or to develop, a new and more stable moral paradigm. Though a number of systematic proposals, including that of Hutcheson, were put forth, none of these, as it turned out, gained general acceptance—nor, indeed, have any of the metaethical systems developed since that time, and the moral crisis that we face today is fundamentally a part of the same crisis that confronted Hutcheson’s era.

Among Hutcheson’s predecessors several are crucial to an understanding of his *Essay*. Thomas Hobbes, in his *Leviathan* (1651), had maintained that people’s behavior is determined solely by egoistic motives, and that all apparently benevolent behavior is based ultimately on self-interest. This viewpoint was extremely unsettling to most moralists of that period, and in the half-century following Hobbes’ classic a large number of tracts vehemently opposing his position were published. Probably the most important of these was *Enchiridion Ethicum* (1666; translated into English in 1690 as *An Account of Virtue*) by Henry More. This book contradicted Hobbes by positing an inherent tendency toward goodness, a “boniform faculty of the soul.” John Locke, in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), however, held that all knowledge comes through the senses, and this ruled out the possibility of innate knowledge of good and evil. In effect, Locke supported Hobbes’ conclusion that moral behavior is based upon self-interest. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, then proposed, in his *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times* (1711), a more altruistic conception of human nature, suggesting that man has an innate “moral sense.” Shaftesbury’s position, in turn, was criticized by Bernard Mandeville, whose position was similar to that of Hobbes, in the 1723 edition of his *The Fable of the Bees*.

Shaftesbury died in 1713, but his works exercised a major influence upon Hutcheson, who on the title page of his first book—the

Inquiry—described that work as one “In which the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are explain’d and defended, against the author of the *Fable of the Bees*. ” It would, however, be an error to assume that Hutcheson’s writings were simply an elaboration of the views of Shaftesbury. It is true that both authors emphasized an innate inclination toward benevolent behavior—as, indeed, did Henry More before them—but Hutcheson’s system, particularly in the book reproduced here, and in later works, differed in a number of respects from Shaftesbury’s. In broad terms, Hutcheson, as compared with Shaftesbury, was less metaphysical, more empirical, and more systematic. More specifically, Hutcheson did not accept Shaftesbury’s equation of the esthetic and moral senses; he developed the conception of a number of “internal senses”; and he was instrumental in laying the general foundations for the later-to-be-developed Utilitarian theory of ethics.

Hutcheson was also strongly indebted—particularly in his *Essay*—to Bishop Joseph Butler, whose very influential *Sermons* had been published in 1726. In particular, Hutcheson appears to have adopted part of his taxonomy of motives and affections from Butler. Further, Hutcheson’s conceptions were significantly influenced by Locke’s *Essay*, as indeed most psychological theories were at that time. While Hutcheson’s assumption of a multiplicity of “internal senses” that in many respects have roles similar to motives or instincts was hardly in keeping with Locke’s notion of a single “internal sense” serving the function of “reflection,” Hutcheson’s theorizing in this regard was nevertheless clearly derived from Locke’s, if only by analogy. Further, Hutcheson’s empiricist—as opposed to rationalist—approach to moral philosophy was in accord with Locke’s position; as Blackstone (*Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory*. Athens, Ga.: Univ. Georgia Press, 1965) put it, Hutcheson “accepted Locke’s epistemology as a matter of course” (p. 6).

An interesting aspect of the popular moral philosophy of Hutcheson’s day, and for a period thereafter, was a peculiar combination of theism (or of deism) and optimism that drew many adherents. This point of view—that God is good, that everything is for the best, that ours is the best of all possible worlds—has a long history: it can be found in some degree in Plato, in the Greek Stoic philosophy, and elsewhere, but it seems to have been particularly widely believed during the first half of the eighteenth century. Its popularity was due, in part, to be optimistic philosophies of Leibnitz and of Shaftesbury,

and of the powerful poetry of Alexander Pope, whose *Essay on Man* (1733-34) contains the proud claim:

“One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right.”

One gets a strong feeling of this general attitude of all things working together for good in certain parts of Hutcheson's *Essay*, especially in Section VI. “Our Mechanism,” says Hutcheson, “as far as we have ever yet discovered, is wholly contrived for good” (p. 182). But though Hutcheson was convinced of the “*Prevalence of Good in the World*,” yet he was not unaware of the presence of Evil: “The many,” he concluded, “are in a tolerable good State; but who can be unconcerned for the distressed *Few*? They are few in comparison with the whole and yet in a great *Multitude*” (p. 188). This last concern was more in keeping with the eventual outcome of this particular philosophic tangent. A great earthquake in Portugal in 1755, which killed some 15,000 persons, many of them while praying in churches, made any naive optimism clearly untenable, and the rout of this position was completed by Voltaire's classic story, *Candide*, in 1759.

Before turning to an examination of Hutcheson's work reproduced here it may be well to examine briefly the content of his first book, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. The first half of this work (treatise I) presented Hutcheson's hypothesis that the perception of beauty is invoked by objects presenting an appropriate balance of “unity amidst variability,” and the second half (treatise II) set forth his argument that individuals have an innate moral sense, and are motivated toward acts of benevolence. Now, the present work, though it followed the *Inquiry*, should not be thought of as simply an extension of that book; though this is true to some extent, the present work is best seen as an independent contribution. To a considerable degree it treats topics not covered in the *Inquiry*, and where there is overlap—as on moral issues—the present treatment reflects Hutcheson's position at a somewhat later period.

The first treatise in the present work, on the *Passions*, is primarily of psychological interest, though, like all of Hutcheson's output, it carries a strong emphasis upon the ethical concept of benevolence. Even this concept, however, is proposed as an aspect of motivation, and thus has psychological as well as moral significance. Of particular interest is Hutcheson's overall schematization of the springs of action. He first proposes a distinction between external and internal “senses” (pp. 4-7), and under the latter lists four “Classes of Per-

ceptions": "Imagination," including the perceptions of harmony, grandeur and novelty; a "Publick Sense," referring to sympathy and compassion for others; a "Moral Sense"; and a "Sense of Honour." With respect to each of these classes certain experiences lead to "Pleasant Perceptions," whereas certain other experiences are the occasion of an "uneasy Sensation." Further, Hutcheson assumes that people are motivated "to obtain for *ourselves or others* the *agreeable Sensation . . . or to prevent the uneasy Sensation*" (p. 7). This assumption leads to five "Desires," or approach motives, and five "Aversions," corresponding to the five "Classes of our Senses" (external sense plus four internal senses).

Hutcheson also proposed a distinction between "primary" and "secondary" Desires (p. 8) which, while not precisely like the contemporary distinction between primary and secondary drives, is nevertheless somewhat suggestive of it. Examples of secondary Desires are the appeals of "Wealth and Power": the universality of such secondary desires is due to the fact that they are "Means of gratifying all other Desires" (p. 8). Another division made by Hutcheson is that between the selfish and benevolent Desires (p. 13). It was a fundamental tenet of his system that the latter of these is not descended or derived from the former, and the reader will note a number of places in the book at which he comes back to this basic insistence. It is particularly important to note that, though Hutcheson accepts the reality of associative learning (p. 9), he holds that one's desire for the happiness of others is not a learned motivation, but rather is—as he puts it—a "most natural Instinct" (p. 24).

It is unnecessary to review here the rest of Hutcheson's conception of human motivation and affection, but there are several aspects of his theory that I want to point up briefly. The first of these concerns the appetites (pp. 91-94). Hutcheson notes that certain of our desires follow from feelings of pain or uneasiness, which themselves inevitably arise when certain objects are absent, quite independently of any prior experience with these objects. Examples of this class, which he calls "appetites," are hunger, thirst, and sex. The "Desire of Society, or the Company of our Fellow-creatures" (p. 91) is also included in this class. Hutcheson noted, however—and I think this is an astute and important observation—that certain other desires depend upon one's prior experience with given objects. "No Man," he writes, "is distressed for want of *fine Smells, harmonious Sounds, beautiful Objects, Wealth, Power, or Grandeur*, previously to some Opinion formed of these things as good, or some *prior Sensa-*

tion of their Pleasures" (p. 92). In other words, there are certain objects that we naturally miss, and certain others that we have to learn to miss.

Another noteworthy aspect of Hutcheson's psychology is his concern with the concepts of reward and punishment, and of success and failure. He notes that the "Sensations of *Joy* or *Sorrow*, upon the Success or Disappointment of any Pursuit—have directly the effect of *Rewards* or *Punishments*, to excite us to act with utmost Vigor" and further, "since we have some considerable *Power* over our Desires . . . we may probably, by good Conduct, obtain more frequent *Pleasures* of *Joy* upon our success, than *Pains* of *Sorrow* upon Disappointment" (p. 56). This last sentence is of particular interest, in that a topic of major interest in contemporary motivational psychology concerns the relative strengths of the motive to attain success and the motive to avoid failure (McReynolds, Paul. "The motives to attain success and to avoid failure: historical background." *Journal of Individual Psychology*, 1968, 24, 157-161).

A particularly intriguing part of the *Essay on the Passions* is that portion termed "Maxims, or natural Laws of *calm Desire*" (pp. 39-43). There are 20 such maxims, which, according to Hutcheson, "seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires arise" (p. 43): in other words, we have here an early theory of the nature of motivated behavior. The "laws" are stated in brief, axiomatic fashion and reflect an attempt at mathematical precision. Hutcheson had been interested in mathematics as a student, and in the *Inquiry* had proposed a mathematical analysis of moral behavior. The presentation of the Maxims in the *Essay*, though clearly related to that in the *Inquiry*, is more sophisticated in that a greater number of important variables are taken into account. Essentially, Hutcheson proposed that the strength of motivation to perform a given act is proportional to the "imagined *Quantity of Good*" (p. 39) ("Good" can be interpreted here in the sense of "benefit") that would result from that event (Maxim 3). In computing the amount of Good or Evil ("Evil" can be read as "discomfort") that would result from an act, it is necessary to take into account the *duration* and the *intensity* of the pleasure ("Good") that would result (Maxims 7, 8); the "*Trouble, Pain, or Danger*" that would be incurred in carrying out the act (Maxim 9); the "*Hazard*" or "*Uncertainty*" of both Good and Evil results (Maxim 10); and the delay between accomplishment of the act and the enjoyment to be obtained (Maxim 14). These suggestions, taken in their entirety, constitute a highly prescient schematiza-

tion of factors that later—in our own time—were incorporated into decision theory; the adumbration of the concept of delay of gratification (Maxim 14) is also noteworthy.

It is not clear to what extent the ideas expressed in these axioms were original with Hutcheson, and to what extent they were part of the psychological climate of ideas of the time. This question cannot be examined in detail here, but several pertinent facts may be noted briefly. It seems clear that in the period we are considering the idea of axiomatizing the factors involved in behavioral preferences—conceptualized in terms of maximizing pleasure—was very great. William Wollaston, in *The Religion of Nature Delineated* (London: S. Palmer, 1726) discussed the relation of duration and “intenseness” to the “quantity” of pleasure and pain (Sec. 2). And John Maxwell, in his translation (1727) of Richard Cumberland’s *De Legibus Naturae* (1672), under the title *A Treatise of the Laws of Nature* (London: R. Phillips) included a footnote of his own pointing out that as between two competing “Motives” the one which prevails is a function not only of the relative strengths of the two motives, but also of the “Probability” or “Chances” of each motive being accomplished (p. 257). Maxwell also quoted Wollaston at length, and refers to Hutcheson’s *Inquiry*. Then, in 1728—the same year in which Hutcheson’s *Essay* appeared, a work by Archibald Campbell (sometimes incorrectly attributed to Alexander Innes), titled *An Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue* (Westminster: B. Creake) was published. This book—which, incidentally, included in its second edition (1733) criticisms of Hutcheson’s *Inquiry*—set forth a logic for estimating the quantities of pleasures yielded by given acts, in terms of Degree, Duration, and Consequents, i.e., “the degrees of pleasure or pain in the consequent perceptions” (quoted in Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 107). Next in 1747, the author of *An Enquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections* (McReynolds, *op. cit.*, 1969; this work was published anonymously: its writer was probably James Long or John Gay), proposed an analysis of pleasure in terms of intensity and duration (pp. 192-3).

Of these several attempts at a systematic, and preferably mathematical, analysis of motivated acts, that of Hutcheson appears to have been the most sophisticated, as well as probably the earliest. Taken together the efforts represent something of a trend, not altogether unlike the attempts of Clark Hull, Kenneth Spence, and others of the present era to develop a viable mathematical formulation of motivated behaviors, though of course on a less sophisticated scale. The quan-

titative trend apparently inaugurated by Hutcheson reached its apogee in Jeremy Bentham's (*An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. New York: Hafner, 1948) so-called "hedonic calculus" (McReynolds, Paul. The motivational psychology of Jeremy Bentham. I and II. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 1968, 4, 230-44 and 349-64). This whole movement, though a failure in its attempt to develop adequate ways of assessing affect, can in a more positive sense be viewed as a forerunner of current decision theory.

Hutcheson's primary purpose in the second treatise in the present volume, *Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, was to extend and defend the system of moral philosophy that he had put forward in the *Inquiry*. William Blackstone (*op. cit.*) has recently contrasted Hutcheson's ethical theory with the views of others of his period. He points out that Hutcheson adopted an empirical-inductive approach to ethical issues, in contradistinction to certain other ethical theorists of his time, such as Richard Price, William Wollaston, and Samuel Clarke, who maintained that morality is based upon reason. Thus Hutcheson, as we have already observed, held that there is an innate disposition toward benevolent behavior, and an inherent "moral sense" which causes individuals to react with approbation to perceptions of benevolent behavior. This, according to Hutcheson, is simply the way man is constituted. Man could, however, have been constituted differently —i.e., the basis of morality is in man's actual nature rather than in some external, independent logical necessity.

The position of the rationalists differed from this in that it asserted that morality is based upon eternal and immutable reality, that it reflects necessary truths, which can be ascertained through reason, and which exist quite independently of man's psychological makeup. For the rationalists there was something inadequate and unstable about the moral sense as a basis for ethical behavior. And contrasting with both the rationalist orientation and the empiricist position of Hutcheson was the associationist approach, which conceived of moral values in terms of learned associations, and which was espoused by John Gay (*Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality*. In Selby-Bigge, L. A. *British Moralists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897, Vol. 2, Pp. 267-285) and the author of *An Enquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections* (see above). Both of these writers specifically criticized Hutcheson's moral sense theory. Only the former work was published in time for Hutcheson to have seen it, but whether he did so is not known. He

did, however, take specific issue with the position of the rationalists, as exemplified in particular by Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston: his criticisms of their positions are contained in the *Illustrations* (pp. 250-279).

Hutcheson's idea of an inherent moral sense was clearly an hypothesis about man's psychobiological makeup, as well as being an ethical theory. From Hutcheson the moral sense conception passed to Hume, and thence into the general body of psychology, where it remained a viable concept—under terms such as "moral faculty" (e.g., Dugald Stewart, *Collected Works*. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable, 1859, Vol. 6, Pp. 219-274) and "moral sentiment" (e.g., McCosh, J. *The Motive Powers*. New York: Scribners, 1890, p. 22)—until around the beginning of this century. One of the important by-products of the rather general assumption of an innate moral faculty, in the early development of psychiatry, was the postulation of specific aberrations in this faculty. This approach was seen in J. C. Prichard's (*A Treatise on Insanity and other Disorders Affecting the Mind*. Philadelphia: Haswell, Barrington & Haswell, 1837) concept of "moral insanity" and, later, in the postulation of "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" as a nosological category.

Among later thinkers who assumed some kind of inherent moral sense the most prominent was Charles Darwin (*The Descent of Man*, New York: Burt, 1874, 2nd Ed., pp. 144-165), who posited the development of a moral faculty through natural selection and its transmission through instinctive mechanisms. William James (*Principles of Psychology*, New York: Holt, Vol. 2) did not consider moral behavior instinctive, nor did he go into the problem at length, but he did reject the idea that moral principles could be explicated in terms of habits, and he suggested that "our sensibility" of them "must assuredly be a phenomenon of supernumerary order," something perhaps like "the higher musical sensibilities" (p. 673). Finally, there is an obvious, even though distant, family resemblance between Hutcheson's idea of an inherent tendency toward benevolence and Alfred Adler's (*Superiority and Social Interest*. Ed. by H. L. & Rowena R. Ansbacher. Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964) concept of an innate disposition of "social interest."

In our own time there is under way something of a renaissance of interest in the psychological basis of moral behaviors. It is interesting, therefore, to look for parallels between the views of Hutcheson and contemporary research trends. One of these is in the focus on the concept of benevolence, which is now rather widely studied

under the heading of altruistic behaviors. Hutcheson was evidently the first to realize the need for, and to seek ways of metricizing such behaviors, and while his suggestions never advanced beyond the merely programmatic stage, their importance in the lineage of current approaches (for which see, e.g., Pittel, S. M., & Mendelsohn, G. A. "Measurement of moral values: a review and critique." *Psychological Bulletin*, 1966, 66, 22-35; and Sawyer, J. "The altruism scale: a measure of cooperative, individualistic and competitive interpersonal orientation." *American Journal of Sociology*, 1966, 71, 407-416) is obvious. Among current theoretical interpretations of moral judgment, that of Jean Piaget (*The Moral Judgment of the Child*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), while in most respects different from Hutcheson's system, bears at least some resemblance to it: this is in its apparent assumption that innate factors play a significant role in the stages of development of ethical judgment. Another, more recent theory, which gives a greater role to genetic factors in the development of "ethicizing" behavior, and thus is closer to Hutcheson's position, is that of C. H. Waddington (*The Ethical Animal*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), who posits an innate capacity to acquire ethical beliefs.

Hutcheson's conceptions are also highly relevant to contemporary ethical theory (as distinguished from theories of ethical behavior). Blackstone (*op. cit.*) has recently noted several respects in which this is the case. These include, first, an apparent relationship between the positions of Hutcheson and A. J. Ayer (*Language, Truth and Logic*, London: V. Gollancz, 2nd Edit., 1946) and Charles Stevenson (*Ethics and Language*, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1944): Blackstone's view is that Hutcheson's arguments that moral judgments are largely expressions of approval or disapproval may be interpreted as a precursor of contemporary non-cognitive ethical theories. And second, Hutcheson's position that moral judgments must have adequate "justification" can be seen as related to the "good reasons" approach in ethics maintained by Stephen Toulmin (*An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950). As Blackstone further observes, Hutcheson—because of his interest in the analysis of given verbal concepts—can also be considered as a forerunner of contemporary analytic philosophy.

One of the most important topics discussed in the *Illustrations* is the distinction between what Hutcheson called "exciting Reasons" and "justifying Reasons" for given acts. The former (pp. 217-18) has to do with what nowadays would ordinarily be termed the moti-

vation for an act; it presupposes, says Hutcheson, the existence of "Instincts and Affections" (p. 218). An example of an "exciting Reason" is a man pursuing wealth in order "to purchase Pleasures" (p. 217). A "justifying Reason," on the other hand, has to do with the *grounds* that one has for carrying out an act; it presupposes, according to Hutcheson, a "Moral Sense" (p. 218). An example of a "justifying Reason" is a man hazarding his life in war on the grounds that "it tends to preserve our honest Countrymen" (p. 218). The distinction proposed here, though not as fundamental as Hutcheson supposed (Blackstone, *op. cit.*), is nevertheless important as one of the first attempts to disentangle the different conceptual orientations in terms of which behavior can be analyzed—in particular, to separate the notions of *explaining* and of *justifying* behavior, or—to put it another way, to distinguish between the motivational and ethical perspectives.

This, then, is the background of the book reproduced in the following pages. Though not a truly major work, in the sense that Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* or Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* were major, the *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions with Illustrations on the Moral Sense* was nonetheless an important and influential contribution in the early history of psychology and moral philosophy. While it has frequently been cited in works on ethics, the book has, however, been almost entirely ignored in histories of psychology. The reasons for this are, probably, that the *Essay* represents a prescientific, essentially speculative approach, and—perhaps more important—that histories of psychology have tended to focus primarily upon the fields of perception and learning, which were the first to attain solid scientific status, rather than upon motivation and affection. Another reason may be simply that the *Essay on the Passions* has not been easily available. Because of this last possibility, as well as because of the intrinsic value of the book, the present reprinting is an especially gratifying event.

I am indebted to N. S. Fiering and R. G. Harris for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Introduction.

PAUL MCREYNOLDS

University of Nevada
February, 1969

A N
E S S A Y
O N T H E
NATUR^E and CONDUCT
O F T H E
Passions and Affections.
W I T H
ILLUSTRATIONS
O N T H E
M O R A L S E N S E.

The THIRD EDITION, with ADDITIONS.

*Hoc opus, hoc studium, parvi properemus, & ampli,
Si Patriæ volumus, si Nobis vivere cibari. Hor.*

L O N D O N:

Printed for A. WARD, J. and P. KNAPTON,
T. LONGMAN, S. BIRT, C. HITCH, L. GILLIVER,
T. ASTLEY, S. AUSTEN, and J. RIVINGTON.
MDCCXLII.

T H E
P R E F A C E.

ALTHO' the main *practical Principles*, which are inculcated in this Treatise, have this Prejudice in their Favour, that they have been taught and propagated by the best of Men in all Ages, yet there is reason to fear that renewed Treatises upon Subjects so often well managed, may be looked upon as *superfluous*; especially since little is offered upon them which has not often been well said before. But beside that general Consideration, that old Arguments may sometimes be set in such a Light by one, as will convince those who were not

moved by them, even when better expressed by another; since, for every Class of *Writers*, there are Classes of *Readers* adapted, who cannot relish any thing higher: Besides this, I say, the very *Novelty* of a Book may procure a little Attention, from those who over look the Writings which the World has long enjoyed. And if by *Curiosity*, or any other means, some few can be engaged to turn their Thoughts to these important Subjects, about which a little *Reflection* will discover the Truth, and a thorough *Consideration* of it may occasion a great Increase of real Happiness; no Person need be ashamed of his Labours as useleſs, which do ſuch Service to any of his Fellow-Creatures.

IF any ſhould look upon ſome Things in this *Inquiry into the Passions*, as too ſubtile for common Apprehension, and conſequently not neceſſary

necessary for the Instruction of Men in *Morals*, which are the common business of Mankind : Let them consider, that the Difficulty on these Subjects arises chiefly from some *previous Notions*, equally difficult at least, which have been already received, to the great Detriment of many a *Natural Temper*; since many have been discouraged from all Attempts of cultivating *kind generous Affections* in themselves, by a previous Notion that there are no such Affections in Nature, and that all Pretence to them was only *Dissimulation, Affectation*, or at best some *unnatural Enthusiasm*. And farther, that to discover Truth on these Subjects, nothing more is necessary than a little *Attention to what passes in our own Hearts*, and consequently every Man may come to Certainty in these Points, without much Art or Knowledge of other Matters.

W H A T E V E R Confusion the Schoolmen introduced into Philosophy, some of their keenest *Adversaries* seem to threaten it with a worse kind of Confusion, by attempting to take away some of the most immediate simple Perceptions, and to explain all *Approbation, Condemnation, Pleasure and Pain*, by some intricate Relations to the Perceptions of the *External Senses*. In like manner they have treated our *Desires* or *Affections*, making the most generous, kind and disinterested of them, to proceed from *Self-Love*, by some subtle Trains of Reasoning, to which honest Hearts are often wholly Strangers.

L E T this also still be remembred, that the *natural Dispositions* of Mankind may operate regularly in those who never reflected upon them, nor formed just Notions about them.

Many

Many are really *virtuous* who cannot explain what *Virtue* is. Some act a most generous disinterested Part in Life, who have been taught to account for all their Actions by *Self-Love*, as their sole Spring. There have been very different and opposite Opinions in *Opticks*, contrary Accounts have been given of *Hearing*, *voluntary Motion*, *Digestion*, and other *natural Actions*. But the Powers themselves in reality perform their several Operations with sufficient Constancy and Uniformity, in Persons of good Health, whatever their Opinions be about them. In the same manner our *moral Actions* and *Affections* may be in good order, when our Opinions are quite wrong about them. *True Opinions* however, about both, may enable us to *improve* our natural Powers, and to *rectify* accidental Disorders incident unto them. And true Speculations on these Subjects must cer-

tainly be attended with as much *Pleasure* as any other Parts of Human Knowledge.

IT may perhaps seem strange, that when in this *Treatise* Virtue is supposed *disinterested*; yet so much Pains is taken, by a *Comparison* of our several *Pleasures*, to prove the *Pleasures of Virtue* to be the greatest we are capable of, and that consequently it is our truest *Interest* to be *virtuous*. But let it be remembered here, that though there can be no *Motives* or *Arguments* suggested which can directly raise any *ultimate Desire*, such as that of our own *Happiness*, or *publick Affections* (as we attempt to prove in *Treatise IV*;) yet if both are *natural Dispositions* of our Minds, and nothing can stop the Operation of *publick Affections* but some *selfish Interest*, the only way to give *publick Affections* their full Force, and to make them prevalent

valent in our Lives, must be to remove these *Opinions of opposite Interests*, and to shew a superior Interest on their side. If these Considerations be just and sufficiently attended to, a *natural Disposition* can scarce fail to exert itself to the full.

IN this *Essay on the Passions*, the Proofs and Illustrations of this Point, that we have a *moral Sense*, and a Sense of Honour, by which we discern an immediate Good in Virtue and Honour, not referred to any further Enjoyment, are not much insisted on since they are already laid down in the *Inquiry into Moral Good and Evil*, in the first and fifth Sections. Would Men reflect upon what they feel in themselves, all Proofs in such Matters would be needless.

SOME strange Love of *Simplicity*
in the Structure of human Nature,
or

The P R E F A C E.

or Attachment to some favourite *Hypothesis*, has engaged many *Writers* to pass over a great many *simple Perceptions*, which we may find in ourselves. We have got the Number *Five* fixed for our *external Senses*, though a larger Number might perhaps as easily be defended. We have Multitudes of Perceptions which have no relation to any *external Sensation*; if by it we mean *Perceptions immediately occasioned by Motions or Impressions made on our Bodies*, such as the Ideas of *Number*, *Duration*, *Proportion*, *Virtue*, *Vice*, *Pleasures of Honour*, *of Congratulation*; the *Pains of Remorse*, *Shame*, *Sympathy*, and many others. It were to be wished, that those who are at such Pains to prove a beloved Maxim, that “all Ideas arise from *Sensation and Reflection*,” had so explained themselves, that none should take their Meaning to be, that all our Ideas are either *external Sensations*,

tions, or *reflex Acts* upon *external Sensations*: Or if by *Reflection* they mean an *inward Power of Perception*, as Mr. *Locke* declares expressly, calling it *internal Sensation*, that they had as carefully examined into the several kinds of *internal Perceptions*, as they have done into the *external Sensations*: that we might have seen whether the former be not as *natural* and *necessary* and *ultimate*, without reference to any other, as the latter. Had they in like manner considered our *Affections* without a previous Notion, that they were all from *Self-Love*, they might have felt an *ultimate Desire* of the Happiness of others as easily conceivable, and as certainly implanted in the human Breast, though perhaps not so strong as *Self-Love*.

THE Author hopes this imperfect *Essay* will be favourably received, till some Person of greater Abilities and

and Leisure apply himself to a more strict Philosophical Inquiry into the various *natural Principles* or *natural Dispositions* of Mankind ; from which perhaps a more exact Theory of Morals may be formed, than any which has yet appeared : and hopes that this Attempt, to shew the fair side of the human Temper, may be of some little use towards this great End.

THE Author takes nothing in bad part from any of his Adversaries, except that Outcry which one or two of them made against these Principles as opposite to *Christianity*, though it be so well known that they have been and are espoused by many of the most zealous Christians. There are Answers interspersed in the later Editions to these Objections, to avoid the disagreeable Work of *Replying* or *Remarking*, in which one is not generally upon his Guard suffi-

sufficiently to avoid Cavils and offensive Expressions.

THE last Treatise had never seen the Light, had not some worthy *Gentlemen* mistaken some things about the moral Sense alledged to be in Mankind: Their Objections gave Opportunity of farther Inquiry into the several *Schemes* of accounting for our *moral Ideas*, which some apprehend to be wholly different from, and independent on, that *Sense* which the Author attempts to establish in *Treat. IV.* The following Papers attempt to shew, that all these *Schemes* must necessarily pre-suppose this *moral Sense*, and be resolved into it: Nor does the Author endeavour to over-turn them, or represent them as unnecessary Superstructures upon the Foundation of a moral Sense; though what he has suggested will probably shew a considerable Confusion in some of the Terms
much

much used on these Subjects. One may easily see from the great *variety of Terms*, and diversity of *Schemes* invented, that all Men *feel* something in their own Hearts recommending Virtue, which yet it is difficult to explain. This Difficulty probably arises from our previous Notions of a small Number of *Senses*, so that we are unwilling to have recourse in our Theories to any more; and rather strain out some Explication of moral Ideas, with relation to some of the natural Powers of Perception universally acknowledged. The like difficulty attends several other *Perceptions*, to the Reception of which Philosophers have not generally assigned their *distinct Senses*; such as *natural Beauty*, *Harmony*, the Perfection of *Poetry*, *Architecture*, *Designing*, and such like Affairs of Genius, Taste, or Fancy: The Explications or Theories on these Subjects are

are in like manner full of Confusion
and Metaphor.

To define *Virtue* by agreeableness to this moral Sense, or describing it to be kind Affection, may appear perhaps too uncertain ; considering that the Sense of particular Persons is often depraved by Custom, Habits, false Opinions, Company : and that some particular kind Passions toward some Persons are really pernicious, and attended with very unkind Affections toward others, or at least with a Neglect of their Interests. We must therefore only assert in general, that “ every one calls that “ Temper, or those Actions virtuous, which are approved by his “ own Sense ;” and withal, that “ abstracting from particular Habits “ or Prejudices, that Temper which “ desires, and those Actions which “ are intended to procure the greatest Moment of Good toward the “ most

“ most extensive System to which
“ our Power can reach, is approved
“ as the highest Virtue; and that the
“ *universal calm Good-will or Bene-*
“ *volence*, where it is the leading Af-
“ fection of the Soul, so as to limit
“ or restrain all other Affections,
“ Appetites, or Passions, is the Tem-
“ per which we esteem in the high-
“ est Degree, according to the na-
“ tural Constitution of our Soul:
“ And withal, that we in a lower
“ Degree approve every particular
“ kind *Affection or Passion*, which is
“ not inconsistent with these higher
“ and nobler Dispositions.”

OUR *moral Sense* shews this calm
extensive Affection to be the highest
Perfection of our Nature; what we
may see to be the *End or Design* of
such a Structure, and consequently
what is required of us by the Author
of our Nature: and therefore if any
one like these Descriptions better, he
may

may call Virtue, with many of the Antients, " *Vita secundum naturam*; " or " acting according to " what we may see from the Constitution of our Nature, we were intended for by our Creator."

If this *Moral Sense* were once set in a convincing Light, those vain Shadows of Objections against a virtuous Life, in which some are wonderfully delighted, would soon vanish: alledging, that whatever we admire or honour in a *moral Species*, is the effect of *Art, Education, Custom, Policy*, or subtle Views of Interest; we should then acknowledge

*Quid sumus, & quidnam victuri
gignimur.* Pers.

It is true, a *Power of Reasoning* is natural to us; and we must own, that all Arts and Sciences which are well founded, and tend to direct our

Actions, if not to be called *Natural*, yet are an *Improvement upon our Nature*: but if Virtue be looked upon as wholly Artificial, there are I know not what Suspicions against it; as if indeed it might tend to the Interest of *large Bodies* or *Societies* of Men, or to that of their *Governors*; while yet one may better find his *private Interest*, or enjoy greater Pleasures in the Practices counted *vicious*, especially if he has any Probability of *Secrecy* in them. These Suspicions must be entirely removed, if we have a *moral Sense* and *publick Affections*, whose Gratifications are constituted by Nature, our most intense and durable *Pleasures*.

GENTLEMEN, who have opposed some other Sentiments of the Author of the *Inquiry*, seem convinced of a *moral Sense*. Some of them have by a Mistake made a Compliment to the Author, which does not belong

belong to him ; as if the World were any way indebted to him for this Discovery. He has too often met with the *Sensus Decoris & Honesti*, and with the φιλάθρων καὶ αγαθοῖς, to assume any such thing to himself.

SOME Letters in the *London Journals* in 1728, subscribed *Philaretus*, gave the first Occasion to the *Fourth Treatise*; the Answers given to them in those weekly Papers bore too visible Marks of the Hurry in which they were wrote, and therefore the Author declined to continue the Debate that way; chusing to send a private Letter to *Philaretus*, to desire a more private Correspondence on the Subject of our Debate. He was soon after informed, that his Death disappointed the Author's great Expectations from so ingenious a Correspondent. The *Objections* proposed in the first *Section of Treatise*

tise IV, are not always those of *Pbilaretus*, though the Author endeavoured to leave no Objections of his unanswered ; but he also interspersed whatever Objections occurred in Conversation on these Subjects ; and has not used any Expressions inconsistent with the high Regard he has for the Memory of so ingenious a Gentleman, and of such Distinction in the World.

IN the References, at bottom of Pages, the Inquiry into *Beauty* is called *Treatise I*. That into the Ideas of moral Good and Evil, is *Treatise II*. The Essay on the Passions, *Treatise III*. And the Illustrations on the moral Sense, *Treatise IV*.

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E S S A Y
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S E C T. I.

*A general Account of our several
 SENSES and DESIRES, Selfish
 or Publick.*

THE Nature of human Actions SECT.
 cannot be sufficiently understood I.
 without considering the *Affections* 
 and *Passions*; or those *Modifica-*
tions, or *Actions of the Mind* consequent upon
the Apprehension of certain Objects or Events,
in which the Mind generally conceives Good or
Evil. In this Inquiry we need little *Reason-*
ing, or *Argument*, since Certainty is only
 B attainable

SECT. attainable by distinct *Attention* to what we
I. are *conscious* happens in our Minds.



*Art. I. "OBJECTS, Actions, or Events
" obtain the Name of Good, or Evil, ac-
" cording as they are the Causes, or Occa-
" sions, mediately, or immediately, of a
" grateful, or ungrateful Perception to some
" sensitive Nature."* To understand therefore
the several Kinds of *Good*, or *Evil*, we must
apprehend the several Powers of Perception
or *Senses* natural to us.

It is by some Power of Perception, or *Sense*, that we first receive the Ideas of these Objects we are conversant with, or by some *Reasoning* upon these perceived Objects of Sense. By Sensation we not only receive the *Image* or *Representation*, but some Feelings of *Pleasure* or *Pain*; nay sometimes the sole Perception is that of Pleasure or Pain, as in *Smells*, and the Feelings of *Hunger* and *Thirst*. The Pleasures or Pains perceived, are sometimes *simple*, without any other previous Idea, or any Image, or other concomitant Ideas, save those of *Duration* or *Time*, which accompanies every Perception, whether of *Sense*, or *inward Consciousness*. Other Pleasures arise only upon some *previous Idea*, or *Image*, or *Assemblage*, or *Comparison* of *Ideas*. These Pleasures presupposing previous Ideas, were called *Perceptions of an internal*

ternal Sense, in a former Treatise *. Thus S E C T. *Regularity* and *Uniformity* in Figures, are no less grateful than *Tastes*, or *Smells*; the *Har-*  *mony* of Notes, is more grateful than simple Sounds †. In like manner, *Affections*, *Tem-*
pers,

* INQUIRY into BEAUTY.

† It is not easy to divide distinctly our several *Sensations* into Classes. The Division of our *External Senses* into the five common Classes, seems very imperfect. Some *Sensations*, received without any previous Idea, can either be reduced to none of them, such as the *Sensations of Hunger, Thirst, Weariness, Sickness*; or if we reduce them to the *Sense of Feeling*, they are *Perceptions* as different from the other *Ideas of Touch*, such as *Cold, Heat, Hardness, Softness*, as the *Ideas of Taste or Smell*. Others have hinted at an *External Sense* different from all of these. The following general Account may possibly be useful. (1.) That certain Motions raised in our Bodies are by a *general Law* constituted the Occasion of *Perceptions* in the Mind. (2.) These *Perceptions* never come entirely alone, but have some other *Perception* joined with them. Thus every *Sensation* is accompanied with the *Idea of Duration*, and yet *Duration* is not a sensible *Idea*, since it also accompanies *Ideas of Internal Consciousness*, or *Reflection*: So the *Idea of Number* may accompany any sensible Ideas, and yet may also accompany any other Ideas, as well as external *Sensations*. Brutes, when several Objects are before them, have probably all the proper *Ideas of Sight* which we have, without the *Idea of Number*. (3.) Some *Ideas* are found accompanying the most different *Sensations*, which yet are not to be perceived separately from some *sensible Quality*; such are *Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest*, which accompany the *Ideas of Sight*, or *Colours*, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the *Ideas of Touch*, at least if we move our Organs along the Parts of the Body touched. *Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest* seem therefore to be more properly called *Ideas accompanying the Sensations of Sight and Touch*, than the *Sensations of either of these Senses*; since they can be received sometimes without the *Ideas of Colour*, and sometimes without those of *Touching*, though never without the one or the other. The *Perceptions* which are purely sensible, received each by its proper *Sense*, are *Tastes, Smells, Colours, Sound, Cold, Heats, &c.* The universal Concomitant *Idea*:

S E C T. pers, *Sentiments*, or *Actions*, reflected upon
 I. in ourselves, or observed in others, are the
 constant Occasions of agreeable or disagreeable
 Perceptions, which we call *Approbation*, or
Dislike. These *Moral Perceptions* arise in us
 as necessarily as any other Sensations; nor can
 we alter, or stop them, while our *previous*
Opinion or *Apprehension* of the *Affection*,
Temper, or *Intention* of the *Agent* continues
 the same; any more than we can make the
 Taste of Wormwood sweet, or that of Honey bitter.

If we may call “ *every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain, A SENSE;* ” we shall find many other *Senses* beside those commonly explained. Though it is not easy to assign accurate Divisions on such Subjects, yet we may reduce them to the following Classes, leaving it to others to arrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will

which may attend any *Idea* whatsoever, are *Duration*, and *Number*. The *Ideas* which accompany the most different Sensations, are *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, *Rest*. These all arise without any previous *Ideas* assembled, or compared: the Concomitant *Ideas* are reputed Images of something External.

From all these we may justly distinguish “ those Pleasures perceived upon the previous Reception and Comparison of various sensible Perceptions, with their concomitant Ideas, or intellectual Ideas, when we find Uniformity, or Resemblance among them.” These are meant by *the Perceptions of the internal Sense*.

shew

shew that there are such *Natural Powers* in S E C T. the human Mind, in whatever Order we I. place them. In the 1st Class are the External Sensés, universally known. In the 2d, the Pleasant Perceptions, arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects; as also, from Grandeur and Novelty. These we may call, after Mr. ADDISON the Pleasures of the Imagination; or we may call the Power of receiving them an Internal Sense. Whoever dislikes this Name may substitute another.

3. The next Class of Perceptions we may call a Publick Sense, viz. "our Determination to be pleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their Misery." This is found in some degree in all Men, and was sometimes called Κοινωνικός, or *Sensus Communis* by some of the Antients. This inward Pain of Compassion cannot be called a Sensation of Sight. It solely arises from an Opinion of Misery felt by another, and not immediately from a visible Form. The same Form presented to the Eye by the exactest Painting, or the Action of a Player, gives no Pain to those who remember that there is no Misery felt. When Men by Imagination conceive real Pain felt by an Actor, without recollecting that it is merely feigned, or when they think of the real Story represented, then, as there is a confused Opinion of real Misery, there is also Pain in Compassion.

4. The fourth Class we may call the Moral Sense,

S E C T. *Sense*, by which “ we perceive *Virtue* or I. “ *Vice*, in ourselves, or others.” This is plainly distinct from the former Class of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon *Virtue* or *Vice*, in themselves, or others, as an Object: as we may find in *Natural Affection*, *Compassion*, *Friendship*, or even general *Benevolence* to Mankind, which connect our Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own Virtue. 5. The fifth Class is a *Sense of Honour*, which makes the *Approbation*, or *Gratitude* of others, for any good Actions we have done, the necessary occasion of pleasure; and their *Dislike*, *Condemnation*, or *Resentment* of Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called *Shame*, even when we fear no further evil from them.

THERE are perhaps other *Perceptions* distinct from all these Classes, such as some Ideas “ of *Decency*, *Dignity*, *Suitableness* to “ *human Nature* in certain Actions and Circumstances; and of an *Indecency*, *Meanness*, and *Unworthiness*, in the contrary Actions or Circumstances, even without “ any conception of *Moral Good*, or *Evil*.” Thus the Pleasures of *Sight*, and *Hearing*, are more esteemed than those of *Taste* or *Touch*:

Touch: The Pursuits of the Pleasures of S E C T. the *Imagination*, are more approved than I. those of simple external Sensations. *Plato* makes one of his Dialogists * account for this difference from a constant opinion of *Innocence* in this sort of Pleasures, which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Sense. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any such Reflection upon their *Innocence*, but that there is a different sort of Perceptions in these cases, to be reckoned another *Class of Sensations*.

II. DESIRES arise in our Mind, from the *A like Division of our Desires.* Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for *ourselves* or *others* the *agreeable Sensation*, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the *uneasy Sensation*, when it is evil. Our original Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses. I. The Desire of *sensual Pleasure*, (by which we mean that of the external Senses, of Taste and Touch chiefly); and Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the *Pleasures of Imagination* or Internal Sense †, and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the Pleasures arising from *Publick Happiness*, and Aversion to the Pains arising

* Hippias Major. See also Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 7.

† See Treat. I.

S E C T. from the *Misery of others.* 4. Desires of *Virtue, and Aversion to Vice,* according to ~~the~~ the Notions we have of the Tendency of Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of *Honour, and Aversion to Shame* *.

Secondary Desires of Memory, Observation, and Reasoning about Wealth and Power. AND since we are capable of *Reflection,* there must arise, in consequence of our *original Desires,* "secondary Desires of every " thing imagined useful to gratify any of " the primary Desires, and that with strength " proportioned to the several original De- " sires, and the imagined Usefulness, or " Necessity, of the advantageous Object." Thus as soon as we come to apprehend the Use of *Wealth* or *Power* to gratify any of our original Desires, we must also desire them. Hence arises the *Universality* of these Desires of Wealth and Power since they are the Means of gratifying all other Desires. " How foolish then is the Inference, some " would make, from the universal Preva- " lence of these Desires, that human Nature " is wholly selfish, or that each one is only " studious of his own *Advantage*; since " Wealth or Power are as naturally fit to

* See *Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 3—8.*

" gratify

" gratify our *Publick Desires*, or to serve **S E C T.**
" *virtuous Purposes*, as the *selfish ones?*" I.



" How weak also are the Reasonings of
" some recluse Moralists, who condemn in
" general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power,
" as below a perfectly virtuous Character :"
since Wealth and Power are the most effe-
ctual *Means*, and the most powerful *Instru-
ments*, even of the greatest Virtues, and most
generous Actions? The Pursuit of them is
laudable, when the *Intention* is virtuous; and
the Neglect of them, when honourable Op-
portunities offer, is really a Weakness. This
justifies the Poet's Sentiments :

*Hic onus borret,
Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpore majus :
Hic subit & perfert : aut virtus nomen inane est,
Aut Decus & Preium recte petit experiens Vir.*

HOR. Epist. XVII.

FURTHER, the *Laws* or *Customs* of a
Country, the *Humour* of our Company may
have made strange *Associations* of *Ideas*, so
that some Objects, which of themselves are
indifferent to any Sense, yet by reason of
some *additional* grateful *Idea*, may become
very desireable; or by like *Addition* of an
ungrateful *Idea* may raise the strongest Aver-
sion. Thus many a Trifle, when once it is
made a *Badge* of *Honour*, an Evidence of
some generous *Disposition*, a Monument of
some

S E C T. some great *Action*, may be impatiently pursued, from our Desire of Honour. When ~~any~~ any *Circumstance, Dress, State, Posture*, is constituted as a Mark of *Infamy*, it may become in like manner the Object of Aversion, though in itself most inoffensive to our Senses. If a certain way of *Living*, of receiving *Company*, of shewing *Courtesy*, is once received among those who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of all this, may be made uneasy at their Condition, though much freer from Trouble than that of higher Stations. Thus *Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour, and Diversions* are made Matters of considerable Importance by additional *Ideas* *. Nor is it in vain that the wisest and greatest Men regard these things; for however it may concern them to break such Associations in their own Minds, yet, since the bulk of Mankind will retain them, they must comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent, as they expect the *publick Esteem*, which is generally necessary to enable Men to serve the Publick.

The Use of these Assocations SHOULD any one be surprized at this *Disposition* in our Nature to associate any *Ideas* together for the future, which once presented themselves jointly, considering what

* See *Treat. I. Sect. 1. Art. 7.* and *Treat. II. Sect. 6. Art. 6.*
great

great *Evils*, and how much *Corruption of Sect.* Affections is owing to it, it may help to account for this Part of our Constitution, to ~~the~~ consider, "that all our *Language* and much "of our *Memory* depends upon it:" So that were there no such *Associations* made, we must lose the use of *Words*, and a great part of our Power of *recollecting past Events*; beside many other valuable *Powers* and *Arts* which depend upon them. Let it also be considered that it is much in our power by a vigorous *Attention* either to prevent *these Associations*, or by *Abstraction* to separate Ideas when it may be useful for us to do so.

CONCERNING our Pursuit of *Honour*, it is to be observed, that "since our Minds are "incapable of retaining a great Diversity of "Objects, the *Novelty*, or *Singularity* of any "Object is enough to raise a particular At- "tention to it among many of equal Me- "rit:" And therefore were *Virtue universal* among Men, yet, it is probable, the *Atten-
tion* of Observers would be turned chiefly toward those who distinguished themselves by some *singular Ability*, or by some Circum-
stance, which, however trifling in its own Nature, yet had some honourable Ideas com-
monly joined to it, such as those of *Magni-
ficence*, *Generosity*, or the like. We should perhaps, when we considered sedately the common

S E C T. common Virtues of others, equally love and

I. esteem them *: And yet probably our *Attention* would be generally fixed to those who thus were distinguished from the Multitude. Hence our natural Love of Honour, raises in us an *Emulation* or desire of *Eminence*, either by higher Degrees of Virtue ; or, if we cannot easily or probably obtain it this way, we attempt it in an easier manner, by any Circumstance, which, through a *Confusion of Ideas*, is reputed honourable.

THIS Desire of *Distinction* has great Influence on the Pleasures and Pains of Mankind, and makes them chuse things for their very *Rarity*, *Difficulty*, or *Expence*; by a confused Imagination that they evidence *Generosity*, *Ability*, or a *finer Taste* than ordinary ; nay, often the merest Trifles are by these means ardently pursued. A *Form of Dress*, a *foreign Dish*, a *Title*, a *Place*, a *Jewel*; an *useless Problem*, a *Criticism on an obsolete Word*, the *Origin of a Poetic Fable*, the *Situation of a razed Town*, may employ many an Hour in tedious Labour :

*Sic leve, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum
Subruit aut reficit.* ————— H O R.

* See *Treat. II. Sect. 3.* last Parag.

Art. III. THERE is another Division of SECT. our Desires taken from the Persons for whose Advantage we pursue or shun any Object. *I.*

“ The Desires in which one intends or pur- *Desires,*
“ sues what he apprehends advantageous to *selfish and*
“ himself, we may call SELFISH; and those *publick.*
“ in which we pursue what we apprehend
“ advantageous to others, and do not appre-
“ hend advantageous to *ourselves*, or do not
“ pursue with this view, we may call Pub-
“ lic or BENEVOLENT Desires.” If there
be a just Foundation for this Division, it is
more extensive than the former Division,
since each of the former Classes may come
under either Member of this Division, acc-
cording as we are desiring any of the five
sorts of Pleasures *for ourselves*, or desiring
them *for others*. The former Division may
therefore be conceived as a Subdivision of the
latter.

THIS Division has been disputed since Epicurus; who with his old Followers, and some of late, who detest other parts of his Scheme, maintain, “ that all our Desires are *selfish*: or, that every one intends or designs ultimately, in each Action, is the obtaining Pleasure to himself, or the avoiding his own *Private Pain.*” *

* See Cicero *de Finib. lib. 1.*

S E C T. IT requires a good deal of Subtilty to defend this Scheme, so seemingly opposite to ~~the~~ *Natural Affection, Friendship, Love of a Country, or Community*, which many find very strong in their Breasts. The Defences and Schemes commonly offered, can scarce free the Sustainers of this Cause from manifest Absurdity and *Affectation*. But some do * acknowledge a *publick Sense* in many Instances; especially in *natural Affection*, and *Compassion*; by which “ the Observation of “ the Happiness of others is made the ne-“ cessary Occasion of Pleasure, and their “ Misery the Occasion of Pain to the Ob-“ server.” That this *Sympathy* with others is the Effect of the Constitution of our Nature, and not brought upon ourselves by any Choice, with view to any *selfish Advantage*, they must own: whatever Advantage there may be in Sympathy with the *Fortunate*, none can be alledged in Sympathy with the *Distressed*: And every one feels that this *publick Sense* will not leave his Heart, upon a change of the Fortunes of his Child or Friend; nor does it depend upon a Man’s *Choice*, whether he will be affected with their Fortunes or not. But supposing this *publick Sense*, they insist, “ That by means

* See Mr. Clark of Hull, his *Remarks on Treat. II.* in his *Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice*.

" of it there is a *Conjunction of Interest*: the S E C T.
" Happiness of others becomes the Means of I.
" private Pleasure to the Observer; and for ~~the~~
" this Reason, or with a View to this private
" Pleasure, he desires the Happiness of ano-
" ther." Others deduce our Desire of the
Happiness of others from Self-love, in a less
specious manner.

IF a *publick Sense* be acknowledged in Men, by which the Happiness of one is made to depend upon that of others, independently of his Choice, this is indeed a strong Evidence of the Goodness of the AUTHOR of our Nature. But whether this Scheme does truly account for our *Love of others*, or for *generous Offices*, may be determined from the following Considerations; which being matters of *internal Consciousness*, every one can best satisfy himself by Attention, concerning their Truth and Certainty.

LET it be premised, that there is a certain *Pain* or *Uneasiness* accompanying most of our violent Desires. Though the Object pursued be Good, or the Means of Pleasure, yet the Desire of it generally is attended with an uneasy Sensation. When an Object or Event appears Evil, we desire to shun or prevent it. This Desire is also attended with uneasy Sensation of *Impatience*: Now this Sensation imme-

S E C T. immediately connected with the Desire, is a
 I. distinct Sensation from those which we dread,
 and endeavour to shun. It is plain then,

I. " THAT no Desire of any Event is
 " excited by any view of removing the *un-*
 " *easy Sensation attending this Desire itself.*"
 Uneasy Sensations previously felt, will raise a
 Desire of whatever will remove them; and
 this Desire may have its concomitant Uneasiness.
 Pleasant Sensations expected from any
 Object may raise our Desire of it; this De-
 sire too may have its concomitant uneasy
 Sensations: But the *uneasy Sensation, accompa-*
nnying and connected with the Desire itself,
 cannot be a Motive to that *Desire* which
 it presupposes. The *Sensation* accompan-
 ying Desire is generally *uneasy*, and conse-
 quently our Desire is never raised with a view
 to obtain or continue it; nor is the Desire
 raised with a view to *remove* this *uneasy Sen-*
sation, for the Desire is raised previously to
 it. This holds concerning all *Desire* publick
 or private.

THERE is also a peculiar pleasant *Sensa-*
tion of Joy, attending the *Gratification* of any
 Desire, beside the *Sensation* received from the
Object itself, which we directly intended.
 " But Desire does never arise from a View of
 " obtaining that *Sensation of Joy*, connected
 " with the Success or Gratification of Desire;
 " other-

“ otherwise the strongest Desires might arise S E C T. I.
 “ toward any Trifle, or an Event in all re-
 “ spect indifferent: Since, if Desire arose ~~very~~
 “ from *this View*, the stronger the Desire
 “ were, the higher would be the *Pleasure of*
 “ *Gratification*; and therefore we might de-
 “ sire the turning of a Straw as violently as
 “ we do *Wealth or Power.*” This Expecta-
 “ tion of that *Pleasure* which merely arises from
 “ gratifying of *Desire*, would equally excite us
 to desire the *Misery* of others as their Happi-
 ness; since this *Pleasure of Gratification*
 might be obtained from both Events alike.

2. It is certain that “ *that Desire of the*
 “ *Happiness of others* which we account
 “ *virtuous*, is not *directly* excited by prospects
 “ *of any secular Advantage, Wealth, Pow-*
 “ *er, Pleasure of the external Senses, Re-*
 “ *ward from the Deity, or future Pleasures*
 “ *of Self-Approval.*” To prove this let
 us consider, “ That no Desire of any Event
 “ can arise immediately or directly from an
 “ *Opinion* in the Agent, that his *having such*
 “ *a Desire* will be the Means of private
 “ *Good.*” This *Opinion* would make us
wish or *desire* to have that *advantageous Desire* or *Affection*; and would incline us *to use*
any means in our power to raise that *Affection*: but no *Affection* or *Desire* is raised in
 us, directly by our *volition* or *desiring* it.
 That alone which raises in us from *Self-Love*

S E C T. the Desire of any Event, is an *Opinion* that

I. *that Event is the Means of private Good.*

~~~ As soon as we form this Opinion, a Desire of the Event immediately arises: But if *having the Desire, or the mere Affection, be imagined the Means of private Good, and not the Existence of the Event desired*, then from *Self-Love* we should only desire or wish to have the *Desire* of that Event, and should not desire the *Event itself*, since the *Event* is not conceived as the *Means of Good*.

For instance, suppose God revealed to us that he would confer Happiness on us, if our *Country were happy*; then from Self-Love we should have immediately the subordinate *Desire* of our Country's Happiness, as the *Means of our own*. But were we assured that, whether our Country were happy or not, it should not affect our future Happiness; but that we should be rewarded, provided we *desired the Happiness of our Country*; our Self-Love could never make us now desire the *Happiness of our Country*, since it is not now conceived as the *Means of our future Happiness*, but is perfectly indifferent to it. The *Means of our Happiness* is the *having a Desire of our Country's Happiness*; we should therefore from Self-Love only *wish to have this Desire*.

IT is true indeed in fact, that, because *S E C T.* *Benevolence* is natural to us, a little Attention to other Natures will raise in us good-will towards them, whenever by any Opinions we are persuaded that there is no real *Opposition of Interest*. But had we no Affection distinct from *Self-Love*, nothing could raise our *Desire of the Happiness of others*, but conceiving their Happiness as the Means of ours. An Opinion that our having *kind Affections* would be the Means of our private Happiness, would only make us desire to have those Affections. Now that Affections do not arise upon our *wishing* to have them, or our volition of raising them; as conceiving the *Affections themselves* to be the *Means* of private Good; is plain from this, that if they did thus arise, then a *Bribe* might raise any Desire toward any Event, or any *Affection* toward the most improper Object. We might be hired to *love* or *hate* any sort of Persons, to be *angry*, *jealous*, or *compassionate*, as we can be engaged into external Actions; which we all see to be absurd. Now those who alledge, that our Benevolence may arise from prospect of *secular Advantage*, *Honour*, *Self-Approbation*, or *future Rewards*, must own, that the two former are Motives only to *external Actions*; and the other two only shew that *having the Desire of the Happiness of others*, would be the *Means* of private Good;

**S E C T.** while the *Event* desired, *viz.* the Happiness

I. of others, is not supposed the *Means* of any  
 private Good. But the best Defenders of  
 this part of the Scheme of *Epicurus*, ac-  
 knowledge that “ Desires are not raised by  
 “ *Volition.*”

*This Di-  
stinction  
defended.*

3. “ THERE are in Men *Desires of the*  
 “ *Happiness of others*, when they do not  
 “ conceive this *Happiness* as the *Means* of  
 “ obtaining any sort of Happiness to them-  
 “ selves.” *Self-Approval*, or *Rewards*  
 from the *DEITY*, might be the *Ends*, for  
 obtaining which we might possibly *desire* or  
*will* from Self-Love, to raise in ourselves  
*kind Affections*; but we could not from *Self-*  
*Love* desire the *Happiness of others*, except  
 we imagined their Happiness to be the *Means*  
 of our own. Now it is certain that some-  
 times we may have this *subordinate Desire* of  
 the Happiness of others, conceived as the  
*Means* of our own; as suppose one had laid  
 a *Wager* upon the Happiness of a Person of  
 such Veracity, that he would own sincerely  
 whether he were happy or not; when Men  
 are *Partners in Stock*, and share in Profit or  
 Loss; when one hopes to *succeed to*, or some  
 way to *share in* the Prosperity of another;  
 or if the *DEITY* had given such Threat-  
 nings, as they tell us *Telamon* gave his Sons  
 when they went to War, that he would re-  
 ward or punish one according as others were  
 happy

happy or miserable: In such Cases one might S E C T. have this subordinate *Desire* of another's Hap- I. pineſs from Self-Love. But as we are ſure the D E I T Y has not given ſuch Comminati- ons, ſo we often are conſcious of the *Desire of the Happiness of others*, without any ſuch Conception of it as the *Means* of our own; and are ſenſible that this subordinate *Desire* is not that virtuous Affection which we approve. The virtuous Benevolence muſt be an ultimate *Desire*, which would ſubſift without view to private Good. Such ultimate publick *Desires* we often feel, without any subordinate *Desire* of the ſame Event, as the *Means* of private Good. The subordinate may ſometimes, nay often does concur with the ultimate; and then indeed the whole Moment of these conſpiring *Desires* may be greater than that of either alone: But the subordinate alone is not that Affection which we approve as virtuous.

*Art. IV. This will clear our Way to answer the chief Difficulty: " May not our Benevolence be at least a Desire of the Happiness of others, as the Means of obtaining the Pleasure of the publick Sense, from the Contemplation of their Happiness?" If it were so, it is very unaccountable, that we should approve this subordinate Desire as virtuous, and yet not approve the like Desire upon a Wager, or other Considerations of Interest.*

S E C T. terest. Both Desires proceed from *Self-Love*

I. in the same manner: In the latter case the Desires might be extended to multitudes, if any one would wager so capriciously; and, by increasing the Sum wagered, the *Motive of Interest* might, with many Tempers, be made stronger than that from the Pleasures of the publick Sense.

Do not we find that we often desire the Happiness of others without any such selfish Intention? How few have thought upon this part of our Constitution which we call a *Publick Sense*? Were it our only View, in *Compassion* to free ourselves from the *Pain of the publick Sense*; should the DEITY propose it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the Person in Distress, or to harden our Hearts against all feelings of Compassion, on the one hand, while yet the Object continued in Misery; or on the other hand to relieve him from it; should we not upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, and chuse the former as soon as the latter? Should the DEITY assure us that we should be immediately annihilated, so that we should be incapable of either Pleasure or Pain, but that it should depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our Friends, or our Country should be happy or miserable; should we not upon this Scheme be entirely indifferent? Or, if we should even desire the  
*pleasant*

*pleasant Thought of their Happiness, in our S E C T.*  
last Moment, would not this Desire be the I.  
faintest imaginable?



IT is true, our *Publick Sense* might be as acute at our Exit as ever; as a Man's Taste of Meat or Drink and his Sensations of Hunger and Thirst might be as lively the instant before his Dissolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as strong *Desires* of the Means of obtaining these Pleasures, only with a view to himself, when he was to perish the next Moment? Is it supposable that any *Desire* of the *Means of private Pleasure* can be as strong when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, it is certain, any good Man would as strongly desire at his Exit the *Happiness of others*, as in any part of his Life, which must be the Case with those who voluntarily hazard their Lives, or resolve on Death for their Country or Friends. We do not therefore desire it as the *Means of private Pleasure*.

SHOULD any alledge, that this Desire of the Happiness of others, after our Exit, is from some *confused Association of Ideas*; as a Miser, who loves nobody, might desire an Increase of Wealth at his Death; or as any one may have an Aversion to have his Body dissected, or made a Prey to Dogs after Death:

**S E C T.** let any honest Heart try if the deepest Reflection will break this *Association* (if there be any) which is supposed to raise the Desire.

I. The closest Reflection would be found rather to strengthen it. How would any *Spectator* like the Temper of one thus rendered indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open his Mouth to procure Happiness to Posterity? Would we esteem it refined *Wisdom*, or a *Perfection* of Mind, and not rather the vilest Perverseness? It is plain then we feel this ultimate *Desire* of the Happiness of others to be a most *natural Instinct*, which we also expect in others, and not the Effect of any confused Ideas.

THE Occasion of the imagined Difficulty in conceiving *distinterested Desires*, has probably been from the attempting to define this simple Idea, *Desire*. It is called *an uneasy Sensation in the absence of Good*\*. Whereas *Desire* is as distinct from any Sensation, as the *Will* is from the *Understanding* or *Senses*. This every one must acknowledge, who speaks of *desiring to remove Uneasiness or Pain*.

WE may perhaps find, that our Desires are so far from tending always towards *private Good*, that they are oftner employed about

\* See Mr. Lock's *Essay on Human Understanding* in the Chapt. on the Passions.

the State of others. Nay further, we may have a Propensity toward an Event, which we neither apprehend as the Means of private Good, or publick. Thus an Epicurean who denies a future State; or, one to whom God revealed that he should be annihilated, might at his very Exit desire a future Fame, from which he expected no Pleasure to himself, nor intended any to others. Such Desires indeed no *selfish Being*, who had the modelling of his own Nature, would chuse to implant in itself. But since we have not this power, we must be content to be thus “ outwitted by nature into a publick Interest “ against our Will;” as an ingenious Author expresses it.

THE Prospect of any *Interest* may be a Motive to us, to desire whatever we apprehend as the Means of obtaining it. Particularly, “ if Rewards of any kind are proposed to those who have virtuous Affections, “ this would raise in us the Desire of having these Affections, and would incline us to use all Means to raise them in ourselves; “ particularly to turn our Attention to all those Qualities in the DEITY, or our Fellows, which are naturally apt to raise the virtuous Affections.” Thus it is, that Interest of any kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue, and Rewards particularly may over-balance all Motives to Vice.

THIS

SECT. I. THIS may let us see, that "the Sancti-  
ons of Rewards and Punishments, as pro-  
posed in the Gospel, are not rendered use-  
less or unnecessary, by supposing the vir-  
tuous Affections to be *disinterested*;" since  
such *Motives of Interest*, proposed and at-  
tended to, must incline every Person to *desire*  
to have virtuous Affections, and to *turn his*  
*Attention* to every thing which is naturally  
apt to raise them; and must *over-balance* e-  
very other *Motive of Interest*, opposite to  
these Affections, which could incline Men to  
suppress or counteract them.

## S E C T. II.

*Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions, with their final Causes.*

I. **A**FTER the general Account of **S E C T.** **I.** *Sensations*, we may consider other **II.** *Modifications* of our Minds, consequent upon ~~the~~ these Perceptions, whether grateful, or uneasy. The first which occur to any one are *Proper Affection* of the grateful Perceptions, and *Aversion* to the uneasy, either for ourselves or others. If we would confine the word *Affection* to these two, which are entirely distinct from all *Sensation*, and directly incline the Mind to *Action* or *Votion of Motion*, we should have less Debate about the Number or Division of Affections. But since, by universal Custom, this Name is applied to other Modifications of the Mind, such as *Joy, Sorrow, Despair*, we may consider what universal *Distinction* can be assigned between these *Modifications*, and the several *Sensations* above-mentioned; and we shall scarce find any other than this, that we call “ the *direct immediate Perception* of Pleasure or Pain from “ the

**S E C T.** “ the present Object or Event, the *Sensation*—  
**II.** “ *on:*” But we denote by the *Affection* or  
*Passion* some other “ *Perceptions* of Pleasure  
<sup>Other Af-</sup> “ or Pain, not directly raised by the *Presence*  
<sup>feelings,</sup>  
<sup>wherein</sup>  
<sup>different</sup>  
<sup>from Sen-</sup> “ or *Operation* of the Event or Object, but  
“ by our *Reflection* upon, or *Apprehension* of  
“ their present or future Existence; so that  
“ we expect or judge that the Object or E-  
“ vent will raise the *direct Sensations* in us.”  
In beholding a regular Building we have the  
*Sensation* of Beauty; but upon our *apprehend-*  
*ing* ourselves possessed of it, or that we can  
procure this pleasant *Sensation* when we please,  
we feel the *Affection* of Joy. When a Man  
has a Fit of the Gout, he has the *painful Sen-*  
*sation*; when he is not at present pained, yet  
apprehends a sudden return of it, he has the  
*Affection* of Sorrow, which might be called  
a Sort of *Sensation*: as the Physicians call  
many of our Passions *internal Senses*.

*Affection*  
*dissinct*  
*from Pas-*  
*sion.*

WHEN the word *Passion* is imagined to  
denote any thing different from the *Affec-*  
*tions*, it includes a strong Brutal Impulse of the  
Will, sometimes without any distinct noti-  
ons of Good, publick or private, attended  
with “ a \* confused *Sensation* either of Plea-

\* Whoever would see subtile Divisions of those *Sensations*, let him read Malebranche's *Recherche de la Verite*, B. v.  
c. 3. Together with these *Sensations* there are also some  
strong *Propensities* distinct from any rational Desire: About which  
see Sect. 3. Art. 2. of this Treatise.

“ sure or Pain, occasioned or attended by S E C T.  
 “ some violent bodily Motions, which keeps II.  
 “ the Mind much employed upon the pre-   
 “ sent Affair, to the exclusion of every thing  
 “ else, and prolongs or strengthens the Af-  
 “ fection sometimes to such a degree, as to  
 “ prevent all *deliberate Reasoning* about our  
 “ Conduct.”

II. WE have little reason to imagine, that all other Agents have such *confused Sensations* <sup>General Desires,</sup> accompanying their Desires as we often have. <sup>and parti-</sup> Let us abstract from them, and consider in <sup>cular Af-</sup> what manner we should act upon the several <sup>sections or</sup> *Passions*. Occasions which now excite our Passions, if we had none of these *Sensations* whence our Desires become *passionate*.

THERE is a Distinction to be observed on this Subject, between “ the *calm Desire* of “ Good, and Aversion to Evil, either selfish “ or publick, as they appear to our *Reason* “ or *Reflection*; and the *particular Passions* “ towards Objects immediately presented to “ some Sense.” Thus nothing can be more distinct than the *general calm Desire* of private Good of any kind, which alone would incline us to pursue whatever Objects were apprehended as the Means of Good, and the particular *selfish Passions*, such as *Ambition, Covetousness, Hunger, Lust, Revenge, Anger*, as they arise upon particular Occasions.

In

**S E C T.** In like Manner our publick Desires may be  
 II. distinguished into the *general calm Desire*  
~~of the Happiness of others, or Aversion to~~  
~~their Misery upon Reflection; and the par-~~  
~~ticular Affections or Passions of Love, Con-~~  
~~gratulation, Compassion, natural Affection.~~  
 These *particular Affections* are found in many Tempers, where, through want of Reflection, the *general calm Desires* are not found: Nay, the former may be opposite to the latter, where they are found in the same Temper. Sometimes the calm Motion of the *Will* conquers the *Passion*, and sometimes is conquered by it. Thus *Lust* or *Revenge* may conquer the calm Affection toward private Good, and sometimes are conquered by it. *Compassion* will prevent the necessary Correction of a Child, or the use of a severe Cure, while the calm *parental Affection* is exciting to it. Sometimes the latter prevails over the former. All this is beautifully represented in the 9th book of *Plato's Republick*. We obtain *Command* over the *particular Passions*, principally by strengthning the *general Desires* through frequent Reflection, and making them *habitual*, so as to obtain Strength superior to the *particular Passions*.\*

AGAIN,

\* The Schoolmen express this Distinction by the *Appetitus rationalis*, and the *Appetitus Sensitivus*. All Animals have in common the *External Senses* suggesting notions of things as pleasant

AGAIN, the *calm publick Desires* may be S E C T. considered as “ they either regard the Good II. “ of particular Persons or Societies present- “ ed to our Senses; or that of some more “ abstracted or general Community, such as “ a Species or System.” This latter sort we may call *universal calm Benevolence*. Now it is plain, that not only *particular kind Passions*, but even *calm particular Benevolence* do not always arise from, or necessarily presuppose, the *universal Benevolence*; both the former may be found in Persons of little Reflection, where the latter is wanting: and the former two may be opposite to the other, where they meet together in one Temper. So the *universal Benevolence* might be where there was neither of the former; as in any superior Nature or Angel, who had no particular Intercourse with any part of Mankind.

sant or painful; and have also the *Appetitus Sensitivus*, or some instinctive Desires and Aversions. *Rational Agents* have, superadded to these, two higher analogous Powers; viz. the *Understanding*, or *Reason*, presenting farther notions, and attended with an higher sort of Sensations; and the *Appetitus rationalis*. This latter is a “ constant natural Disposition of Soul “ to desire what the Understanding, or these sublimer Sensa- “ tions, represent as Good, and to shun what they represent “ as Evil, and this either when it respects ourselves or o- “ thers.” This many call the *Will* as distinct from the *Passions*. Some later Writers seem to have forgot it, by ascribing to the *Understanding* not only *Ideas, Notions, Knowledge*; but *Action, Inclinations, Desires, Prosecution*, and their Contraries.

OUR

SECT. OUR moral Sense, though it approves all  
II. particular kind Affection or Passion, as well  
~~as~~ as calm particular Benevolence abstractedly  
considered; yet it also approves the Restraint or Limitation of all particular Affections or Passions, by the calm universal Benevolence. To make this Desire prevalent above all particular Affections, is the only sure way to obtain constant Self-Approval.

THE calm selfish Desires would determine any Agent to pursue every Object or Event, known either by Reason or prior Experience to be good to itself. We need not imagine any innate Idea of Good in general, of infinite Good, or of the greatest Aggregate: Much less need we suppose any actual Inclination toward any of these, as the Cause or Spring of all particular Desires. It is enough to allow, " that we are capable by enlarging, or " by Abstraction, of coming to these Ideas: " that we must, by the Constitution of " our Nature, desire any apprehended Good " which occurs a-part from any Evil: That " of two Objects inconsistent with each o- " ther, we shall desire that which seems to " contain the greatest Moment of Good." So that it cannot be pronounced concerning any finite Good, that it shall necessarily engage our Pursuit; since the Agent may possibly have

have the Idea of a *Greater*, or see this to be S E C T. inconsistent with some *more valuable Object*, II. or that it may bring upon him some *prepollent*  *Evil*. The certain Knowledge of any of these Things, or probable *Presumption* of them, may stop the Pursuit of any finite Good. If this be any sort of *Liberty*, it must be allowed to be in Men, even by those who maintain "the *Desire* or *Will* to be "necessarily determined by the *prepollent* " *Motive*;" since this very *Presumption* may be a *prepollent Motive*, especially to those, who by frequent *Attention* make the Idea of the *greatest Good* always present to themselves on all important Occasions. The same may easily be applied to our Aversion to finite Evils.

THERE seems to be this Degree of *Li-*  
*berty* even in the acts of the *Understanding*,  
or in *Judging*, that though the *highest Cer-*  
*tainty* or *Demonstration* does necessarily en-  
gage our *Affsent*, yet we can suspend any  
*absolute Conclusion* from *probable Arguments*,  
until we examine whether this apparent  
*Probability* be not opposite to *Demonstrati-*  
*on*, or *superior Probability* on the other side.

THIS may let us see, that though it were acknowledged that "Men are *necessarily de-*"  
" *termined to pursue their own Happiness,*"  
" and to be influenced by whatever Mo-

SECT. "tive appears to be *prepollent*;" yet they II. might be proper Subjects of a Law; since ~~the~~ the very Sanctions of the Law, if they attend to them, may suggest a Motive *prepollent* to all others. In like manner, "Errors may be criminal, \* where there are sufficient Data or Objective Evidence for the Truth;" since no Demonstration can lead to Error, and we can suspend our Assent to probable Arguments, till we have examined both Sides. Yet *human Penalties* concerning Opinions must be of little consequence, since no Penalty can supply the place of Argument, or Probability to engage our Assent, however they may as Motives determine our Election.

IN the *calm publick Desires*, in like manner, where there are no opposite Desires, the greater Good of another is always preferred to the less: And in the calm universal Benevolence, the Choice is determined by the Importance or Moment of the Good, and the Number of those who shall enjoy it.

WHEN the *publick Desires* are opposite to the *private*, or seem to be so, that kind prevails which is stronger or more intense.

\* See *Treat. II. Sect 6. Art. 6.* last Paragraph.

III. THE following Definitions of certain Words used on this Subject, may shorten our Expressions; and the Maxims subjoined may shew the manner of acting from *calm Desire*, with Analogy to the *Laws of Motion*.

1. NATURAL *Good* is Pleasure: *Natural Evil* is Pain.

*Natural Good and Evil.*

2. NATURAL *good Objects* are those which are apt either mediately or immediately to give Pleasure; the former are called *Advantageous*. NATURAL *Evil Objects* are such as, in like manner, give Pain.

3. ABSOLUTE *Good* is that which, considered with all its Concomitants and Consequences, contains more Good than what compensates all its Evils.

4. ABSOLUTE *Evil*, on the contrary, contains Evil which outweighs all its Good.

5. RELATIVE *Good or Evil*, is any particular Good or Evil, which does not thus compensate its contrary Concomitants or Consequences. This Distinction would have been more exactly expressed by the *Bonum simpliciter*, and *secundum quid* of the Schoolmen.

**SECT. HENCE** relative *Good* may be *Absolute Evil*; thus often sensual Pleasures are in the whole pernicious: And *Absolute Good* may be *Relative Evil*; thus an *unpleasant Potion* may recover Health.

Good and *Evil*, according to the *Persons* whom they affect, may be divided into *Universal*, *Particular*, and *Private*.

*Universal.* 6. **UNIVERSAL Good** is what tends to the Happiness of the whole *System of sensitive Beings*; and *Universal Evil* is the contrary.

*Particular.* 7. **PARTICULAR Good** is what tends to the Happiness of a Part of this System: *Particular Evil* is the contrary.

*Private.* 8. **PRIVATE Good or Evil** is that of the Person acting. Each of these three Members may be either *Absolute* or *Relative*.

**HENCE.** 1. *Particular or private Good* may possibly be *universal Evil*: And *universal Good* may be *particular or private Evil*. The Punishment of a Criminal is an Instance of the latter. Of the former, perhaps, there are no real Instances in the whole Administration of Nature: but there are

are some apparent Instances: such as the *SECT.*  
*Success of an unjust War*; or the *Escape of II.*  
*an unrelenting Criminal.*



2. WHEN particular or private Goods are entirely innocent toward others, they are universal Good.

9. COMPOUND good Objects or Events, are *Compound.* such as contain Goods of several sorts at once. Thus, Meat may be both pleasant and healthful; an Action may give its Author at once the Pleasures of the *Moral Sense* and of *Honour*. The same is easily applicable to compound Evil.

10. A MIXED Object is what contains at *Mixed.* once Good and Evil: Thus a virtuous Action may give the Agent the *Pleasures of the Moral Sense*, and *Pains of the external Senses*. Execution of Justice may give the Pleasures of the *publick Sense*, and the Pains of *Compassion* toward the Sufferer.

11. THE greatest or most perfect Good is *Greatest Good.* that whole Series, or Scheme of Events, which contains a greater Aggregate of Happiness in the whole, or more absolute universal Good, than any other possible Scheme, after subtracting all the Evils connected with each of them.

**S E C T. 12.** AN Action is morally *good*, when it  
 II. flows from benevolent Affection, or Inten-  
*Moral Good.* ~~tion~~ of absolute Good to others. Men of  
 much Reflection may actually intend *uni-*  
*versal absolute Good*; but with the common  
 rate of Men their Virtue consists in intend-  
 ing and pursuing *particular absolute Good*,  
 not inconsistent with universal Good.

*Moral Evil.* **13.** AN Action is morally *evil*, either  
 from Intention of *absolute Evil*, universal,  
 or particular, (\*universal Evil is scarce ever  
 intended, and particular Evil only in violent  
 Passions) or from pursuit of *private* or *par-*  
*ticular relative Good*, which they might  
 have known did tend to *universal absolute Evil*. For even the *want* of a † just De-  
 gree of Benevolence renders an Action evil.

*Compound.* **14.** COMPOUND moral *Goodness* is that to  
 which different moral Species concur: Thus  
 the same Action may evidence Love to our  
 Fellows, and Gratitude to God. We may  
 in like manner understand compound moral  
*Evil*. We cannot suppose mixed moral  
*Actions.* ‡

\* See Treatise II. Sect. 2. Art. 4. p. 143.

† Treatise IV. Sect. 6. Art. 4.

‡ See Treatise II. Sect. 7. Art. 9. last Parag.

15. AGENTS are denominated morally S E C T. good or evil, from their Affections and Actions, or Attempts of Action. 

IV. MAXIMS, or natural Laws of *calm Axioms, or general Laws.* Desire.

1. SELFISH Desires pursue ultimately only the private Good of the Agent.

2. BENEVOLENT or publick Desires pursue the Good of others, according to the several Systems to which we extend our Attention, but with different Degrees of Strength.

3. THE Strength either of the private or publick Desire of any Event, is proportioned to the imagined Quantity of Good, which will arise from it to the Agent, or the Person for whose sake it is desired.

4. MIXED Objects are pursued or shunned with Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the apprehended Excess of Good or Evil.

5. EQUAL Mixtures of Good and Evil stop all Desire or Aversion.

6. A COMPOUND good or evil Object, is prosecuted or shunned with a Degree of

**S E C T.** Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the *Sum*  
**II.** of Good, or of Evil.



7. IN computing the *Quantities* of Good or Evil, which we pursue or shun, either for ourselves or others, when the *Durations* are equal, the Moment is as the *Intenseness*, or Dignity of the Enjoyment: and when the *Intenseness* of Pleasure is the same, or equal, the Moment is as the *Duration*.

8. HENCE the *Moment* of Good in any Object, is in a compound Proportion of the *Duration* and *Intenseness*.

9. THE *Trouble*, *Pain*, or *Danger*, incurred by the Agent, in acquiring or retaining any Good, is to be subtracted from the *Sum* of the Good. So the *Pleasures* which attend or flow from the means of *prepotent Evil*, are to be subtracted, to find the *absolute Quantity*.

10. THE Ratio of the *Hazard* of acquiring or retaining any Good must be multiplied into the Moment of the Good; so also the *Hazard* of avoiding any Evil is to be multiplied into the Moment of it, to find its comparative value.

HENCE it is, that the smallest certain Good may raise stronger Desire than the greatest

greatest Good, if the *Uncertainty* of the SECT. latter surpass *that* of the former, in a greater Proportion than that of the greater to the less. Thus Men content themselves in all Affairs with *smaller*, but more *probably successful* Pursuits, quitting those of greater Moment but *less Probability*.

11. To an *immortal* Nature it is indifferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys a Good limited in Duration, if its Sense be equally *acute* in all parts of its Existence; and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes not the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one time more than another. The same may be applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited in Duration.

12. BUT if the Duration of the Good be *infinite*, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment, as *finite* added to *infinite*, surpasses *infinite* alone.

13. To Beings of *limited certain Duration*, Axiom 12. may be applied, when the Duration of the Good would not surpass the Existence of the Possessor, after the Time of its Commencement.

14. To Beings of *limited uncertain Duration*, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment of any Good, according

SECT. ing to the Hazard of the Possessor's Duration. This may, perhaps, account for what ~~we~~ some alledge to be a *natural Disposition* of our Minds, even previous to any Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, *viz.* that we are so constituted, as to desire more ardently the *nearer Enjoyments* than the more distant, tho' of equal Moment in themselves, and as certainly to be obtained by us.

15. THE Removal of Pain has always the Notion of Good, and sollicits us more importunately: Its Moment is the same way computed by Intenseness and Duration, and affected by the Hazard and by the Uncertainty of our Existence.

THESE are the general Ways of computing the Quantities of Good in any Object or Event, whether we are pursuing our own private Good from selfish Desires, or the Good of others from publick Affections. Concerning these latter we may observe,

16. THAT our Desires toward *publick Good* are, when other Circumstances are equal, proportioned to the Moment of the Goods themselves.

17. OUR publick Desires of any Events, are proportioned to the Number of Persons to whom the good Event shall extend, when the

the *Moments* and other Circumstances are **S E C T.**  
equal.

II.



18. WHEN the *Moments* themselves, and Numbers of Enjoyers are equal, our Desire is proportioned to the *Strength* or *Nearness* of the *Ties* or *Attachments* to the Persons.

19. WHEN all other Circumstances are equal, our Desires are proportional to the apprehended *Moral Excellence* of the Persons.

20. IN general, the Strength of publick Desire is in a Compound Ratio of the *Quantity of the Good itself, and the Number, Attachment, and Dignity* of the Persons.


THESE seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires arise. Our *Senses* constitute Objects, Events or Actions *good*; and “ we have Power to *reason*, *reflect* and compare the several Goods, and “ to find out the proper and effectual Means “ of obtaining the greatest for ourselves or “ others, so as not to be led aside by every “ Appearance of *relative* or *particular* “ *Good*.”

V. If it be granted, that we have im- *planted* in our Nature the several *Desires* <sup>from pure</sup> <sub>Desire or Affection.</sub> above-mentioned, let us next inquire “ into *what*

SECT. " what *State* we would incline to bring  
 II. " ourselves, upon the several Accidents  
 ~~~ " which now raise our *Passions*; supposing  
 " that we had the Choice of our own State
 " entirely, and were not, by the Frame of
 " our Nature, subjected to certain *Sensa-*
 " *tions*, independently of our Volition."

IF it seems too rash to assert a Distinction between *Affections* and *Passions*, or that *De-*
sire may subsist without any *uneasiness*, since
 perhaps we are never conscious of any *De-*
sire absolutely free from all *uneasiness*; " let
 " it be considered, that the simple Idea of
 " *Desire* is different from that of Pain of
 " any kind, or from any *Sensation* whatso-
 " ever: Nor is there any other Argument
 " for their Identity than this, that they oc-
 " cur to us at once: But this Argument is
 " inconclusive, otherwise it would prove
 " *Colour* and *Figure* to be the same, or *In-*
 " *cision* and *Pain*."

THERE is a *middle State* of our Minds,
 when we are not in the pursuit of any *im-*
portant Good, nor know of any great *Indi-*
gence of those we love. In this State, when
 any smaller positive Good to ourselves or
 our Friend is apprehended to be in our
 power, we may resolutely *desire* and *pursue*
 it, without any considerable *Sensation* of
Pain or *Uneasiness*. Some Tempers seem
 to

to have as strong *Desires* as any, by the Con-S E C T. stancy and Vigor of their Pursuits, either of II. publick or private Good ; and yet give small  Evidence of any *uneasy Sensation*. This is observable in some sedate Men, who seem no way inferior in Strength of Desire to others : Nay, if we consult our Hearts, we shall perhaps find, that "the noblest Desire " in our Nature, that of *universal Happiness*, is generally calm, and wholly free " from any confused uneasy Sensation :" except in some warm Tempers, who, by a lively *Imagination*, and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raise something of Passion even toward *universal Nature*.* Yea, further, Desire may be as strong as possible toward a certainly future Event, the fixed Time of its Existence being also known, and yet we are not conscious of any *Pain* attending such Desires. But tho' this should not be granted to be Fact with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas of Desire and Pain, may give sufficient ground for abstracting them ; and for our making the Supposition of their being separated.

UPON this Supposition then, when any Object was desired, if we found it *difficult* or *uncertain* to be obtained, but worthy of all the Labour it would cost ; we would set

* See *Marcus Aurelius*, in many places.

SECT. about it with Diligence, but would never
II. chuse to bring upon ourselves any *painful*
~~~~ *Sensation* accompanying our Desire, nor to  
increase our Toil by *Anxiety*. Whatever  
Satisfaction we had in our State before the  
Prospect of this additional Good, we should  
continue to enjoy it while this Good was in  
suspense; and if we found it unattainable,  
we should be just as we were before: We  
should never chuse to bring upon ourselves  
those *Frettings* which now commonly arise  
from Disappointments. Upon Opinion of  
any impending Evil, we should *desire* and  
*use all means* to prevent it, but should never  
voluntarily bring upon ourselves the uneasy  
Sensation of *Fear*, which now naturally ant-  
icipates our Misery, and gives us a Foretaste  
of it, more ungrateful sometimes than the  
Suffering itself. If the Evil did befall us,  
we should never chuse to increase it, by the  
Sensations of *Sorrow* or *Despair*; we should  
consider what was the Sum of Good remain-  
ing in our State, after subtracting this Evil;  
and should enjoy ourselves as well as a Be-  
ing, who had never known greater Good,  
nor enjoyed greater Pleasure, than the *abso-*  
*lute Good* yet remaining with us; or perhaps  
we should pursue some other attainable  
Good. In the like manner, did our *State*  
and the *Modifications* of our Mind depend  
upon our Choice, should we be affected up-  
on the apprehended Approach of Good or  
Evil,

Evil, to those whom we love; we should have *desires* of obtaining the one for them, II. and of defending them from the other, accompanied with no *uneasy Sensations*. We indeed find in fact, that our stronger Desires, whether private or publick, are accompanied with *uneasy Sensations*; but these Sensations seem not the necessary *Result* of the Desire itself: They depend upon the present *Constitution of our Nature*, which might possibly have been otherwise ordered. And in fact we find a considerable Diversity of Tempers in this matter; some *sedate Tempers* equally desiring either publick or private Good with the more passionate Tempers; but without that Degree of *Ferment, Confusion, and Pain*, which attend the same Desires in the *Passionate*.

ACCORDING to the present Constitution of our Nature, we find that the *Modifications or Passions* of our Mind, are very different from those which we would chuse to bring upon ourselves, upon their several Occasions. The Prospect of any considerable Good for ourselves, or those we love, raises Desire; and this Desire is accompanied with *uneasy confused Sensations*, which often occasion *Fretfulness, Anxiety, and Impatience*. We find violent *Motions* in our Bodies; and are often made unfit for serious Deliberation about the Means of obtaining the

SECT. the Good desired. When it is first obtained, we find violent confused *Sensations* of Joy, beyond the Proportion of the Good itself, or its Moment to our Happiness. If we are disappointed, we feel a Sensation of Sorrow and *Dejection*, which is often entirely useless to our present State. Foreseen Evils are antedated by painful Sensations of Fear; and Reflection, attended with Sensations of Sorrow, gives a tedious Existence to transitory Misfortunes. Our *publick Desires* are in the same manner accompanied with painful Sensations. The Presence or Suspence of Good or Evil *to others*, is made the Occasion of the like confused Sensations. A little Reflection will shew, that none of these Sensations depend upon our Choice, but arise from the very *Frame of our Nature*, however we may regulate or moderate them.

*The Necessity  
fit for  
these Sensa-  
tions.*

VI. LET us then examine "for what Purpose our Nature was so constituted, " that Sensations do thus necessarily arise in "us." Would not those *first sorts of Sensations*, by which we apprehend Good and Evil in the Objects themselves, have been sufficient, along with our *Reason* and *pure Desires*, without those Sensations attending the very Desires themselves, for which they are called *Passions*, or those *Sensations* which attend

attend our Reflection upon the Presence, SECT.  
Absence, or Approach of Good or Evil? II.



THE common Answer, that " they are  
" given to us as useful *Incitements* or *Spurs*  
" to Action, by which we are roused more  
" effectually to promote our private Good,  
" or that of the Publick," is too general  
and undetermined. What need is there for  
rousing us to Action, more than a *calm*  
*pure Desire of Good*, and Aversion to Evil  
would do, without these confused Sensa-  
tions? Say they, " we are averse to *La-*  
" *bour*; we are apt to be hurried away  
" by Avocations of *Curiosity* or *Mirth*; we  
" are often so *indolent* and averse to the vi-  
" *gorous Use* of our Powers, that we should  
" neglect our true Interest without these  
" *soliciting Sensations.*" But may it not  
be answered, that if Labour and vigorous  
Use of our Powers be attended with *Uneasi-*  
*ness* or *Pain*, why should not this be brought  
into the Account? The Pursuit of a small  
Good by great Toil is really foolish; vio-  
lent *Labour* may be as pernicious as any  
thing else: Why should we be excited to  
any *uneasy Labour*, except for prepotent  
Good? And, when the Good is *prepellent*,  
what need of any further *Incitement* than  
the calm Desire of it? The same may be  
said of the Avocations of *Curiosity* or *Mirth*;  
if their *absolute Pleasures* be greater than

SECT. that of the Good from which they divert

II. us, why should we not be diverted from it?

~~~ If not, then the *real Moment* of the Good proposed is sufficient to engage our Pursuit of it, in Opposition to our Curiosity or Mirth.

If indeed our Aversion to Labour, or our Propensity to Mirth be accompanied with these Sensations, then it was necessary that other *Desires* should be attended with like Sensations, that so a Ballance might be preserved. So if we have confused Sensation strengthening and fixing our *private Desires*, the like Sensation joined to *publick Affections* is necessary, lest the former Desires should wholly engross our Minds: If weight be cast into one Scale, as much must be put into the other to preserve an *Equilibrium*. But the first Question is, " whence arose " the Necessity of such additional Incite- " ments on either side ? "

It must be very difficult for Beings of such imperfect Knowledge as we are, to answer such Questions: we know very little of the Constitution of *Nature*, or what may be necessary for the Perfection of the *whole*. The Author of Nature has probably formed many active Beings, whose Desires are not attended with confused Sensations, raising them into Passions like to ours. There are perhaps

perhaps Orders of rational Beings also without these particular limited Attachments, II. to which our Natures are subjected; who may perhaps have no *Parental Affection*, Friendships, or Love to a Country, or to any special smaller Systems; but have *Universal Good-will* to all, and this solely proportioned to the moral Excellencies of the several Objects, without any other Bonds of Affection. There is probably an infinite Variety of Beings, of all possible Degrees, in which the Sum of Happiness exceeds that of Misery. We know that our State is *absolutely Good*, notwithstanding a considerable Mixture of Evil. The Goodness of the great Author of Nature appears even in producing the *inferior Natures*, provided their State in the whole be absolutely Good: Since we may probably conclude,* that there are in the Universe as many Species of *superior Natures*, as was consistent with the most perfect State of the whole. This is the Thought so much insisted on by *Simplicius*, that the universal Cause must produce τα μέσα, as well as τα πρώτα, καὶ τα ἔχατα. We know not if this Globe be a fit Place for the Habitation of Natures superior to ours: If not, it must certainly be in the whole better that it should have its *imperfect*

* See *Simplicius on Epictetus*, Cap. 34. And the Archbishop of *Dublin*, *De Origine Niali*, above all others on this Subject.

SECT. Inhabitants, whose State is absolutely Good,
II. than that it should be desolate.



ALL then which we can expect to do in this Matter, is only to shew, that "these confused Sensations are necessary to such Natures as we are in other respects: Particularly that Beings of such Degrees of Understanding, and such Avenues to Knowledge as we have, must need these additional Forces, which we call Passions, beside the first *Sensations* by which Objects are constituted Good or Evil, and the pure *Desire* or *Aversion* arising from Opinion or Apprehension of Good or Evil."

From the Imperfection of our Under-standing, which requires a Sensation of pleasant Sensation which tends to their Preservation; and some painful Sensation which shews what is pernicious. Now our Reason, or Knowledge of the Relations of external Things to our Bodies, is so inconsiderable, that it is generally some pleasant Sensation which teaches us what tends to their Preservation; and some painful Sensation which shews what is pernicious. Nor is this Instruction sufficient; we need also to be directed when our Bodies want supplies of Nourishment; to this our Reason could not extend: Here then appears the first Necessity of uneasy Sensation, preceding Desire, and continuing to accompany it when it is raised.

AGAIN,

AGAIN, our Bodies could not be preserved without a Sense of Pain, connected with **II.** *Incisions, Bruises, or violent Labour, or* ~~whatever else tends to destroy any part of their Mechanism; since our Knowledge does not extend so far, as to judge in time what would be pernicious to it: And yet, without a great deal of human Labour, and many Dangers, this Earth could not support the tenth Part of its Inhabitants. Our Nature therefore required a Sensation, accompanying its Desires of the *Means of Preservation*, capable to surmount the Uneasiness of *Labour*: this we have in the Pains or Uneasiness accompanying the Desires of Food.~~

IN like manner, the *Propagation of Animals* is a Mystery to their *Reason*, but easy to their *Instinct*. An Offspring of such Creatures as Men are, could not be preserved without perpetual Labour and Care; which we find could not be expected from the more general Ties of *Benevolence*. Here then again appears the Necessity of strengthening the *Sτοργή*, or *natural Affection*, with strong Sensations, or Pains of Desire, sufficient to counter-ballance the Pains of *Labour*, and the Sensations of the *selfish Appetites*; since Parents must often check and

E 3 disappoint

SECT. disappoint their own Appetites, to gratify
II. those of their Children.



" When a Necessity of joining strong
" Sensations to one Class of Desires appears,
" there must appear a like Necessity of
" strengthning the rest by like Sensations,
" to keep a just Ballance." We know, for
instance, that the Pleasures of the *Imagination* tend much to the Happiness of Man-
kind: the Desires of them therefore must
have the like Sensations assisting them, to
prevent our indulging a nasty solitary Luxu-
ry. The Happiness of human Life cannot
be promoted without *Society* and *mutual
Aid*, even beyond a Family; our *publick
Affections* must therefore be strengthned as
well as the private, to keep a Ballance; so
must also our Desires of *Virtue* and *Honour*.
Anger, which some have thought an useless
Passion, is really as necessary as the rest;
since Men's Interests often seem to interfere
with each other; and they are thereby led
from Self-Love to do the worst *Injuries* to
their Fellows. There could not therefore
be a wiser Contrivance to restrain *Injuries*,
than to make every mortal some way *formi-
dable* to an unjust Invader, by such a violent
Passion. We need not have recourse to a
Prometheus in this matter, with the old Po-
ets: they might have ascribed it to their
Optimus Maximus.

—*Insani*

—*Insani Leonis,
Vim Stomacho apposuisse nostro.*

SECT.
II.

VII. WITH this *Ballance* of publick Passions against the private, with our *Passions* toward Honour and Virtue, we find that ^{A Ballance may be still preserved.} human Nature may be as really amiable in its low Sphere, as superior Natures endowed with higher Reason, and influenced only by *pure Desires*; provided we vigorously exercise the Powers we have in keeping this Ballance of Affections, and checking any Passion which grows so violent, as to be inconsistent with the publick Good. If we have selfish Passions for our own Preservation, we have also *publick Passions*, which may engage us into vigorous and laborious Services to *Offspring, Friends, Communities, Countries*. *Compassion* will engage us to succour the distressed, even with our private Loss or Danger. An Abhorrence of the injurious, and Love toward the injured, with a Sense of Virtue and Honour, can make us despise Labour, Expence, Wounds and Death.

THE Sensations of Joy or Sorrow, upon the Success or Disappointment of any Pursuit, either publick or private, have directly the Effect of *Rewards* or *Punishments*, to excite us to act with the utmost Vigor, either for our own Advantage, or that of

SECT. others, for the future, and to punish past
II. Negligence. The Moment of every Event
~~is~~ is thereby increased: as much as the Sensa-
tions of *Sorrow* add to our *Misery*, so much
those of *Joy* add to our *Happiness*. Nay,
since we have some considerable *Power* over
our Desires, as shall be explained hereafter,
we may probably, by good Conduct, obtain
more frequent *Pleasures of Joy* upon our
Success, than *Pains of Sorrow* upon Disap-
pointment.

A just Balance very rare. 'Tis true indeed, that there are few Tem-
pers to be found, wherein these Sensations
of the several Passions are in such a *Balance*, as in all Cases to leave the Mind in a
proper State, for considering the Importance
of every Action or Event. The Sensations
of *Anger* in some Tempers are violent above
their proportion; those of *Ambition*, *Ava-
rice*, *desire of sensual Pleasure*, and even of
natural Affection, in several Dispositions,
possess the Mind too much, and make it in-
capable of attending to any thing else.
Scarce any one Temper is always constant
and uniform in its Passions. The best State
of human Nature possible, might require a
Diversity of Passions and Inclinations, for
the different Occupations necessary for the
whole: But the Disorder seems to be much
greater than is requisite for this End. *Cus-
tom, Education, Habits, and Company*, may
often

often contribute much to this Disorder, S E C T. however its Original may be ascribed to II. some more universal Cause. But it is not ~~so~~ so great, but that human Life is still a desireable State, having a superiority of Goodness and Happiness. Nor, if we apply ourselves to it, does it hinder us from discerning that just *Ballance* and *Oeconomy*, which would constitute the most happy State of each Person, and promote the greatest Good in the whole.

LET Physicians or Anatomists explain the *Dispositi-*
several Motions in the *Fluids* or *Solids* of the ^{ons to some} *Body*, which accompany any Passion; or ^{particular} *Passions.*
the *Temperaments* of Body which either make Men prone to any Passion, or are brought upon us by the long Continuance, or frequent Returns of it. It is only to our Purpose in general to observe, "that probably certain *Motions* in the Body accompany every Passion by a fixed Law of Nature; and alternately, that *Temperament* which is apt to receive or prolong these Motions in the Body, does influence our Passions to heighten or prolong them." Thus a certain *Temperament* may be brought upon the Body, by its being frequently put into Motion by the Passions of *Anger*, *Joy*, *Love*, or *Sorrow*; and the Continuance of this *Temperament* shall make Men prone to the several Passions for the future. We find our-

SECT. ourselves after a long Fit of *Anger* or *Sorrow*, in an uneasy State, even when we are ~~not~~ reflecting on the particular *Occasion* of our Passion. During this State, every trifle shall be apt to provoke or deject us. On the contrary, after good *Success*, after strong friendly *Passions*, or a State of *Mirth*, some considerable *Injuries* or *Losses*, which at other times would have affected us very much, shall be overlooked, or meekly received, or at most but slightly resented; perhaps because our Bodies are not fit easily to receive these *Motions* which are constituted the Occasion of the uneasy Sensations of Anger. This *Diversity* of Temper every one has felt, who reflects on himself at different Times. In some Tempers it will appear like *Madness*. Whether the only *Seat* of these Habits, or the Occasion rather of these *Dispositions*, be in the Body; or whether the *Soul* itself does not, by frequent Returns of any Passion, acquire some greater Disposition to receive and retain it again, let those determine, who sufficiently understand the Nature of either the one or the other.

S E C T. III.

*Particular Divisions of the Affections
and Passions.*

I. THE Nature of any *Language* has S E C T. considerable Influence upon Men's III. Reasonings on all Subjects, making them often take all those Ideas which are denoted by the same Word to be the same; and on the other hand, to look upon different Words as denoting different Ideas. We shall find that this Identity of Names has occasioned much Confusion in Treatises of the Passions; while some have made larger, and some smaller Collections of Names, and have given the Explications of them as an Account of the Passions.

CICERO, in the Fourth Book of *Tusculan Questions*, gives from the Stoicks, this general Division of the Passions: First, into Love and Hatred, according as the Object is good or evil; and then subdivides each, according as the Object is present or expected. About Good we have these two, *Libido* & *Lætitia*, Desire and Joy: About Evil we have likewise two, *Metus* & *Ægritudo*, Fear and Sorrow. To this general Division he subjoins

S E C T. subjoins many *Subdivisions* of each of these
 III. four Passions; according as in the *Latin*
 Tongue they had different Names for the
 several *Degrees* of these Passions, or for the
 same Passion employed upon different Ob-
 jects. A Writer of *Lexicons* would proba-
 bly get the most precise Meanings of the *Lat-
 in* Names in that Book; nor would it be
 useless in considering the Nature of them.

THE Schoolmen, as their Fund of Lan-
 guage was much smaller, have not so full
 Enumerations of them, going no further
 than their admired *Aristotle*.

II. IT is strange that the thoughtful
 MALEBRANCHE did not consider, that “ *De-*
 “ *fire* and *Aversion* are obviously different
 “ from the other Modifications called *Pa-*
 “ *sions*; that these two directly lead to
 “ Action, or the Volition of Motion, and
 “ are wholly distinct from all sort of Sen-
 “ sation.” Whereas Joy and Sorrow are
 only a sort of Sensations; and other Affec-
 tions differ from Sensations only, by includ-
 ing Desire or Aversion, or their correspon-
 dent Propensities: So that *Desire* and *Aver-*
sion are the only pure Affections in the strict-
 est Sense.

*Sensation
 and Affec-
 tion dis-
 tinct.*

IF, indeed, we confine the Word *Sensa-*
tion to the “ immediate Perceptions of
 “ Plea-

" Pleasure and Pain, upon the very Presence SECT.
 " or Operation of any Object or Event, III.
 " which are occasioned by some Impression ~~~
 " on our Bodies ;" then we may denote by
 the Word *Affection*, those *Pleasures* or *Pains*
 not thus excited, but " resulting from some
 " *Reflection* upon, or *Opinion* of our Posse-
 " sion of any Advantage, or from a certain
 " Prospect of future pleasant Sensations on
 " the one hand, or from a like *Reflection* or
 " Prospect of evil or painful Sensations on
 " the other, either to ourselves or others."*

WHEN more violent confused *Sensations* *Passion*.
 arise with the *Affection*, and are attended
 with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we
 call the whole by the Name of *Passion*, es-
 pecially when accompanied with some *na-*
tural Propensities, to be hereafter explained.

IF this Use of these Words be allowed, *Division*
 the *Division* of MALEBRANCHE is very na-
 tural. Good Objects excite *Love*; evil Ob-
 jects *Hatred*: each of these is subdivided,
 as the Object is *present* and *certain*, or *doubt-*
fully expected, or *certainly removed*. To
 these three Circumstances correspond three
 Modifications of the original Affections;
 viz. *Joy*, *Desire*, and *Sorrow*. Good pre-
 sent, raises *joyful Love*: Good in suspense,

* See above, Sect. 2. Art. 1.

S E C T. the *Love of Desire*, or *desirous Love*: Good III. lost, *sorrowful Love*. Evil present, raises sorrowful *Aversion*: Evil expected, *desirous Aversion*; and Evil removed, *joyful Aversion*. The joyful Love, and joyful Hatred, will possibly be found nearly the same sort of Sensations, though upon different Occasions; the same may be said of the sorrowful Love, and the sorrowful Aversion: and thus this Division will amount to the same with that of the Stoicks.

Desire and Aversion. PERHAPS it may be more easy to conceive our *Affections* and *Passions* in this manner. The Apprehension of Good, either to ourselves or others, as attainable, raises *Desire*: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises *Aversion*, or Desire of removing or preventing it. These two are the proper *Affections*, distinct from all *Sensation*: We may call both *Desires* if we please. The Reflection upon the Presence or certain Futurity of any Good, raises the Sensation of Joy, which is distinct from those immediate Sensations which arise from the Object itself.* A like Sensation is raised, when we reflect upon the Removal or Prevention of Evil which once threatned ourselves or others. The *Reflection* upon the Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect

Joy and sorrow.

of it, or of the Loss of Good, is the Occa- S E C T.
sion of the Sensation of *Sorrow*, distinct from III.
those *immediate Sensations* arising from the ~~the~~ Objects or Events themselves.

THESE Affections, *viz.* *Desire*, *Aversion*, *Affections*
Joy and *Sorrow*, we may, after MALE-^{may be di-}
BRANCHE, call *spiritual* or *pure Affections*; ^{stinguished} *from Passions*;
because the purest Spirit, were it subject to *Passions*,
any Evil, might be capable of them. But
beside these Affections, which seem to arise
necessarily from a rational Apprehension of
Good or Evil, there are in our Nature vio-
lent confused *Sensations*, connected with *bodily Motions*, from which our *Affections* are
denominated *Passions*.

WE may further observe something in *Affections*
our Nature, determining us very frequently ^{attended} to Action, distinct both from *Sensation* and ^{with under-}
Desire; if by *Desire* we mean a distinct In- ^{signing} *Propensi-*
clination to something apprehended as Good ^{ties.}
either publick or private, or as the Means
of avoiding Evil: *viz.* a certain *Propensity of Instinct* to Objects and Actions, with-
out any Conception of them as Good, or
as the Means of preventing Evil. These
Objects or Actions are generally, tho' not
always, in effect the *Means* of some Good;
but we are determined to them even with-
out this Conception of them. Thus, as we
observed

SECT. observed above,* the *Propensity to Fame*
 III. may continue after one has lost all notion
 of *Good*, either publick or private, which
 could be the Object of a distinct Desire. Our
 particular *Affections* have generally some of
 these *Propensities* accompanying them; but
 these Propensities are sometimes without the
 Affections or distinct Desires, and have a
 stronger Influence upon the Generality of
 Men, than the Affections could have alone.
 Thus in Anger, beside the Intention of re-
 moving the uneasy Sensation from the In-
 jury received; beside the Desire of obtaining
 a Reparation of it, and Security for the fu-
 ture, which are some sort of *Goods* intend-
 ed by Men when they are calm, as well as
 during the Passion, there is in the passionate
 Person a Propensity to occasion *Misery* to
 the Offender, a Determination to *Violence*,
 even where there is no *Intention* of any
 Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by
 this Violence. And it is principally this
 Propensity which we denote by the Name
Anger, tho' other Degrees may often ac-
 company it.

Anger

So also our *Presence* with the distressed is
 generally necessary to their relief; and yet
 when we have no Hopes nor Intention of
 relieving them, we shall find a *Propensity* to

* Sect. i. near the End.

run to such Spectacles of Pity. Thus also, **S E C T.** beside the calm *Desire* of the Happiness of III. a Person beloved, we have a strong Propensity to their *Company*, to the very *Sight* of them, without any Consideration of it as a Happiness either to ourselves or to the Person beloved. The sudden Appearance of great Danger, determines us to shriek out or fly, before we can have any distinct Desires, or any Consideration that a Shriek or Flight are proper Means of Relief. These *Propensities*, along with the Sensations above-mentioned, when they occur without rational Desire, we may call *Passions*, and when they happen along with Desires, denominate them *passionate*. This part of our Constitution is as intelligible as many others universally observed and acknowledged; such as these, that Danger of falling makes us stretch out our Arms; noise makes us wink; that a Child is determined to suck; many other Animals to rise up and walk; some to run into Water, before they can have any Notion of Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by these means.

IT may perhaps be convenient to confine *Love and Hatred* to our Sentiments toward Moral Agents; *Love* denoting " *Desire of the Happiness of another, generally attended with some Approbation of him as innocent at least, or being of a mixed*

S E C T. "Character, where Good is generally pre-
 III. "valent :" And *Hatred* "denoting Disap-
 ∽ "probation by our *Sense*, with the Absence
 "of Desire of their Happiness." *Benevo-*
lence may denote only "the Desire of ano-
 "ther's Happiness ;" and *Malice*, "the De-
 "sire of their Misery," abstractly from any
 Approval or Condemnation by our *Mor-*
al Sense. This sort of Malice is never
 found in our Nature, when we are not trans-
 ported with Passion. The Propensities of
 Anger and Envy have some Resemblance of
 it ; yet Envy is not an ultimate Desire of
 another's Misery, but only a subordinate De-
 sire of it, as the Means of advancing our-
 selves, or some Person more beloved than
 the Person envied.

Fear.

FEAR, as far as it is an *Affection*, and not
 an undesigning Propensity, is "a Mixture
 "of *Sorrow* and *Aversion*, when we appre-
 hend the Probability of Evil, or the Loss
 "of Good befalling ourselves, or those we
 "love :" There is more or less of Sorrow,
 according to the apprehended Degrees of
 Probability. Hope, if it be any way an
 Affection, and not an Opinion, is "a Mix-
 "ture of *Desire* and *Joy*, upon the proba-
 "bility of obtaining Good, and avoiding
 "Evil." Both these Passions may have some
 Propensities and *Sensations* attending them,
 distinct from those of the other Affections.

Hope.

THE

THE confused Use of the Names, *Love*, *Sect.*
Hatred, *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Delight*, has made III.
 some of the most important Distinctions of  our Affections and Passions, to be overlook-
 ed. No Modifications of Mind can be more <sup>Confused
Use of
Names,</sup> different from each other, than a *private
Desire*, and a *publick*; yet both are called
Love. The *Love of Money*, for Instance,
 the *Love of a generous Character*, or a
Friend: The *Love of a fine Seat*, and the
Love of a Child. In like manner, what can
 be more different than the *Sorrow for a Loss
befallen ourselves*, and *Sorrow for the Death
of a Friend*? Of this Men must convince
 themselves by Reflection.

THERE is also a considerable Difference even among the *selfish Passions*, which bear the same general Name, according to the different *Senses* which constitute the Objects good or evil. Thus the Desire of *Honour*, and the Desire of *Wealth*, are certainly very different sorts of Affections, and accompanied with different Sensations: The *Sorrow* in like manner for our *Loss* by a *Shipwreck*, and our *Sorrow* for having done a *base Action*, or *Remorse*: Sorrow for our being subject to the *Gout* or *Stone*, and Sorrow for our being *despised* and *condemned*, or *Shame*: Sorrow for the *Damage* done by a *Fire*, and that Sorrow which arises upon an

S E C T. apprehended *Injury* from a Partner, or any
III. other of our Fellows, which we call *Anger*.

Where we get some special distinct *Names*,
we more easily acknowledge a Difference, as
it may appear in *Shame* and *Anger*; but had
we other *Names*, appropriated in the same
manner, we should imagine, with good
ground, as many distinct *Passions*. The like
Confusion is observable about our Senses.*

False Re-
presenta-
tions of our
Nature
rectified. To say that the *Sensation* accompanying
all sorts of Joy is pleasant, and *that* accom-
panying Sorrow uneasy, will not argue that
there is no farther Diversity. Pains have
many differences among themselves, and so
have Pleasures, according to the different
Senses by which they are perceived. To enu-
merate all these *Diversities*, would be diffi-
cult and tedious. But some Men have piqued
themselves so much upon representing "all
" our Affections as *selfish*; as if each Person
" were in his whole Frame only a *seperate*
" *System* from his Fellows, so that there was
" nothing in his Constitution leading him
" to a *publick Interest*, further than he ap-
" prehended it subservient to his own pri-
" vate Interest; and this Interest made no
" thing else, than the gratifying our *exter-*
" *nal Senses* and *Imagination*, or obtaining
" the Means of it:" that thereby the Wis-

* Treat. I. Sect. 1. Art. 10.

dom and Goodness of the AUTHOR of our SECT. Nature is traduced, as if he had given us III. the strongest *Dispositions* toward what he had ~~in~~ in his Laws prohibited; and directed us, by the Frame of our Nature, to the meanest and most contemptible Pursuits; as if *what* all good Men have represented as the *Excellence* of our Nature, were a *Force* or *Constraint* put upon it by *Art* or *Authority*. It may be useful to consider our Affections and Passions more particularly, as “they are ex-“ cited by something in our Frame different “from *Self-Love*, and tend to something “else than the private Pleasures of the ex-“ ternal *Senses* or *Imagination*.” This we may do under the following Heads, by shewing, 1. How our Passions arise from the *Moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour*. 2. How our Passions tend toward the *State of others*, abstractly from any Consideration of their *Moral Qualities*. 3. How the *publick Passions* are diversified by the *Moral Qualities* of the Agents, when they appear to our Moral Sense as virtuous or vicious. 4. How the publick Passions are diversified by the *Relations* of several Agents to each other, when we consider at once their *State* as to Happiness or Misery, and their past as well as present *Actions* towards each other. 5. How all these Passions may be complicated with the *selfish*. Under each of these Heads we may find the six Passions of *Malebranche*, or

SECT. the four of Zeno; with many other Combinations of them.



1. Passions about our own Actions. III. i. THE Passions about our own Actions occasioned by the *Moral Sense*. When we form the Idea of a *morally good Action*, or see it represented in the *Drama*, or read it in *Epicks* or *Romance*, we feel a *Desire* arising of doing the like. This leads most *Tempers* into an imagined Series of *Adventures*, in which they are still acting the generous and virtuous Part, like to the Idea they have received. If we have executed any good Design, we feel inward *Triumph* of Joy: If we are disappointed through our own *Negligence*, or have been diverted from it by some *Selfish View*, we shall feel a Sorrow called *Remorse*.

Reluctance. WHEN the Idea is in like manner formed of any *morally evil Action*, which we might possibly accomplish, if we reflect upon the Cruelty or pernicious Tendency of it, there arises *Reluctance*, or Aversion: If we have committed such a Crime, upon like Reflection we feel the Sorrow called *Remorse*: If we have resisted the Temptation, we feel a secret *Joy* and *Self-Approval*, for which there is no special Name.

WE might enumerate six other Passions from the Sense of *Honour*, according as we appre-

apprehend our Actions, or any other Circumstances, shall affect the *Opinions* which others form concerning us. When any ~~three~~^{three} Action or Circumstance occurs, from which we imagine Honour would arise, we feel *Desire*; when we attain it, *Joy*; when we are disappointed, *Sorrow*. When we first apprehend any Action or Circumstance as *dishonourable*, we feel *Aversion* arising; if we apprehend ourselves involved in it, or in danger of being tempted to it, we feel a Passion we may call *Modesty* or *Shame*; *Modesty*. *Shame*. when we escape or resist such Temptations, or avoid what is dishonourable, we feel a *Joy*, for which there is no special Name.

WE give the Name *Ambition* to a violent *Ambition.* Desire of Honour, but generally in a bad Sense, when it would lead the Agent into *immoral Means* to gratify it. The same Word often denotes the *Desire of Power*. *Pride* denotes sometimes the same Desires *Pride.* of Honour and Power, with Aversion to their contraries; sometimes *Pride* denotes Joy upon any apprehended *Right* or *Claim* to Honour; generally it is taken in a bad Sense, when one claims that to which he has no Right.

MEN may feel the Passion of *Shame* for *Shame* for the dishonourable Actions of others, when *others*. any part of the Dishonour falls upon *them-selves*;

S E C T. selves; as when the Person dishonoured is
 III. one of their Club, or Party, or Family.
 ~~~~ The general Relation of *human Nature* may  
 produce some uneasiness upon the Dishonour  
 of another, tho' this is more owing to our  
 publick Sense.

*2. Publick Passions abstractly.* IV. 2. THE second Class are the *publick Passions* about the *State of others*, as to Happiness or Misery, abstractly from their *Moral Qualities*. These Affections or Passions extend to all perceptive Natures, when there is no real or imagined Opposition of Interest. We naturally *desire* the Happiness of others while it is in suspense; *rejoice* in it when obtained, and *sorrow* for it when lost. We have *Aversion* to any impending Misery; we are *sorrowful* when it befalls any Person, and *rejoice* when it is removed. This Aversion and Sorrow we often call Pity or *Compassion*; the Joy we may call *Congratulation*.

SINCE our Moral Sense represents *Virtue* as the greatest Happiness to the Person possessed of it, our publick Affections will naturally make us desire the *Virtue of others*. When the Opportunity of a great Action occurs to any Person against whom we are no way prejudiced, we *wish* he would attempt it, and desire his good Success. If he succeeds, we feel *Joy*; if he is disappointed, or

or quits the Attempt, we feel Sorrow. Up-SECT. on like Opportunity of, or Temptation to III. a base Action, we have *Aversion* to the ~~the~~ Event: If he resists the Temptation, we feel Joy; if he yields to it, Sorrow. Our Affections toward the Person arise jointly with our Passions about this Event, according as he acquits himself virtuously or basely.

V. 3. THE Passions of the third Class 3. *Publick Affections*, jointly with ~~mo-~~ <sup>Passions</sup> ~~with mo-~~ <sup>real Percep-</sup> Agents. When Good appears attainable by ~~tions.~~ <sup>real Percep-</sup> a Person of *Moral Dignity*, our Desire of his Happiness, founded upon *Esteem* or *Approbation*, is much stronger than that supposed in the former Clas. The Misfortune of such a Person raises stronger *Sorrow*, *Pity*, or *Regret*, and *Dissatisfaction* with the ~~Regret.~~ Administration of the World, upon a light View of it, with a Suspicion of the *real Advantage* of Virtue. The Success of such a Character raises all the contrary Affections of Joy and Satisfaction with Providence, and Security in Virtue. When Evil threatens such a Character, we have strong *Aversion* to it, with *Love* toward the Person: His escaping the Evil raises Joy, Confidence in Providence, with Security in Virtue. If the Evil befalls him, we feel the contrary Passions, Sorrow, *Dissatisfaction* with Providence,

SECT. dence, and *Suspicion* of the Reality of  
III. Virtue.

*Wbi. b of  
them fit for  
the Dra-  
ma.*

HENCE we see how unfit such Representations are in *Tragedy*, as make the perfectly Virtuous miserable in the highest degree. They can only lead the Spectators into *Distrust* of Providence, *Diffidence* in Virtue; and into such Sentiments, as some Authors, who probably mistake his meaning, tell us *Brutus* expressed at his Death, “ That the “ Virtue he had pursued as a solid Good, “ proved but an empty Name.” But we must here remember, that, notwithstanding all the frightful Ideas we have inculcated upon us of the *King of Terrors*, yet an *honourable Death* is far from appearing to a generous Mind, as the greatest of Evils. The *Ruin of a Free State*, the *Slavery of a generous Spirit*, a *Life upon shameful Terms*, still appear vastly greater Evils; beside many other exquisite *Distresses* of a more private nature, in comparison of which, an honourable Death befalling a favourite Character, is looked upon as a Deliverance.

*Passions to-  
ward mo-  
ral evil  
Agents.*

*No disinte-  
reflected or ul-  
timate Ma-  
tive in Men.*

UNDER this Class are also included the Passions employed about the Fortunes of Characters, apprehended as *morally Evil*. Such Characters raise *Dislike* in any Observer, who has a moral Sense: But *Malice*, or the ultimate *Desire* of their Misery, does not

not necessarily arise toward them. Perhaps SECT.  
our Nature is not capable of desiring the III.  
Misery of any Being calmly, farther than it W W W  
may be necessary to the Safety of the innocent: We may find, perhaps, that there is no Quality in any Object which would excite in us *pure disinterested Malice*, or calm Desire of Misery for its own sake.\* When we apprehend any Person as *injurious* to ourselves, or to any innocent Person, especially to a Person beloved, the Passion of *Anger* arises toward the Agent. By *Anger Anger.*  
is generally meant " a Propensity to occasion Evil to another, arising upon apprehension of an Injury done by him:" This violent Propensity is attended generally, when the Injury is not very sudden, with Sorrow for the Injury sustained, or threatened, and Desire of repelling it, and making the Author of it *repent* of his Attempt, or *repair* the Damage.

THIS Passion is attended with the most *Its Effects.*  
violent *uneasy Sensations*, and produces as great Changes in our Bodies as any whatsoever. We are precipitantly led by it, to apprehend the *injurious* as *directly malicious*, designing the Misery of others without further Intention. While the Heat of this Passion continues, we naturally pursue the Mi-

\* See Sect. 5. Art. 5. of this Treatise.

S E C T. sery of the injurious, until they relent, and  
III. convince us of their better Intentions, by  
expressing their Sense of the Injury, and of-  
fering Reparation of Damage, with Securi-  
ty against future Offences.

Now as it is plainly necessary, in a System of Agents *capable of injuring* each other, that every one should be made *formidable* to an Invader, by such a violent Passion, till the Invader shews his Reformation of Temper, as above, and no longer ; so we find it is thus ordered in our Constitution. Upon these Evidences of Reformation in the Invader, our Passion naturally abates ; or if in any perverse Temper it does not, the *Sense of Mankind* turns against him, and he is looked upon as cruel and inhumane.

In considering more fully the Passions about the Fortunes of evil Characters, distinct from *Anger*, which arises upon a fresh Injury, we may first consider the evil Agents, such as a sudden View sometimes represents them, *directly evil* and *malicious* ; and then make proper Abatements, for *what* the worst of Men come short of this compleatly evil Temper. As Mathematicians suppose perfect *Hardness* in some Bodies, and *Elasticity* in others, and then make Allowances for the imperfect Degrees in natural Bodies.

THE Prospect of Good to a Person apprehended as entirely malicious, raises *Aversion* in the Observer, or *Desire* of his Disappointment; at least, when his Success would confirm him in any evil Intention. His Disappointment raises *Joy* in the Event, with *Trust* in Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. His Success raises the contrary Passions of *Sorrow* of *Hatred*. *Sorrow*, *Distrust*, and *Suspicion*. The *Prospect of Evil*, befalling an evil Character, at first, perhaps, seems grateful to the Observer, if he has conceived the Passion of *Anger*; but to a sedate Temper, no Misery is farther the Occasion of *Joy*, than as it is necessary to some prepotent Happiness in the whole. The *escaping* of Evil impending over such a Character, by which he is confirmed in Vice, is the Occasion of *Sorrow*, and *Distrust* of Providence and Virtue; and the Evil befalling him raises *Joy*, and *Satisfaction* with Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. We see therefore, that the *Success of evil Characters*, by obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, is an unfit Representation in *Tragedy*.

LET one reflect on this Class of Passions, as they arise upon Occasions which do not affect himself, and he will see how little of *Self-Love* there is in them; and yet they are frequently as violent as any Passions what-

**S E C T.** whatsoever. We seem conscious of some  
 III. *Dignity* in these Passions above the selfish  
 ones, and therefore never conceal them, nor  
 are we ashamed of them. These *complicated Passions* the Philosophers have confusedly  
 mentioned, under some general Names,  
 along with the simple selfish Passions. The  
*Poets* and *Criticks* have sufficiently shown,  
 that they felt these Differences, however it  
 did not concern them to explain them. We  
 may find Instances of them in all Dramatick Performances, both Antient and Modern.

*Passions about mixed Characters.* THE *Abatements* to be made for what  
 human Nature comes short of the highest  
 Degrees either of Virtue or Vice, may be  
 thus conceived: When the Good in any  
*mixed Character* surpasses the Evil, the Passions arise as toward the *Good*; where the  
 Evil surpasses the Good, the Passions arise as toward the *Evil*, only in both Cases with  
 less Violence. And further, the Passions in  
 both Cases are either *stopped*, or turned the  
 contrary way, by want of due *Proportion*  
 between the *State* and *Character*. Thus an  
 imperfect good Character, in pursuit of a  
 Good too great for his Virtue, or to the ex-  
 clusion of more worthy Characters, instead  
 of raising *Desire* of his Success, raises *Aver-  
 Envy, Sor- fision*; his Success raises *Envy*, or a Species  
 new, *Joy* of *Sorrow*, and his Disappointment, *Joy*.

An

An imperfectly evil Character, threatned by S E C T. an Evil greater than is necessary to make III. him relent and reform, or by a great Calamity, which has no direct tendency to reform him, instead of raising *Desire* toward the Event, raises *Aversion*; his escaping it raises *Joy*, and his falling under it raises *Pity*. *Pity*, a Species of Sorrow.

THERE is another Circumstance which exceedingly varies our Passions of this Class, <sup>The best Plots in Tragedy.</sup> when the Agents themselves, by their own Conduct, procure their Misery. When an imperfect good Character, by an evil Action, procures the highest Misery to himself; this raises these complicated Passions, *Pity* toward the Sufferer, *Sorrow* for the State, *Abhorrence* of Vice, *Awe* and *Admiration* of Providence, as keeping strict Measures of Sanctity and Justice. These Passions we may all feel, in reading the *Oedipus* of *Sophocles*, when we see the Distress of that Prince, occasioned by his superstitious Curiosity about his future Fortunes; his rash Violence of Temper, in Duelling without Provocation, and in pronouncing Execrations on Persons unknown. We feel the like Passions from the Fortunes of *Creon* in the *Antigone*; or from the Fates of *Pylades* and *Orestes*, in the *Andromache* of *Racine*, or our *Distressed Mother*. We heartily

SECT. tily pity these Characters, but without re-  
 III. pining at Providence; their Misery is the  
 ~~ Fruit of their own Actions. It is with the  
 justest Reason, that Aristotle\* prefers such  
 Plots to all others for *Tragedy*, since these  
 Characters come nearest to those of the  
 Spectators, and consequently will have the  
 strongest Influence on them. We are gene-  
 rally conscious of some good Dispositions,  
 mixed with many Weaknesses: few imagine  
 themselves capable of attaining the *height* of  
 perfectly good Characters, or arriving to  
 their high Degrees of Felicity; and fewer  
 imagine themselves capable of sinking into  
 the Baseness of perfectly *evil Tempers*, and  
 therefore few dread the Calamities which  
 befall them.

*How these Passions are raised by high and complicated Fortune* THERE is one farther Circumstance which strengthens this Class of Passions exceedingly, that is, the *greatness of the Change of Fortune* in the Person, or the *Surprize* with which it comes. As this gives the Person a more *acute Perception* either of Happiness or Misery, so it strengthens our Passions, arising from Observation of his State. Of this the Poets are very sensible, who so often represent to us the former Prosperity of the Person, for whom they

\* *Aristotle Poetic. Chap. 13.*

would

would move our pity; his *Projects*, his *SECT.* *Hopes*, his *half-executed Designs*. One left III. his *Palace unfinished*, another his *betrothed* ~~two~~  
*Mistress*, or *young Wife*; one promised him-  
self *Glory*, and a fortunate *old Age*; another  
was heaping up *Wealth*, boasted of his  
*Knowledge*, was honoured for his fine *Ar-  
mour*, his *Activity*, his *Augury*.

Αλλ' εἰς οἰωνοῖς ἐρύσσαται κῆρα μέλανιν.  
—οὐδὲ τί οἱ τόγ' ἐπίρκεσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον. Homer.


Sed non Augurio potuit depellere pestem;  
Sed non Dardanice medicari cupidis ietum  
Invaluit. ————— Virg.

THE Joy is in like manner increased up-  
on the Misfortunes of evil Characters, by  
representing their former *Prosperity*, *Pride*  
and *Insolence*.

THIS Sorrow or Joy is strangely diversi-  
fied or complicated, when the Sufferers are  
*multiplied*, by representing the Persons at-  
tached to the principal Sufferer, and setting  
before us their *Affections*, *Friendships*, ten-  
der *Solicitudes*, care in *Education*, succour  
in former *Distresses*; this every one will  
find in reading the Stories of *Pallas*, *Ca-  
milla*, *Nisus*, and *Euryalus*; or in general,  
any Battle of *Homer* or *Virgil*. What there

G                      is



SECT. is in Self-Love to account for these Effects,  
III. let all Mankind judge.



*4. Publick  
Passions  
and Rela-  
tions of A-  
gents.*

VI. THE Passions of the fourth Class arise from the same moral Sense and publick Affections, upon observing the Actions of Agents some way attached to each other, by prior Ties of Nature or good Offices, or disengaged by prior Injuries; when these Relations are known, the moral Qualities of the Actions appear considerably different, and our Passions are much diversified by them: there is also a great Complication of different Passions, and a sort of Contraste, or assemblage of opposite Passions toward the several Persons concerned. The most moving Peripeties, and Remembrances, in Epick and Dramatick Poetry, are calculated to raise these complicated Passions; and in Oratory we study to do the same.

THUS strong Sentiments of *Gratitude*, and vigorous Returns of good Offices observed, raise in the Spectator the highest *Love* and *Esteem* toward both the *Benefactor*, and even the *Person obliged*, with *Security* and *Delight* in *Virtue*.—*Ingratitude*, or returning bad Offices designedly, raises the greatest *Detestation* against the *Ungrateful*; and *Love* with *Compassion* toward the Bene-

Benefactor, with *Dejection* and *Dissidence* S E C T. in a virtuous Course of Life.—*Forgiving* III. of *Injuries*, and much more returning *God*  for *Evil*, appears wonderfully great and beautiful to our moral Sense: it raises the strongest *Love* toward the Forgiver, *Compassion* for the Injury received; toward the Injurious, if *relenting*, some degree of *Good-will*, with *Compassion*; if not *relenting*, the most violent *Abhorrence* and *Hatred*.— Mutual *good Offices* done designedly between morally *good Agents*, raise *Joy* and *Love* in the Observer toward both, with *delight* in *Virtue*.—*Mutual Injuries* done by evil Agents designedly, raise *Joy* in the Events, along with *Hatred* to the Agents, with *Detestation* of *Vice*.—*Good Offices* done designedly by *good Agents* toward *Evil*, but not so as to encourage, or enable them to further *Mischief*, raise *Love* toward the *good Agent*; *Displience*, with some *Good-will* toward the *evil Agent*.—*Good Offices* designedly done mutually among *evil Agents*, if these Offices do not promote their *evil Intentions*, diminish our *Dislike* and *Hatred*, and introduce some *Compassion* and *Benevolence*.—*Good Offices* from *good Agents*; to *Benefactors unknown to the Agent*, or to their unknown Friends or *Posterity*, increase *Love* toward both; and raise great *Satisfaction* and *Trust* in *Providence*, with 

S E C T. Security in Virtue, and Joy in the Event.

III. —*Undesigned evil Returns* in like Case  
with the former, raise Sorrow in the Observer upon account of the Event, Pity toward both, with Suspicion of Providence and Virtue.—An *undesigned Return of Evil* to an evil Agent from a good one, whom he had injured, raises Joy upon account of the Event, and Trust in Providence.—*Undesigned evil Offices mutually done* to each other by evil Agents, raise Joy in the Event, Abhorrence of Vice, and Satisfaction with Providence.—*Undesigned good Offices* done by good Agents toward the evil, by which they are further excited or impowered to do evil, raise Pity toward the good Agent, Indignation and Envy toward the Evil, with Distrust in Providence.—*Undesigned good Offices* done by good to evil Agents, by which they are not excited or enabled to do further mischief, raise Envy or Indignation toward the evil Agent, if the Benefit be great; if not, they scarce raise any new Passion distinct from that we had before, of Love toward the one, and Hatred or Dislike toward the other.

THESE Passions might have been diversified, according to Malebranche's Division, as the Object or Event was *present*, or in *suspence*, or *certainly removed*: And would appear in different Degrees of Strength, according

cording as the Persons concerned were more S E C T. nearly attached to the Observer, by *Nature*, III. *Friendship*, or *Acquaintance*. *~~~~~*

VII. THE Passions of the last Class, are *5. Publick Passions joined with the selfb.* those in which any of the former Kinds are complicated with *selfish Passions*, when our own Interest is concerned. It is needless here to repeat them over again: Only this may be noted in general, that, as the Conjunction of selfish Passions will very much increase the Commotion of Mind, so the Opposition of any *selfish Interests*, which appear of great Importance, will often conquer the *publick Desires* or Aversions, or those founded upon the Sense of *Virtue* or *Honour*; and this is the Case in vicious Actions done against *Conscience*.

THESE Complications of Passions are often not reflected on by the Person who is acted by them, during their Rage: But a judicious Observer may find them by Reflection upon himself, or by Observation of others; and the Representation of them never fails to affect us in the most lively manner.

—*Aestuat ingens*

*Imo in Corde Pudor, mixtoque Insania Luctu,*  
*Et Furiis agitatus Amor, & conscientia Virtus. Virg.*

**S E C T.** IN all this tedious Enumeration, let any  
**III.** one consider, " How few of our Passions  
 can be any way deduced from *Self-Love*,  
 or desire of private Advantage? And  
 how improbable it is, that Persons in  
 the Heat of Action, have any of those  
*subtile Reflections*, and *selfish Intentions*,  
 which some Philosophers invent for  
 them? How great a part of the Com-  
 motions of our Minds arise upon the  
*moral Sense*, and from *publick Affections*  
 toward the good of others? We should  
 find, that without these Principles in  
 our Nature, we should not feel the  
 one half at least of our present *Plea-  
 sures or Pains*; and that our Na-  
 ture would be almost reduced to *Indo-  
 lence*."

*How Characters and Tempers of Men are deformed.* AN accurate Observation of the several distinct Characters and Tempers of Men, which are constituted by the various Degrees of their *natural Sagacity*, their Knowledge, their *Interests*, their *Opinions*, or *Associations* of Ideas, with the Passions which are prevalent in them, is a most useful and pleasant Entertainment for those, who have Opportunities of large Acquaintance and Observation. But our present Purpose leads only to consider the first general

neral Elements, from the various Combinations of which, the several Tempers and Characters are formed.



THIS account of our Affections will, *The Order* however, prepare the way for discerning *of Nature's* considerable Evidences for the *Goodness of* <sup>partly vindicated.</sup> *the Deity*, from the Constitution of our Nature; and for removing the Objections of voluptuous luxurious Men, against the Rules of Virtue laid down by Men of Reflection. While no other Ideas of *Pleasure* or *Advantage* are given us, than those which relate to the external Senses; nor any other *Affections* represented as natural, save those toward private Good: it may be difficult to persuade many, even of those who are not Enemies to Virtue from *Inclination*, of the Wisdom of the Deity, in making the *Bias* of our Nature opposite to the Laws he gives us; and making all *Pleasure*, the most natural Character of Good, attend the *prohibited Actions*, or the *indifferent ones*; while *Obedience* to the Law must be a *constrained Course of Action*, inforced only by *Penalties* contrary to our *natural Affections* and *Senses*. *Nature* and *Grace* are by this Scheme made very opposite: Some would question whether they could have the same Author. Whereas, if the preceding Account be just, we see no

S E C T. such Inconsistency: " Every Passion or Af-  
III. " fection in its moderate Degree is inno-  
~ " cent, many are directly amiable, and mo-  
" rally good: we have *Senses* and *Affections*  
" leading us to *publick Good*, as well as to  
" *private*; to *Virtue*, as well as to other  
" sorts of Pleasure."

S E C T.

## S E C T. IV.

*How far our several Affections and Passions are in our Power, either to govern them when raised, or to prevent their arising : with some general Observations about their Objects.*

I. **F**ROM what was said above it appears, S E C T. IV. that our Passions are not so much in the Topicks used either to raise or allay them. *Affections and Passions depend much upon Opinions.* We are so constituted by Nature, that, as soon as we form the Idea of certain Objects or Events, our *Desire* or *Aversion* will arise toward them; and consequently our Affections must very much depend upon the *Opinions* we form, concerning any thing which occurs to our Mind, its *Qualities*, *Tendencies*, or *Effects*. Thus the Happiness of every sensitive Nature is desired, as soon as we remove all *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of *Opposition of Interest* between this Being and others. The *Apprehension* of morally good Qualities, is the necessary Cause of *Approval*, by our moral Sense, and of stronger Love.

**S E C T. Love.** The Cause of Hatred, is the Apprehension of the opposite Qualities. Fear, in like manner, must arise from Opinion of Power, and Inclination to hurt us: Pity from the Opinion of another's undeserved Misery: Shame only arises from Apprehension of Contempt from others, or Consciousness of moral Evil: Joy, in any Event, must arise from an Opinion of its Goodness. Our selfish Passions in this, do not differ from our publick ones.

THIS may shew us some Inconsistency in Topicks of Argument, often used to inculcate Piety and Virtue. Whatever Motives of Interest we suggest, either from a present or future Reward, must be ineffectual, until we have first laboured to form amiable Conceptions of the Deity, and of our Fellow-Creatures. And yet in many Writers, even in this Cause, "Mankind are represented as *absolutely evil*, or at best as *entirely selfish*; nor are there any nobler Ideas of the DEITY suggested. It is grown a *fashionable Topick*, to put some *fly selfish Construction* upon the most generous human Actions; and he passes for the shredest Writer, or Orator, who is most artful in these Insinuations."

*Appetites  
and Ahe-  
cetions di-  
stinguished.*

**II. THE Government of our Passions**  
must then depend much upon our Opinions:  
But

But we must here observe an obvious Difference among our Desires, *viz.* that "some have a *previous*, painful, or uneasy Sensation, antecedently to any Opinion of Good in the Object; nay, the Object is often chiefly esteemed good, only for its *allaying this Pain* or Uneasiness; or if the Object gives also positive Pleasure, yet the *uneasy Sensation* is previous to, and independent of this Opinion of Good in the Object." These Desires we may call *Appetites*. "Other Desires and Aversions necessarily pre-suppose an Opinion of Good and Evil in their Objects; and the Desires or Aversions, with their concomitant uneasy Sensations, are produced or occasioned by this Opinion or Apprehension." Of the former kind are Hunger and Thirst, and the Desires between the Sexes; to which Desires there is an uneasy Sensation *previous*, even in those who have little other Notion of Good in the Objects, than allaying this Pain or Uneasiness. There is something like to this in the Desire of Society, or the Company of our Fellow-creatures. Our Nature is so much formed for this, that altho' the Absence of Company is not immediately painful, yet if it be long, and the Person be not employed in something which tends to Society at last, or which is designed to fit him for Society, an uneasy Fretfulness, Sullenness, and Discontent,

SECT. content, will grow upon him by degrees, IV. which Company alone can remove. He ~~never~~ shall not perhaps be sensible always, that it is the Absence of Company which occasions his Uneasiness: A painful Sensation dictates nothing of itself: it must be therefore some *Reflection* or *Instinct*, distinct from the Pain, which suggests the Remedy. Our Benevolence and Compassion pre-suppose indeed some *Knowledge* of other sensitive Beings, and of what is good or evil to them: But they do not arise from any previous *Opinion*, that "the Good of others " tends to the Good of the Agent." They are *Determinations of our Nature*, previous to our Choice from Interest, which excite us to Action, as soon as we know other sensitive or rational Beings, and have any Apprehension of their Happiness or Misery.

IN other Desires the Case is different. No Man is distressed for want of *fine Smells*, *harmonious Sounds*, *beautiful Objects*, *Wealth*, *Power*, or *Grandeur*, previously to some Opinion formed of these things as good, or some *prior Sensation* of their Pleasures. In like manner, *Virtue* and *Honour* as necessarily give us Pleasure, when they occur to us, as Vice and Contempt give us Pain; but, antecedently to some *Experience* or *Opinion* of this Pleasure, there is no previous uneasy Sensation in their Absence, as there is

is in the Absence of the Objects of *Appetite*. S E C T. The Necessity of these Sensations previous IV. to our Appetites, has been considered already.\* The Sensations accompanying or subsequent to our other Desires, by which they are denominated *Passions*, keep them in a just Ballance with our *Appetites*, as was before observed.

BUT this holds in general, concerning all our Desires or Aversions, that according to the *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good or Evil, the Desire or Aversion is increased or diminished: Every *Gratification* of any Desire gives at first Pleasure; and Disappointment Pain, generally proportioned to the Violence of the Desire. In like manner, the *escaping* any Object of Aversion, tho' it makes no permanent Addition to our Happiness, gives at first a pleasant *Sensation*, and relieves us from Misery, proportioned to the Degree of *Aversion* or *Fear*. So when any Event, to which we had an Aversion, befalls us, we have at first Misery proportioned to the Degree of Aversion. So that some Pain is subsequent upon all *Frustration* of Desire or Aversion, but it is previous to those Desires only, which are called *Appetites*.

\* Sect. 2. Art. 6.

SECT. III. HENCE we see how impossible it is  
 IV. for one to judge of the *Degrees* of Happi-  
 ness or Misery in others, unless he knows  
 their *Opinions*, their *Associations* of Ideas,  
 and the *Degrees* of their Desires and Aver-  
 sions. We see also of how much Conse-  
 quence our *Associations* of Ideas and *Opin-*  
*ions* are to our Happiness or Misery, and  
 to the Command of our Passions.

*Associati-* For tho' in our *Appetites* there are uneas-  
*ons of Ideas* and *Sensations*, previous to any Opinion, yet  
*and Opini-* our very Appetites may be strengthned or  
*ons increase* weakned, and variously altered by *Opinion*,  
*or diminis* the strength of our *De-* or *Associations* of Ideas. Before their Inter-  
*sirs.* vention, the bodily Appetites are easily sa-  
 tisfied ; Nature has put it in almost every  
 one's power, so far to gratify them, as to  
 support the Body, and remove Pain. But  
 when *Opinion*, and *confused Ideas*, or *Fancy*  
 comes in, and represents some particular  
 kinds of *Gratifications*, or great Variety of  
 them, as of great Importance ; when Ideas  
 of *Dignity*, *Grandeur*, *Magnificence*, *Gene-*  
*rosity*, or any other *moral Species*, are joined  
 to the Objects of Appetites, they may  
 furnish us with endless Labour, Vexation,  
 and Misery of every kind.

As to the other Desires which pre-sup-  
 pose some *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good,  
 previous

previous to any Sensation of uneasiness; S E C T. they must still be more directly influenced IV. by *Opinion*, and *Affections* of Ideas. The ~~more~~ higher the *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good or Evil is, the stronger must the *Desire* or *Aversion* be; the greater is the Pleasure of *Success* at first, and the greater the Pain of *Disappointment*. Our publick Desires are influenced in the same manner with the private: what we conceive as Good, we shall desire for those we love, as well as for ourselves; and that in proportion to the *Degree of Good* apprehended in it: whatever we apprehend as Evil in any degree to those we love, to that we shall have proportionable Aversion.

THE common Effect of these *Affections* of Ideas is this, " that they raise the " Passions into an extravagant Degree, be- " yond the proportion of real Good in the " Object: And commonly beget some se- " cret Opinions to justify the Passions. But " then the Confutation of these false Opi- " nions is not sufficient to break the *Affec- " tion*, so that the *Desire* or *Passion* shall " continue, even when our Understanding " has suggested to us, that the Object is not " good, or not proportioned to the Strength " of the *Desire*." Thus we often may ob- serve, that Persons, who by reasoning have laid aside all Opinion of *Spirits being in the dark*

**S E C T.** dark more than in the light, are still uneasy to be alone in the dark.\* Thus the *luxuricus*, the extravagant Lover, the *Miser*, can scarce be supposed to have *Opinions* of the several Objects of their Pursuit, proportioned to the Vehemence of their Desires; but the constant *Indulgence* of any Desire, the frequent *Repetition* of it, the *diverting* our Minds from all other Pursuits, the Strain of *Conversation* among Men of the same Temper, who often haunt together, the *Contagion* in the very Air and Countenance of the passionate, beget such wild *Affociations* of Ideas, that a sudden *Conviction* of *Reason* will not stop the Desire or Aversion, any more than an Argument will surmount the *Loathings* or *Aversions*, acquired against certain Meats or Drinks, by Surfeits or emeticke Preparations.

THE *Luxurious* are often convinced, when any Accident has revived a *natural Appetite*, of the superior Pleasures in a plain Dinner, with a sharp Stomach:† but

\* *Ac veluti pueri trepidant, atque omnia cæcis  
In tenebris metuant, sic nos in luce timemus  
Interdum nihilo quæ sunt metuenda magis.*

Luc.

† —— *Leporem seclatus, equove  
Lassus ab in domito, vel si Romana satigat  
Militia assuetum Græcari ——  
Cum labor extuderit fastidiz  
————— Cum sale panis  
Latrancem stomachum bene leniet ——*

Hoc.  
this

this does not reform them ; they have got S E C T. all the Ideas of *Dignity*, *Grandeur*, *Excellence*, and *Enjoyment of Life* joined to their ~~WW~~ IV. Table. Explain to a Miser the Folly of his Conduct, so that he can alledge nothing in his Defence ; yet he will go on,

*Ut locuples moriatur egenti vivere fato.* Juv.

He has likewise all Ideas of *Good*, of *Worth*, and *Importance* in Life confounded with his Coffers.

A ROMANTICK Lover has in like manner no Notion of Life without his *Mistress*, all *Virtue* and *Merit* are summed up in his *inviolable Fidelity*. The *Connoisseur* has all Ideas of valuable *Knowledge*, *Gentleman-like Worth* and *Ability* associated with his beloved Arts. The Idea of *Property* comes along with the *Taste*, and makes his Happiness impossible, without *Possession* of what he admires. A plain Question might confute the *Opinion*, but will not break the *Association* : “ What Pleasure “ has the Possessor more than others, to “ whose Eyes they are exposed as well as “ his ?

OUR *publick Desires* are affected by confused Ideas, in the same manner with our private Desires. What is apprehended as

H Good,

SECT. Good, thro' an Association of foreign Ideas,  
IV. shall be pursued for those we love, as well as  
what is really good for them. Our benevo-  
lent Passions in the nearer Ties, are as apt  
to be too violent as any whatsoever: this we  
may often experience in the *Love of Off-  
spring, Relations, Parties, Cabals.* The  
Violence of our Passion makes us sometimes  
incapable of pursuing effectually their Good,  
and sinks us into an useless State of Sorrow  
upon their Misfortunes. *Compassion* often  
makes the Evil greater to the Spectator than  
to the Sufferer; and sometimes subjects the  
Happiness of a Person of great Worth, to  
every Accident befalling one entirely void  
of it.

THE Desire of Virtue, upon extensive  
impartial Schemes of publick Happiness,  
can scarce be too strong; but, upon *mista-  
ken or partial Views* of publick Good, this  
Desire of Virtue may often lead Men into  
very pernicious Actions. One may con-  
ceive a sort of *Extravagancy*, and *effeminate  
Weakness* even of this Desire; as when Men  
are dissatisfied with themselves for *Dijap-  
pointments* in good Attempts, which it was  
not in their Power to accomplish; when some *heroick Tempers* shew no Regard to  
private Good; when the Pursuit of the  
lovely Form is so passionate, that the Agent  
does

does not relish his *past Conduct* by agreeable S E C T.  
Reflection, but like the Ambitious,

IV.



*Nil actum reputat si quid supereffet agendum.* Lucan.

BUT the most pernicious *Perversions* of this Desire are “ some *partial Admirations* “ of certain moral Species, such as *Fortitude*, *Propagation of true Religion*, *Zeal for a Party*; while other Virtues are “ overlooked, and the very *End* to which “ the admired Qualities are subservient is “ forgotten. Thus some *Phantoms* of Virtue are raised, wholly opposite to its true “ Nature, and to the sole End of it, *the publick Good.*”

HONOUR, in like manner, has had its foolish Associations, and the true Nature of it has been overlooked, so that the Desire of it has run into *Enthusiasm*, and pernicious *Madness*. Thus, “ however our Desires, when our *Opinions* are true, and “ the Desire is proportioned to the *true Opinion*, are all calculated for good, either “ publick or private; yet *false Opinions*, “ and *confused Ideas*, or too great a *Violence* “ in any of them, above a due Proportion “ to the rest, may turn the best of them into destructive Follies.”

SECT. THIS is probably the Case in those Affections which some suppose *natural*, or at least incident to our Natures, and yet *absolutely evil*: Such as *Rancour*, or *disinterested Malice*, *Revenge*, *Misanthropy*. We indeed find our Nature determined to disapprove an Agent apprehended as evil, or malicious, thro' *direct Intention*; we must desire the Destruction of such a Being, not only from Self-Love, but from our Benevolence to others. Now when we rashly form Opinions of *Sects*, or *Nations*, as absolutely evil; or get associated Ideas of *Impiety*, *Cruelty*, *Profaneness*, recurring upon every mention of them: when, by repeated Reflection upon Injuries received, we strengthen our Dislike into an *obdurate Aversion*, and conceive that the Injurious are *directly malicious*; we may be led to act in such a manner, that Spectators, who are unacquainted with our *secret Opinions*, or *confused Apprehensions of others*, may think we have *pure disinterested Malice* in our Nature; a very *Instinct* toward the Misery of others, when it is really only the *overgrowth* of a just natural Affection, upon false Opinions, or confused Ideas; even as our *Appetites*, upon which our natural Life depends, may acquire accidental *Loathings* at the most wholesome Food. Our Ideas and Opinions of Mankind are often very rashly formed,  
but

*Malicious or cruel Tempers, how they arise.*

but our *Affections* are generally suited to our S E C T. Opinions. When our Ideas and Opinions of the moral Qualities of others are just, our Affections are generally regular and good: But when we give loose Reins to our *Imagination* and *Opinion*, our Affections must follow them into all Extravagance and Folly; and inadvertent Spectators will imagine some *Dispositions* in us wholly useless, and absolutely and directly *evil*.

Now the *Gratification* of these destructive Desires, like those of all the rest, gives at first some *Pleasure*, proportioned to their Violence; and the *Disappointment* gives proportioned *Pain*. But as to the *Continuance* of these Pleasures or Pains, we shall find hereafter great Diversity.

FROM this view of our Desires, we may see "the great Variety of Objects, Circumstances, Events, which must be of Importance to the Happiness of a Creature, furnished with such a Variety of Senses of Good and Evil, with equally various Desires corresponding to them: especially considering the strange Combinations of Ideas, giving Importance to many Objects, in their own Nature indifferent."

IV. WE must in the next Place enquire how far these several Desires must necessarily arise

SECT. "sarily arise, or may be prevented by our  
IV. "Conduct."

1. *That of  
external  
Pleasures.*

THE Pleasures and Pains of the *external Senses* must certainly be perceived by every one who comes into the World; the one raising some Degree of Desire, and the other Aversion: the *Pains of Appetites* arise yet more certainly than others, and are previous to any *Opinion*. But then it is very much in our power to keep these Sensations *pure* and *unmixed* with any foreign Ideas: so that the plainest Food and Raiment, if sufficiently nourishing and healthful, may keep us easy, as well as the *rarest* or most *expensive*. Nay the Body, when accustomed to the simpler Sorts, is easiest in the Use of them: And we are raised to an higher Degree of *Chearfulness*, by a small Improvement in our Table, than it is possible to bring a *pampered Body* into, by any of the Productions of Nature. Whatever the Body is once accustomed to, produces no considerable Change in it.

2. *The De-  
fines of the  
Pleasures  
of the Im-  
agination.*

THE Pleasures of the *Imagination*, or of the *internal Sense of Beauty, and Decency, and Harmony*, must also be perceived by us. The *Regularity, Proportion and Order* in external Forms, will as necessarily strike the Mind, as any Perceptions of the external Senses. But then, as we have no uneasiness

finess of *Appetite*, previous to the Reception SECT. IV.  
of those grateful Ideas, we are not *necessa-*  
*rily* made miserable in their Absence; unless THE  
by some fantastick *Habit* we have raised  
very violent Desires, or by a long Pursuit of  
them, have made ourselves incapable of  
other Enjoyments.

AGAIN, the Sense and Desire of *Beauty*  
of several kinds is entirely abstracted from  
*Possession* or *Property*; so that the finest *Re-*  
*lish* of this kind, and the strongest subse-  
quent *Desires*, if we admit no foolish Con-  
junctions of Ideas, may almost every where  
be gratified with the Prospects of *Nature*,  
and with the Contemplation of the more  
curious *Works of Art*, which the Propri-  
tors generally allow to others without *Re-*  
*straint*. But if this Sense or Desire of Beau-  
ty itself be accompanied with the Desire of  
*Possession* or *Property*; if we let it be guided  
by *Custom*, and receive *Associations* of so-  
reign Ideas in our Fancy of *Dress*, *Equi-*  
*page*, *Furniture*, *Retinue*; if we relish only  
the Modes of the *Great*, or the Marks of  
*Distinction* as beautiful; if we let such De-  
sires grow strong, we must be very *great* in-  
deed, before we can secure constant Pleasure  
by this Sense: and every Disappointment or  
Change of Fortune must make us miserable.  
The like Fate may attend the Pursuit of  
*Speculative Sciences*, *Poetry*, *Musick*, or  
H 4 Painting;

SECT. Painting; to excel in these things is granted  
 IV. but to few. A violent Desire of *Distinction*  
 and *Eminence* may bring on Vexation and  
 Sorrow for the longest Life.

3. *The publick Desires.* THE Pleasures and Pains of the *publick Sense* will also necessarily arise in us. Men cannot live without the *Society* of others, and their *good Offices*; they must observe both the *Happiness* and *Misery*, the *Pleasures* and *Pains* of their Fellows: *Desire* and *Aversion* must arise in the Observer. Nay farther, as we cannot avoid more near Attachments of Love, either from the Instinct between the *Sexes*, or that toward *Offspring*, or from Observation of the *benevolent Tempers* of others, or their particular *Virtues* and *good Offices*, we must feel the Sensations of *Joy* and *Sorrow*, from the State of others even in the stronger Degrees, and have the *publick Desires* in a greater Height. All we can do to prevent the *Pains* of general Benevolence, will equally lessen the *Pleasures* of it. If we restrain our *publick Affection* from growing strong, we abate our *Pleasures* from the good *Succes* of others, as much as we lessen our *Compassion* for their *Misfortunes*: If we confine our *Desires* to a small *Circle* of *Acquaintance*, or to a *Cabal* or *Faction*, we contract our *Pleasures* as much as we do our *Pains*. The *Distinction* of *Pleasures* and *Pains* into *real* and

and *imaginary*, or rather into necessary and ~~SECT.~~ IV.  
*voluntary*, would be of some use, if we could correct the *Imaginations* of others, as ~~we~~ well as our own ; but if we cannot, we are sure, whoever thinks himself miserable, is really so ; however he might possibly, by a better Conduct of his Imagination, have prevented this Misery. All we can do in this affair, is to obtain a great Share of the Pleasures of the *stronger Ties*, with fewer *Pains* of them, by confining the stronger Degrees of Love, or our Friendships, to Persons of *corrected Imaginations*, to whom as few of the uncertain Objects of Desire are necessary to Happiness as is possible. Our Friendship with such Persons may probably be to us a much greater Source of Happiness than of Misery, since the Happiness of such Persons is more probable than the contrary.

SINCE there is nothing in our Nature determining us to *disinterested Hatred* toward any Person ; we may be secure against all the Pains of *Malice*, by preventing false *Opinions* of our Fellows as absolutely evil, or by guarding against *habitual Anger*, and *rash Aversions*.

THE moral Ideas do arise also necessarily in our Minds. We cannot avoid observing the *Affections* of those we converse with ; their

SECT. their *Actions*, their *Words*, their *Looks* before us. IV. tray them. We are conscious of our own *Affections*, and cannot avoid Reflection upon them sometimes: the kind and generous Affections will appear amiable, and all Cruelty, Malice, or even very selfish Affections, will be disapproved, and appear odious. Our own *Temper*, as well as that of others, will appear to our moral Sense either lovely or deformed, and will be the Occasion either of Pleasure or Uneasiness. We have not any proper *Appetite* toward Virtue, so as to be uneasy, even antecedently to the Appearance of the lovely Form; but as soon as it appears to any Person, as it certainly must very early in Life, it never fails to raise *Desire*, as Vice does raise *Aversion*. This is so rooted in our Nature, that no *Education*, *false Principles*, *depraved Habits*, or even *Affectation* itself can entirely root it out. LUCRETIUS and HOBBES shew themselves in innumerable Instances struck with some moral Species; they are full of Expressions of *Admiration*, *Gratitude*, *Praise*, *Desire of doing Good*; and of *Censure*, *Disapprobation*, *Aversion to some Forms of Vice*.

SINCE then there is no avoiding these Desires and Perceptions of *Morality*, all we can do to secure ourselves in the possession of Pleasures of this kind, without Pain, consists in “ a vigorous Use of our Reason, to discern

“ discern what Actions really tend to the SECT.  
“ publick Good in the *whole*, that we may IV.  
“ not do *that* upon a partial View of Good, ~~WW~~  
“ which afterwards, upon a fuller Exam-  
“ nation, we shall condemn and abhor our-  
“ selves for ; and withal, to fix our *Friend-*  
“ *ships* with Persons of like Dispositions,  
“ and just Discernment.” Men of partial  
Views of publick Good, if they never ob-  
tain any better, may be easy in a very perni-  
cious Conduct, since the *moral Evil* or *De-*  
*formity* does not appear to them. But this  
is seldom to be hoped for in any partial Con-  
duct. Those who are injured by us fail not  
to complain ; the Spectators, who are dis-  
engaged from our partial Attachments, will  
often take the Freedom to express their  
Sentiments, and set our Conduct in a full  
Light : This must very probably occasion  
to us *Shame* and *Remorse*. It cannot there-  
fore be an indifferent Matter, to an Agent  
with a moral Sense, what *Opinions* he forms  
of the Tendency of Actions ; what partial  
*Attachments* of Love he has toward *Parties*  
or *Factions*. If he has true Opinions of the  
Tendencies of Actions ; if he carefully ex-  
amines the real Dignity of Persons and Cau-  
ses, he may be sure that the Conduct which  
he now approves he shall always approve,  
and have delight in Reflection upon it,  
however it be censured by others. But if  
he takes up at hazard *Opinions* of Actions ;  
if

SECT. if he has a foolish *Admiration* of particular Sects, and as foolish *Aversions* and Dislike to others, not according to any real Importance or Dignity, he shall often find occasion for *Inconstancy* and *Change* of his Affections, with *Shame* and *Remorse* for his past Conduct, and an inward *Dislike* and *Self-Condemnation*.

WHAT most deeply affects our Happiness or Misery, are the Dispositions of those Persons with whom we voluntarily contract some nearer *Intimacies* of Friendship: If we act wisely in this Point, we may secure to ourselves the greatest Pleasures with the fewest Pains, by attaching ourselves to Persons of real Goodness, good Offices toward whom are useful to the World. The Ties of *Blood* are generally very strong, especially toward *Offspring*; they need rather the Bridle than the Spur, in all Cases wherein the Object is not recommended to a singular Love by his good Qualities. We may, in a considerable measure, restrain our *natural Affection* toward a worthless *Offspring*, by setting our *publick Affections* and our *moral Sense* against it, in frequent Contemplation of their Vices, and of the Mischief which may arise to Persons of more worth from them, if we give them any Countenance in their Vices.

THE regulating our Apprehensions of S E C T. the *Actions of others*, is of very great Im- IV. portance, that we may not imagine Man-kind worse than they really are, and thereby bring upon ourselves a Temper full of Suspicion, Hatred, Anger and Contempt toward others; which is a constant State of Misery, much worse than all the Evils to be feared from Credulity. If we examine the true Springs of human Action, we shall seldom find their Motives worse than Self-Love. Men are often subject to Anger, and upon sudden Provocations do Injuries to each other, and that only from Self-Love, without Malice; but the greatest part of their Lives is employed in Offices of natural Affection, Friendship, innocent Self-Love, or Love of a Country. The little Party-Prejudices are generally founded upon Ignorance, or false Opinions, rather apt to move Pity than Hatred. Such Considerations are the best Preservative against Anger, Malice, and Discontent of Mind with the Order of Nature. " When you would make yourself cheerful and easy (says the Emperor \*) consider the Virtues of your several Acquaintances, the Industry and Diligence of one, the Modesty of another, the Generosity or Liberality of a

\* Marcus Antoninus, Lib. vi. C. 48.

" third;

SECT. " third; and in some Persons some other  
 IV. " Virtue. There is nothing so delightful,  
 ~~~ " as the Resemblances of the *Virtues* ap-  
 " pearing in the Conduct of your Contem-
 " poraries as frequently as possible. Such
 " Thoughts we should still retain with us."

WHEN the *moral Sense* is thus assisted by a sound Understanding and Application, our own Actions may be a constant Source of solid Pleasure, along with the Pleasures of *Benevolence*, in the highest Degree which our Nature will admit, and with as few of its Pains as possible.

*How far
our Sense
of Honour
is in our
power.*

As to the Desires of *Honour*, since we cannot avoid observing or hearing of the Sentiments of others concerning our Conduct, we must feel the Desire of the *good Opinions* of others, and Aversion to their *Censures* or *Condemnation*: since the one necessarily gives us Pleasure, and the other Pain. Now it is impossible to bring all Men into the same Opinions of particular Actions, because of their different Opinions of *publick Good*, and of the *Means* of promoting it; and because of *opposite Interests*; so that it is often impossible to be secure against all Censure or Dishonour from some of our Fellows. No one is so much Master of *external Things*, as to make his honourable Intentions successful; and yet *Success*

cess is a Mark by which many judge of the SECT.
Goodness of Attempts. Whoever therefore IV.
suffers his Desire of Honour or *Applause* to ~~grow~~
grow violent, without Distinction of the
Persons to whose Judgment he submits,
runs a great hazard of Misery. But our
natural Desire of Praise, is in a compounded
Proportion of the Numbers of Applauders,
and their *Dignity*. "He therefore who
" makes *Distinction* of Persons justly, and
" acts wisely for the *publick Good*, may se-
" cure himself from much uneasiness up-
" on injudicious Censure, and may obtain
" the Approbation, of those whose Esteem
" alone is valuable, or at least far over-bal-
" lances the Censure of others."

THE *Desire of Wealth* must be as necessary *The Desire of Wealth and Power.*
as any other Desires of our Nature, as soon as we apprehend the usefulness of Wealth to gratify all other Desires. While it is desired as the *Means* of something farther, the Desire tends to our Happiness, proportionably to the good Oeconomy of the *principal Desires* to which it is made subservient. It is in every Man's power, by a little Reflection, to prevent the Madness and Enthusiasm with which Wealth is insatiably pursued even for itself, without any direct Intention of using it. The Consideration of the small Addition often made by Wealth to the Happiness of the Possessor, may check this

SECT this Desire, and prevent that *Insatiability*
 IV. which sometimes attends it.



POWER in like manner is desired as the Means of gratifying other *original Desires*; nor can the Desire be avoided by those who apprehend its usefulness. It is easy to prevent the *Extravagance* of this Desire, and many of its consequent Pains, by considering “the *Danger* of affecting it by injurious Means, supporting it by *Force*, without Consent of the Subject, and employing it to *private Interest*, in Opposition to publick Good.” No Mortal is easy under such Subjection; Every Slave to such a Power is an *Enemy*: The Possessor must be in a continual State of *Fear, Suspicion and Hatred*.

The Occasion of fantastick Desires.

THERE is nothing in our Nature leading us necessarily into the *fantastick Desires*; they wholly arise through our *Ignorance* and *Negligence*; when, through want of Thought, we suffer foolish *Associations* of Ideas to be made, and imagine certain trifling Circumstances to contain something *honourable and excellent* in them from their being used by Persons of *Distinction*. We know how the *Inadvertencies, Negligences, Infirmities*, and even *Vices*, either of great or ingenious Men, have been affected, and imitated by those who were incapable of imi-

imitating their Excellencies. This happens S E C T. often to young Gentlemen of plentiful For- IV. tunes which set them above the Employ- ments necessary to others, when they have not cultivated any relish for the Pleasures of the *Imagination*, such as *Architecture*, *Musick*, *Painting*, *Poetry*, *Natural Philosophy*, *History*: When they have no farther Knowledge of these things, than stupidly to praise what they hear others praise: When they have neglected to cultivate their *publick Affections*, are bantered a long time from *Marriage* and *Offspring*; and have neither themselves Minds fit for *Friendships*, nor any intimate Acquaintance with such as are fit to make Friends of: When their *moral Sense* is weakened, or, if it be strong in any points, these are fixed at random, without any *regular Scheme*: When thro' Ignorance of *publick Affairs*, or want of *Eloquence* to speak what they know, they despair of the *Esteem* or *Honour* of the wife: When their Hearts are too gay to be entertained with the dull Thoughts of increasing their *Wealth*, and they have not Ability enough to hope for *Power*; such poor empty Minds have nothing but Trifles to pursue; any thing becomes agreeable, which can supply the Void of Thought, or prevent the sullen Discontent which must grow upon a Mind conscious of no *Merit*, and expecting the *Contempt* of its Fellows; as a *Pack of Dogs*,

SECT. an Horse, a Jewel, an Equipage, a Pack of
 IV. Cards, a Tavern; any thing which has got
~~any~~ any confused Ideas of Honour, Dignity, Li-
 berality, or genteel Enjoyment of Life join-
 ed to it. These fantastick Desires any Man
 might have banished at first, or entirely
 prevented. But if we have lost the Time
 of substituting better in their stead, we shall
 only change from one sort to another, with
 a perpetual Succession of Inconstancy and
 Dissatisfaction.

—*Cui si vitiosa Libido*

Fecerit Auspicium—

Iidem eadem possunt horam durare probantes.

Hor. Ep. I.

V. THE End of all these Considerations,
 is to find out the most effectual Way of ad-
 vancing the Happiness of Mankind; in or-
 der to which, they may perhaps appear of
 considerable Consequence, since Happiness
 consists in “the highest and most durable
 “ Gratifications of, either all our *Desires*,
 “ or, if all cannot be gratified at once, of
 “ those which tend to the greatest and
 “ most durable *Pleasures*, with exemption
 “ either from all *Pains* and Objects of *A-*
 “ *version*, or at least from those which are
 “ the most grievous.” The following ge-
 neral Observations may be premised concern-
 ing their Objects.

I. “ IT

I. "IT is plainly impossible that any SECT.
 " Man should pursue the Gratifications of IV.
 " all these *Desires* at once, with Prudence,
 " Diligence, and Vigour, sufficient to ob-
 " tain the highest Pleasures of each kind,
 " and to avoid their opposite Pains." For,
 not to mention the *Narrowness* of the Pow-
 ers of our Minds, which makes them in-
 capable of a Multiplicity of Pursuits at
 once; the very *Methods* of obtaining the
 highest Gratification of the several Senses
 and Desires, are directly inconsistent with
 each other. For example, the violent Pur-
 suit of the Pleasures of the *external Senses*,
 or *Sensuality*, is opposite to the Pleasures
 of the *Imagination*, and to the Study of
 the ingenious *Arts*, which tend to the Or-
 nament of Life; These require Labour and
 Application, inconsistent with the *Volup-
 tuousness* of the external Senses, which by
 itself would engross the whole Application
 of our Minds, through vain Associations of
 Ideas.

AGAIN: The violent Pursuits of either
 of the former kinds of Pleasures, is often
 directly inconsistent with *publick Affections*,
 and with our *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Ho-
 nour*. These Pleasures require a quite diffe-
 rent Temper, a Mind little set upon selfish
 Pleasures, strongly possessed with Love for

*The full
 Pursuit of
 all kinds of
 Pleasure is
 impossible.*

SECT. others, and Concern for their Interests capable of Labour and Pain. However our desire of Honour be really *selfish*, yet we know it is never acquired by Actions appearing selfish; but by such as appear publick-spirited, with Neglect of the Pleasures of the external Senses and Wealth. *Selfishness* is generally attended with *Shame*;* and hence we conceal even our *Desire of Honour* itself, and are ashamed of *Praise* in our own Presence, even when we are doing beneficent Actions, with design to obtain it. The Pursuits of *Wealth* and *Power* are often directly opposite to the Pleasures of all the other kinds, at least for the present, however they may be intended for the future Enjoyment of them.

No Certainty of Success in any Pursuit, save that of Virtue.

2. " THERE is no such *Certainty* in human Affairs, that a Man can assure himself of the perpetual Possession of these Objects which gratify any one Desire," except that of *Virtue* itself: which, since it does not depend upon external Objects and Events†, but upon our own *Affections* and *Conduct*, we may promise to ourselves that we shall always enjoy. But then Virtue consists in Benevolence, or Desire of the publick Good: *The Happiness of others* is

* *Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 7.*

† *Treat. II. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.*

very uncertain, so that our publick Desires S E C T. may often be disappointed; and every Dis- IV. appointment is uneasy, in proportion to the ~~the~~ Degree of Desire. And therefore, how-ever the *Admiration* and fixed *Pursuit of Virtue* may always secure one stable and constant Pleasure of *Self-Approbation*, yet this Enjoyment presupposes a *Desire of publick Good*, subject to frequent Disappointments, which will be attended with Uneasi-ness proportioned to the Degree of publick Desire, or the *Virtue* upon which we re-flect. There seems therefore no possibility of securing to ourselves, in our present State, an *unmixed Happiness* independently of all other Beings. Every Apprehension of Good raises desire, every Disappoint-ment of Desire is uneasy; every Object of Desire is uncertain except Virtue, but the *Enjoyment of Virtue* supposes the Desire of an uncertain Object, viz. the *publick Happiness*. To secure therefore independently of all other Beings invariable and pure Happiness, it would be necessary either to have the *Power* of directing all Events in the U-niverse, or to root out all *Sense of Evil*, or Aversion to it, while we retained our *Sense of Good*, and that without previous Desire, the Disappointment of which could give Pain. The *rooting out* of all Senses and Desires, were it practicable, would cut off all Happiness as well as Misery: The re-moving

S E C T. moving or stopping a part of them, might
IV. indeed be of consequence to the Happiness
 of the *Individual* on some occasions, how-
 ever pernicious it might be to the *Whole*.
 But it is plain, we have not in our power
 the modelling of our *Senses or Desires*, to
 form them for a private Interest: They are
 fixed for us by the **A U T H O R** of our Na-
 ture, subservient to the Interest of the *Sy-
 stem*; so that each Individual is made, pre-
 viously to his own Choice, a Member of
 a *great Body*, and affected with the Fortunes
 of the Whole; or at least of many Parts
 of it; nor can he break himself off at Plea-
 sure.

*The Mi-
 stakes of
 the Stoicks
 about com-
 plet Hap-
 piness.* **T**HIS may shew the Vanity of some Ex-
 pressions of the *Stoicks*, boasting, one would
 imagine, who did not remember other parts
 of their Scheme, of an undisturbed Hap-
 piness and Serenity, independently even of
 the **D E I T Y**, as well as of their Fellow-
 Creatures, wholly inconsistent with the *O r-
 der* of Nature, as well as with the Princi-
 ples of some of their great Leaders: For
 which, Men of Wit in their own Age did
 not fail to ridicule them.

THAT must be a very fantastick Scheme
 of Virtue, which represents it as a *private*
sublimely selfish Discipline, to preserve our
 selves wholly unconcerned, not only in the
 Changes

Changes of Fortune as to our *Wealth or Sect.* *Poverty, Liberty or Slavery, Ease or Pain,* IV. but even in all *external Events* whatsoever, *even* in the Fortunes of our dearest *Friends or Country*, solacing ourselves that we are easy and undisturbed. If there be any thing amiable in human Nature, the Reflection upon which can give us pleasure, it must be kind *disinterested Affections* towards our Fellows, or towards the *whole*, and its *AUTHOR and Cause*. These Affections, when reflected upon, must be one constant Source of Pleasure in *Self-Approbation*. But some of these very Affections, being toward an uncertain Object, must occasion Pain, and directly produce one sort of Misery to the virtuous in this Life. It is true indeed, it would be a much greater Misery to want such an amiable Temper, which alone secures us from the basest and most detestable State of *Self-Condemnation and Abhorrence*. But, allowing such a Temper to be the necessary Occasion of one sort of Happiness, even the greatest we are capable of, yet it may also be the Occasion of no inconsiderable Pains in this Life.

THAT this *affectionate Temper* is true Virtue, and not that *undisturbed Selfishness*, were it attainable, every one would readily own who saw them both in Practice. Would any honest Heart relish such a Speech

SECT. as this from a *Cato* or an *Aemilius Paulus*?

IV. "I foresee the Effects of this Defeat, my
 Fellow-Creatures, my Countrymen, my
 honourable Acquaintances; many a ge-
 nerous gallant Patriot and Friend, Fa-
 thers, Sons, and Brothers, Husbands and
 Wives, shall be enslaved, tortured, torn
 from each other, or in each other's sight
 made subject to the Pride, Avarice, Pe-
 tulancy, or Lust of the Conqueror. I
 have, for my own Pleasure, to secure
 agreeable Reflections, laboured in their
 Defence. I am unconcerned in their Mis-
 fortunes; their bodily Tortures, or more
 exquisite Distresses of Mind for each o-
 ther, are to me indifferent. I am entire-
 ly absolute, compleat in myself; and can
 behold their Agonies with as much Ease
 or Pleasure, as I did their Prosperity."
 This is the plain Language of some boasting
 Refiners upon Virtue; Sentiments as dis-
 agreeable as those of *Catiline*.

THE Desire of Virtue is toward an Object *ἐκ τῶν ἐπ' ἡμῖν*, or *in our power*, since all Men have naturally *kind Affections*, which they may increase and strengthen; but these kind Affections tend toward an *uncertain Object*, which is not in our power. Suppose the Stoick should alledge, "Vice is the only Evil, and Virtue the only Good." If we have *Benevolence* to others, we must wish

wish them to be virtuous, and must have SECT.
compassion toward the vicious: thus still IV.
we may be subjected to Pain or Uneasiness,
UW by our *very Virtue*; unless we suppose,
what no Experience can confirm, that Men
may have strong Desires, the Disappoint-
ment of which will give no *Uneasiness*, or
that Uneasiness is no Evil. Let the *Philoso-*
pher regulate his own Notions as he pleases
about Happiness or Misery; whoever ima-
gines himself unhappy, is so in reality; and
whoever has *kind Affections* or Virtue, must
be uneasy to see others really unhappy.

BUT tho' a pure unmixed Happiness is
not attainable in this Life, yet all their Pre-
cepts are not rendered useless.

Est quādam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.

3. FOR we may observe, thirdly, that
“ the Sense of Good can continue in its full 3. The full
Sense of
Good may
be preser-
ved, with-
out the
Pains of
Desire, in
many Ca-
ses.
Strength, when yet we shall have but
“ weak Desires.” In this case we are capa-
ble of enjoying all the Good in any Object,
when we obtain it, and yet exposed to no
great Pain upon *Disappointment*. This may
be generally observed, that “ the Violence
“ of Desire does not proportionably enliven
“ the Sensation of Good, when it is obtain-
“ ed: nor does diminishing the Desire weak-
“ en the Sensation, tho’ it will diminish the
“ Unea-

SECT. "Uneasiness of Disappointment, or the Misery of contrary Evils." Our high Expectations of Happiness from any Object, either thro' the Acuteness of our Senses, or from our Opinions or Associations of Ideas, never fail to increase Desire: But then the Violence of Desire does not proportionably enliven our Sensation in the Enjoyment. During the first confused Hurry of our Success, our Joy may perhaps be increased by the Violence of our previous Desire, were it only by allaying the great Uneasiness accompanying the Desire itself. But this Joy soon vanishes, and is often succeeded by Disgust and Uneasiness, when our Sense of the Good, which is more fixed in Nature than our Fancy or Opinions, represents the Object far below our Expectation. Now he who examines all Opinions of Good in Objects, who prevents or corrects vain Associations of Ideas, and thereby prevents extravagant Admirations, or enthusiastick Desires, above the real Moment of Good in the Object, if he loses the transient Raptures of the first Success, yet he enjoys all the permanent Good or Happiness which any Object can afford; and escapes, in a great measure, both the uneasy Sensations of the more violent Desires, and the Torments of Disappointment, to which Persons of irregular Imaginations are exposed.

THIS

THIS is the Case of the *Temperate* and *Sect.*
the *Cbaste*, with relation to the Appetites; *IV.*
of the Men of *Moderation* and *Frugality*, *~~~~~*
and *corrected Fancy*, with regard to the Plea-
sures of *Imagination*; of the *Humble* and
the *Content*, as to *Honour*, *Wealth* or *Pow-*
er. Such Persons upon good Success, want
only the first *transitory Ecstacies*; but have
a full and lively *Sense* of all the lasting
Good in the Objects of their Pursuit; and
yet are in a great measure secure against both
the Uneasiness of *violent Desire*, and the
Dejection of Mind, and *abject Sorrow* upon
Disappointment, or upon their being exposed
to the contrary Evils.

FURTHER, Persons of *irregular Imagina-*
tions are not soon reformed, nor their *As-*
sociations of Ideas broke by every *Experi-*
ence of the Smallness of the Good in the ad-
mired Object. They are often rather set
upon *new Pursuits* of the same kind, or of
greater *Variety* of like Objects. So their
experience of *Disappointment*, or of contra-
ry Evils, does not soon correct their *Imagi-*
nations about the Degrees of Good or Evil.
The Loss of Good, or the Pressure of any
Calamity, will continue to torment them,
thro' their *vain Notions* of these Events, and
make them insensible of the real Good
which they might still enjoy in their present
State.

S E C T. State. Thus the *Covetous* have smaller Pleasures in any given Degree of Wealth; the *Luxurious* from a splendid Table; the *Ambitious* from any given Degree of Honour or Power, than Men of more moderate Desires: And on the other hand, the Miseries of Poverty, mean Fare, Subjection, or Contempt, appear much greater to them, than to the moderate. Experience, while these confused Ideas remain, rather increases the Disorder: But if just Reflection comes in, and tho' late, applies the proper Cure, by correcting the *Opinions* and the *Imagination*, every Experience will tend to our Advantage.

THE same way may our *publick Desires* be regulated. If we prevent confused Notions of Good, we diminish or remove many Anxieties for our *Friends* as well as ourselves. Only this must be remembered, that weakening our *publick Affections*, necessarily weakens our *Sense* of publick Good founded upon them, and will deprive us of the Pleasures of the *moral Sense*, in reflecting on our Virtue.

4. *Laying our account to meet with Evil,* 4. We may lastly remark, "That the *Expectation* of any Pain, or the frequent *Consideration* of the Evils which may often lessens *our Misery*, " fal us, or the Loss of Good we now enjoy, before these Events actually threaten us,

" us, or raise any *Consternation* in our Minds S E C T. " by their Approach, does not diminish our IV. " Joy upon escaping Evil, or our *Pleasure* ~~~ " upon the arrival of any Good beyond Ex- " pectation : But this previous Expectation " generally diminishes our *Fear*, while the " Event is in suspense, and our *Sorrow* up- " on its arrival ;" Since thereby the Mind examines the *Nature* of the Event, sees how far it is necessarily Evil, and what Supports under it are in its power : This *Consideration* may break vain Conjunctions of foreign Ideas, which occasion our greatest Fears in Life, and even in Death itself. If, indeed, a *weak Mind* does not study to correct the *Imagination*, but still dwells upon its possible Calamities, under all their *borrowed Forms* of Terror ; or if it industriously aggravates them to itself, this previous Consideration may embitter its whole Life, without arming it against the smallest Evil.

THIS Folly is often occasioned by that Delight which most Men when under Mis- fortunes find in being pitied by others ; those especially, who are continually indulged as the *Favourites of Families or Company*, being long enured to the Pleasure arising from the perpetual *Marks of Love* toward them from all their Company, and from their tender *Sympathy* in Distress : this often leads them even to feign *Misery* to obtain Pity, and

S E C T. and to raise in themselves the most dejected
IV. Thoughts, either to procure *Consolation*, or
~~or~~ the Pleasure of observing the *Sympathy* of
others. This *peevish* or *pettish Temper*, tho'
it arises from something sociable in our
Frame, yet is often the Fore-runner of the
greatest Corruption of Mind. It disarms the
Heart of its natural *Integrity*; it induces us
to throw away our true *Armour*, our *natural Courage*, and cowardly to commit our-
selves to the vain Protection of others, while
we neglect our own Defence.

S E C T.

S E C T. V.

*A Comparison of the Pleasures and
Pains of the several Senses, as to
Intenseness and Duration.*

I. HAVING considered how far these S E C T. Desires must necessarily affect us, and when they are the Occasions of Pleasure or Pain ; since by the first general Observation, the Pursuits of the several Pleasures, and the avoiding the several Pains, may often be inconsistent with each other ; let us next examine, which of these several Pleasures are *the most valuable*, so as to deserve our Pursuit, even with neglect of the others ; and which of these Pains are *most grievous*, so as to be shunned even by the enduring of other Pains if necessary.

“ THE Value of any Pleasure, and the “ Quantity or Moment of any Pain, is in a “ compounded Proportion of the Intenseness “ and Duration.” In examining the Duration of Pleasure, we must include not only the Constancy of the Object, but even of our Fancy ; for a Change in either of these will put an end to it.

To

S E C T. To compare these several Pleasures and
V. Pains as to their *Intenseness*, seems difficult,
~~because of the Diversity of Tastes, or Turns~~
~~The difficulty in comparing~~
~~which make strange Associations of Ideas,~~
~~the several and form Habits; from whence it happens,~~
~~Pleasures, as to Intenseness.~~ Senses and Desires seem equally natural, yet some are led into a constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of one kind, as the only Enjoyment of Life, and are indifferent about others. Some pursue, or seem to pursue only the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, and all other Pursuits are made subservient to them: Others are chiefly set upon the Pleasures of *Imagination or internal Senses*; *social and kind Affections* employ another sort, who seem indifferent to all private Pleasure: This last Temper has generally joined with it an high *moral Sense*, and *Love of Honour*. We may sometimes find an high *Sense of Honour* and desire of *Applause*, where there is indeed a *moral Sense*, but a very weak one, very much perverted, so as to be influenced by *popular Opinion*, and made subservient to it: In this *Character* the Pleasures of the external Senses, or even of the Imagination, have little room, except so far as they may produce *Distinction*. Now upon comparing the several Pleasures, perhaps the Sentence of the *Luxurious* would

would be quite opposite to that of the *Vir-S E C T.*
Ambitious would differ from *V.*
 both. Those who are devoted to the *internal Senses* or *Imagination*, would differ from
 all the three. The *Miser* would applaud
 himself in his Wealth above them all. Is
 there therefore no disputing about Tastes?
 Are all Persons alike happy, who obtain
 the several Enjoyments for which they have
 a Relish? If they are, the Dispute is at an
 end: A Fly or Maggot in its proper haunts,
 is as happy as a *Hero*, or *Patriot*, or *Friend*,
 who has newly delivered his *Country* or
Friend, and is surrounded with their grate-
 ful *Praises*. The Brute or Insect may
 think so of itself; but who will stand to
 its Judgment, when we are sure that it has
 experienced only one sort of Pleasure, and
 is a stranger to the others? May we not in
 like manner find some Reasons of *appealing*
 from the Judgment of certain Men? Or
 may not some *Characters* be found among
 Men, who alone are capable of judging in
 this matter?

II. IT is obvious that " those alone are *The Plea-*
 " capable of judging, who have experien- *sures of a*
 " ced all the several kinds of *Pleasure*, and *moral Kind*
 " have their *Senses* acute and fully exerci- *proved su-*
 " sed in them all." Now a high Relish *perior by*
 for *Virtue*, or a strong *moral Sense*, with *the Testimo-*
Virtuous.

SECT. its concomitant publick Sense and Affections, V. and a Sense of Honour, was never alledged ~~to~~ to impair our external Senses, or to make us incapable of any pleasure of the *Imagination*; Temperance never spoiled a good Palate, whatever Luxury may have done; a generous affectionate publick Spirit, reflecting on itself with delight, never viti- ated any Organ of external *Pleasure*, nor weakened their Perceptions. Now all virtuous Men have given *Virtue* this Testimony, that its Pleasures are superior to any other, nay to all others jointly; that a friendly generous *Action* gives a *Delight* superior to any other; that other Enjoyments, when compared with the Delights of *Integrit*y, *Faith*, *Kindness*, *Generosity*, and pub- lick Spirit, are but trifles scarce worth any regard.*

By the Testimony of the Vicious.

NAY, we need not confine our Evidence to the Testimony of the perfectly *Virtuous*. The vicious Man, tho' no fit judge, were he entirely abandoned, since he loses his *Sense* of the Pleasures of the moral *Kind*, or at least has not experienced them fully, yet he generally retains so much of human Nature, and of the *Senses* and *Affections* of our

* See this Argument in *Plato de Repub.* Lib. IX. And Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning *Virtue*.

Kind,

Kind, as sometimes to experience even mortal Pleasures. There is scarce any Mortal, who is wholly insensible to all Species of Morality.

A DEBAUCHEE has never perhaps felt the *Pleasures* of a wise publick-spirited Conduct, of an entirely upright, generous, social, and affectionate Life, with the Sense of his own *moral Worth*, and merited *Esteem* and *Love*; this course of Life, because unknown to him, he may despise in comparison of his *Pleasures*. But if in any particular Affair, a *moral Species*, or *Point of Honour* has affected him, he will soon despise his sensual Pleasures in comparison of the Moral. Has he a Person whom he calls his *Friend*, whom he loves upon whatever fantastick Reasons, he can quit his *Debauch* to serve him, nay can run the Hazard of *Wounds* and *Death* to rescue him from Danger? If his *Honour* be concerned to resent an *Affront*, will he not quit his *Pleasures*, and run the hazard of the greatest bodily Pain, to shun the Imputation of *Cowardice* or *Falshood*? He will scorn one who tells him, that "a *Lyar*, or a *Coward*, may be " happy enough, while he has all things necessary to *Luxury*." It is in vain to alledge, "that there is no disputing about " *Tastes*:" To every Nature there are certain *Tastes* assigned by the great AUTHOR

S E C T. of all. To the *human Race* there are assign'd a publick *Taste*, a *moral one*, and a *Taste for Honour*. These Senses they cannot extirpate, more than their *external Senses*: They may pervert them, and weaken them by false *Opinions*, and foolish *Affociations* of Ideas; but they cannot be happy but by keeping them in their natural State, and gratifying them. The Happiness of an *Insect* or *Brute*, will only make an *Insect* or *Brute* happy. But a Nature with further Powers, must have further *Enjoyments*.

NAY, let us consider the different *Ages* in our own Species. We once knew the time when an *Hobby-Horse*, a *Top*, a *Rattle*, was sufficient Pleasure to us. We grow up, we now relish *Friendships*, *Honour*, good *Offices*, *Marriage*, *Offspring*, serving a *Community or Country*. Is there no difference in these Tastes? We were happy before, are we no happier now? If not, we have made a foolish Change of Fancy. Our former Toys we more easily procured, kept in good order, and managed, than the present Objects of our Cares, an Employment, a Son, a Friend, a Country, a Party. But this Change of Fancy does not depend upon our *Will*. “Our Nature determines us to certain Pursuits in our several Stages; and following her Dictates, is the only way to our Happiness. Two States may both be happy,

“ happy, and yet the one infinitely preferable to the other: Two Species may both be content, and yet the Pleasures of the one, greater beyond all comparison, than those of the other.” The *virtuous Man*, who has as true a Sense of all external Pleasure as any, gives the preference to moral Pleasures. The Judgment of the *Vicious* is either not to be regarded, because of his Ignorance on one side; or, if he has experience of moral Sentiments in any particular Cases, he agrees with the *Virtuous*.

III. AGAIN, we see in fact, that in the virtuous Man, *publick Affections*, a moral Sense, and Sense of Honour, actually overcome all other Desires or Senses, even in their full Strength. Here there is the fairest Combat, and the Success is on the side of Virtue.

THERE is indeed an obvious Exception against this Argument. “ Do not we see, in many Instances, the external Senses overcome the moral?” But the Reply is easy. A constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of the external Senses can never become agreeable, without an Opinion of Innocence, or the Absence of moral Evil; so that here the moral Sense is not engaged in the Com-

SECT. bat. Do not our * Debauchees, among their
 V. Intimates, continually defend their Practices as *innocent*? Transient Acts of Injustice
 may be done, contrary to the moral Sentiments of the Agent, to obtain relief from some pressing Evil, or upon some violent Motion of *Appetite*: and yet even in these cases, Men often argue themselves into some moral Notions of their *Innocence*. But for a continued Course of Life disapproved by the Agent, how few are the Instances? How avowedly miserable is that State, wherein all *Self-Approval*, all consciousness of *Merit or Goodness* is gone? We might here also alledge, what universal Experience confirms, that not only an Opinion of *Innocence* is a necessary Ingredient in a Course of *selfish Pleasures*, so that there should be no Opposition from the moral Sense of the Agent; but that some *publick Affections*, some Species of *moral Good*, is the most powerful Charm in all sensual Enjoyments. And yet, on the other hand,
 " *Publick Affections, Virtue, Honour*, need
 " no Species of sensual Pleasure to recommend them; nor even an Opinion or
 " Hope of Exemption from external Pain.
 " These powerful Forms can appear amiable, and engage our Pursuit thro' the rug-

* *Treat. II. Sect. 4. Art. 4. last Paragraph.*

" ged

" ged Paths of Hunger, Thirst, Cold, La- SECT.
" bour, Expences, Wounds and Death. V.



THUS, when a Prospect of external Pleasure, or of avoiding bodily Pain, engages Men into Actions really evil, the *moral Sense* of the Agent is not really overcome by the *external Senses*. The Action or Omission does not appear morally evil to the Agent. The *Temptation* seems to extenuate, or wholly excuse the Action. Whereas when a *Point of Honour*, or a *moral Species*, makes any one despise the Pleasures or Pains of the *external Senses*, there can be no question made of a real Victory. The *external Senses* represent these Objects in the same manner, when they are conquered. None denies to the *Virtuous* their *Sense of Pain, Toil or Wounds*. They are allowed as lively a Sense as others, of all *external Pleasure* of every kind. The *Expences of Generosity, Humanity, Charity and Compassion*, are allowed, even when yielded to *Virtue*, to be known to the full. But the *moral Sense*, weak as it often is, does not yield even to known *external Pleasure, Ease or Advantage*: but, where there is a depraved *Taste*, and a weak *Understanding*, private Advantage, or the avoiding of some *external Evil*, may make Actions appear *innocent*, which are not; and then the *moral Sense* gives no Opposition. All the Con-

SECT. quest on such Occasions is only this, that
 V. private external *Advantage* surmounts our
 Aversion to *Dishonour*, by making us do
 Actions which others will censure, but we
 esteem *innocent*. In these Cases we generally
 fear only the Reproach of a *Party*, of
 whom we have conceived an unfavourable
 Opinion.*

NAY farther: It was before observed, that fantastick *Associations* of Ideas do not really increase the Pleasure of *Enjoyment*, however they increase the previous *Desire*. The want of such Associations does not abate the external *Pain*, tho' it diminishes the previous *Fear*, or takes away some farther *Fears* which may attend the Pain. So that a Man of the most correct Imagination does feel and know all the *Good* in external Pleasure, and all the *Evil* in Pain.

“ When therefore the *moral Sense*, and *publick Affections*, overcome all *sensual Pleasure*, or *bodily Pain*, they do it by their “ own Strength, without *foreign Aids*. “ *Virtue* is never blended with *bodily Pleasure*, nor *Vice* with *bodily Pain* in our “ Imaginations. But when the external “ Senses seem to prevail against the moral “ Sense, or *publick Affections*, it is continually by *Aid* borrowed from the *mo-*

* Sect. 4. Art. 3.

“ *ral*

"*real Sense, and publick Affections them-* SECT.
" "selves, or from our Sense of Honour." V.

The Conquest is over a weakned moral ~~weak~~
Sense, upon partial views of Good, not by
external Pleasure alone, but by some *moral*
Species, raised by a false Imagination.

SET before Men in the clearest Light
all external Pleasures, but strip them of
their borrowed Notions of *Dignity, Hospitality, Friendship, Generosity, Liberality, Communication of Pleasure*; let no regard
be had to the *Opinions* of others, to *Credit*,
to avoiding *Reproach*, to *Company*: Sepa-
rate from the Pursuit of Wealth all
Thoughts of a *Family, Friends, Relations, Acquaintance*; let Wealth be only regarded
as the Means of private Pleasure of the
external Senses, or of the *Imagination*, to
the Possessor alone; let us divide our con-
fused Ideas,* and consider things barely and
apart from each other: and in opposition
to these Desires, set but the weakest *moral Species*, and see if they can prevail over it.
On the other hand, let us examine as much
as we please, a *friendly, generous, grateful, or publick-spirited Action*; divest it of all
external Pleasure, still it will appear the
more lovely; the longer we fix our Atten-

* See *Marcus Antoninus*, Lib. III. c. 11. and often else-
where.

SECTION to it, the more we admire it. What
 V. is it which we feel in our own Hearts, de-
 termining as it were our Fate as to Happi-
 ness or Misery? What sort of Sensations
 are the most lively and delightful? In what
 sort of Possessions does the highest Joy and
 Self-Satisfaction consist? Who has ever felt
 the Pleasure of a generous friendly Temper,
 of mutual Love, of compassionate Relief and
 Succour to the distressed; of having served
 a Community, and rendered Multitudes hap-
 py; of a strict Integrity, and thorough Hon-
 esty, even under external Disadvantages,
 and amidst Dangers; of Congratulation and
 publick Rejoicing, in the Wisdom and
 Prosperity of Persons beloved, such as
 Friends, Children, or intimate Neighbours?
 Who would not, upon Reflection, prefer
 that State of Mind, these Sensations of Plea-
 sure, to all the Enjoyments of the external
 Senses, and of the Imagination without
 them? *

*Our J udg-
 ments in
 the Case of
 others
 proves the
 same.* IV. THE truth, in a Question of this
 nature, one might expect would be best
 known by the Judgment of Spectators,
 concerning the Pursuits of others. Let
 them see one entirely employed in Solitude,
 with the most exquisite Tastes, Odors,

* See this Subject fully treated, in the second Part of Lord Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue*.

Prospects, Painting, Musick ; but without **SECT.** any *Society, Love or Friendship*, or any **V.** Opportunity of doing a kind or generous **WVW** *Action* ; and see also a * Man employed in protecting the Poor and Fatherless, receiving the Blessings of those who were ready to perish, and making the Widow to sing for Joy ; a Father to the Needy, an Avenger of Oppression ; who never despised the Cause of his very Slave, but considered him as his Fellow-Creature, formed by the same Hand ; who never eat his Morsel alone, without the Orphan at his Table, nor caused the Eyes of the Poor to fail ; who never suffered the Naked to perish, but warmed them with the Fleece of his Sheep ; who never took advantage of the Indigent in Judgment, thro' Confidence in his own Power or Interest ; Let this Character be compared with the former ; nay, add to this latter some considerable *Pains of the external Senses*, with *Labour* and kind *Anxiety* : which of the two would a Spectator chuse ? Which would he admire, or count the happier, and most suitable to human Nature ? Were he amusing himself with imaginary Scenes of Life, or were he advising a *Son*, or a *Friend*, which of these States would he chuse or recommend ? Such a Trial would

* See the Character of *Job*, ch. xxxi. See also *Treat. II.* *§. 6.*

SECT. soon discover the Prevalence of the *moral*
 V. *Species* above all Enjoyments of Life.

*Little Happiness in
malicious
Pleasures.*

V. THERE are a sort of Pleasures opposite to those of the publick Sense, arising from the Gratification of *Anger* or *Hatred*. To compare these Pleasures with those of Benevolence, we must observe what holds universally of all Mankind. The Joy, and Gaiety, and Happiness of any Nature, of which we have formed no previous Opinion, either favourable or unfavourable, nor obtained any other Ideas than merely that it is *sensitive*, fills us with Joy and Delight: The apprehending the Torments of any such sensitive Nature, gives us Pain. The Poets know how to raise delight in us by such *pastoral Scenes*, they feel the Power of such *pleasing Images*: they know that the human Heart can dwell upon such Contemplations with *delight*; that we can continue long with Pleasure, in the View of *Happiness* of any Nature whatsoever. When indeed we have received unfavourable Apprehensions of any Nature, as *cruel* and *savage*, we begin from our very publick Affections, to desire their Misery as far as it may be necessary to the Protection of others.

BUT that the Misery of another, for its *own sake*, is never grateful, we may all find by making this Supposition: That we had the most

most savage Tyger, or Crocodile, or some S E C T. greater Monster of our own Kind, a *Nero*, or *Domitian*, chained in some Dun- V. geon; that we were perfectly assured they should never have power of doing farther *Injuries*; that no Mortal should ever know their Fate or Fortunes, nor be influenced by them; that the *Punishments* inflicted on them would never restrain o-
thers by Way of example, nor any *Indul-
gence* shown be discovered; that the first Heat of our *Resentment* were allayed by Time—No mortal, in such a Case, would incline to torture such wretched Natures, or keep them in continual Agonies, without some prospect of *Good* arising from their Sufferings. What farther would the fiercest Rage extend to, if once the Tyrant, thus eternally confined from Mischief, began himself to feel *Remorse* and *Anguish* for his Crimes? Nay, did he continue without Reflection on his past Life, so as neither to betray Remorse nor Approbation, were Mankind well secured against his Temper, who would delight to load him with *useless Misery*?

IF the Misery of others then be not grateful for itself, whence arises the Pleasure of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*? The Reason is plainly this: Upon apprehending *Injury* to ourselves or others, NATURE wisely determines

us

SECT. us to study *Defence*, not only for the present, but for the future. *Anger* arises with *uneasy Sensations*, as every one acknowledges. *The Misery* of the Injurious allays this furious Pain. Our Nature scarce leads to any farther Resentment, when once the Injurious seems to us fully seized with *Remorse*, so that we fear no farther Evils from him, or when all his Power is gone. Those who continue their Revenge further, are prepossessed with some false *Opinion* of Mankind, as worse than they really are; and are not easily inclined to believe their hearty Remorse for Injuries, or to think themselves secure. Some *Point of Honour*, or *Fear of Reproach*, engages Men in cruel Acts of Revenge: But this farther confirms, that the *Misery of another* is only grateful as it allays, or secures us against a furious Pain; and cannot be the Occasion, by itself, of any Satisfaction. Who would not prefer Safety from Injury, to the having revenged an Injury? Who would not chuse an untainted Reputation, for *Courage* gained in a just War, in which, without *Hatred* or *Anger*, we acted from Love of our Country, rather than the Fame acquired by asserting our questioned Courage with furious *Anger* in a *Duel*, and with continued *Hatred* toward the Person conquered? Who can dwell upon a *Scene of Tortures*, though practised upon the vilest Wretch; or can delight either

ther in the Sight or Description of *Ven-Sect-*
geance, prolonged beyond all necessity of *V.*
Self-Defense, or *publick Interest?* "The ~~WW~~
 " Pleasure of Revenge then is to the Plea-
 " sures of Humanity and Virtue, as the fla-
 " king the burning, and constantly recur-
 " ring Thirst of a Fever, to the natural En-
 " joyments of grateful Food in Health."

VI. WERE we to compare, in like man- *Moral*
 ner, the *Pains* of the publick and moral *Evil com-*
Sense, and of the Sense of Honour, with *other Evils,* *pared with*
 other *Pains of the external Senses*, or with *appears* *greater.*
 the greatest external Losses, we should find
 the former by far superior. And yet no-
 thing is more ordinary, than to find Men,
 who will allow "the *Pleasures* of the
 " former Classes superior to any other, and
 " yet look upon *external Pain* as more in-
 " tollerable than any." There are two Rea-
 sons for this Mistake. 1. "They compare *Causes of*
 " the most *acute Pains* of the external Senses *Mistakes.*
 " with some *smaller Pains* of the other Sen-
 ses." Whereas, would they compare the
 strongest of both Kinds, they would find
 the Ballance on the other side. How of-
 ten have Parents, Husbands, Friends, Pa-
 triots, endured the greatest *bodily Pains*, to
 avoid the Pains of their *publick* and *moral*
Sense, and *Sense of Honour?* How do they
 every Day suffer Hunger, Thirst, and Toil,
 to prevent like Evils to those they love?
 How

S E C T. How often do Men endure, for their *Party*
 V. or *Faction*, the greatest external Evils, not
~~only~~ only when they are unavoidable, but, when
 by counter-acting their *publick* or *moral Senſe*,
 or *Sense of Honour*, they could extricate them-
 selves? Some Crimes appear so horrid, some
 Actions so cruel and detestable, that there is
 hardly any Man but would rather suffer
Death, than be conscious of having done them.

THE second Cause of Mistake in this Matter, is this, “ The avoiding moral E-
 “ vil by the Sufferance of *external Pain*,
 “ does not diminish the *Sense* of the Pain;
 “ but on the other hand, the *Motive* of
 “ avoiding grievous Pain, really diminishes
 “ the moral *Evil* in the Action done with
 “ that design.” So that in such Instances
 we compare *external Pain* in its full strength,
 with a *moral Pain* of the lighter sort, thus
 alleviated by the Greatness of the *Tempta-
 tion**. To make a just Comparison, it
 should be thus: “ Whether would a Man
 “ chuse to be tortured to Death, or to have,
 “ without any *Temptation* or *Necessity*, tor-
 “ tured another, or a dear Friend, or Child
 “ to Death?” Not whether a Man will be-
 tray his Friend or Country, for fear of
 Tortures, but “ whether it be better vo-
 “ luntarily, and under no fear, to betray
 “ a Friend, or our Country, than to suffer

* *Treat. II. Sect. 7, 9. Cor. 3.*

“ Tortures,

"Tortures, or the Pain of the Gout or SECT.
"Stone equal to Tortures?" Upon such V.
Comparisons as these, we should find some ~~some~~
other Pains and Misery superior to any *external Pain*. When we judge of the State
of others, we would not be long in suspense
which of these Evils to chuse as the lightest
for those whom we † most regarded.

VII. WE have hitherto only compared on *Publick Affect.ions*
the one side the *publick and moral Sense*, ^{compared}
and the *Sense of Honour* jointly, with the ^{with our}
external Senses, the *Pleasures of Imagination*, ^{Desire of}
and *external Advantage or Disadvantage* jointly. The reason of joining them
thus must be obvious, since, to a Mind
not prepossessed with any *false Apprehensions* of things, the former three Senses
and Desires really concur, in exciting to the
same Course of Action; for promoting the
publick Good, can never be opposite to *private Virtue*; nor can the *Desire of Virtue*
ever lead to any thing pernicious to the
Publick: Had Men also true Opinions, *Honour* could only be obtained by *Virtue*, or
serving the Publick.

BUT since there may be some *corrupt partial Notions of Virtue*, as when Men
have inadvertently engaged themselves into

* *Treat. II. Sect. 6. Art. 1.*

SECT. some Party or Faction pernicious to the
 V. Publick, or when we mistake the *Tendencies* of Actions, or have some Notions of
 the DEITY, † as requiring some Actions
 apprehended pernicious to the publick, as
Duties to himself; in such cases there is
 room to compare our *publick Sense or Desires* with our *moral*, to see which is pre-
 valent. The Pleasures of these Senses, in
 such cases, need not be compared; the fol-
 lowing either the one or the other will give
 little Pleasure: The Pain of the counter-
 acted Sense will prevent all *Satisfaction*.
 This State is truly deplorable, when a Per-
 son is thus distracted between two noble
 Principles, his *publick Affections*, and *Sense of Virtue*. But it may be enquired, which
 of these Senses, when counteracted, would
 occasion the greater *Pain*? Perhaps no-

† Such mistaken Notions of Religion, and of some par-
 ticular moral Species, have produced these monstrous Deci-
 sions or Apothegms; viz. "Some Actions are not lawful,
 " though they were necessary not only to universal temporal Happi-
 " ness, but to the eternal Salvation of the whole World, or
 " to avoid universal eternal Misery."

"Fiat Justitia & ruat Cælum."

Whereas the only Reason why some Actions are looked up-
 on as universally and necessarily Evil, is only this, "that in
 " our present Constitution of Nature, they cannot possibly
 " produce any good, propellent to their evil Consequences."
 Whatever Action would do so, in the whole of its Effects
 must necessarily be good. This Proposition is Identick.

thing

thing can be answered *universally* on either S E C T. side. With Men of *recluse contemplative Lives*, who have dwelt much upon some ~~some~~^{V.} moral Ideas, but without large extensive View of publick Good, or without engaging themselves to the full in the publick Affections, and common Affairs of Life, the Sense of Virtue, in some partial confined View of it, would probably prevail; especially since these partial Species of Virtue have always some sort of kind Affection to assist them. With active Men, who have fully exercised their publick Affections, and have acquired as it were an Habit this way, it is probable the publick Affections would be prevalent. Thus we find that active Men, upon any publick Necessity, always break through the limited narrow Rules of Virtue or Justice, which are publickly received, even when they have scarce any Scheme of Principles to justify their Conduct: Perhaps, indeed, in such cases, their moral Sense is brought over to the Side of their Affections, though their speculative Opinions are opposite to both.

VIII. It is of more consequence to compare the publick and moral Senses, in opposition to the Sense of Honour. Here there may be direct Opposition, since Honour is conferred according to the moral Notions

The Moral Sense compared with the Sense of Honour.

S E C T. of those who confer it, which may be contrary to those of the Agent, and contrary to what he thinks conducive to the publick Good.

To allow the Prevalence of *Honour*, cannot with any Person of just Reflection, weaken the Cause of Virtue, since Honour presupposes * a *moral Sense*, both in those who desire it, and those who confer it. But it is enough for some *Writers*, who affect to be wondrous shrewd in their Observations on human Nature, and fond of making all the World, a *selfish Generation*, without any *natural Disposition* toward a *publick Interest*, or toward any moral *Species*; to get but a Set of different *Words* from those commonly used, yet including the same *natural Dispositions*, † or presupposing them, however an inadvertent Reader may not observe it; and they are sufficiently furnished to shew, that there is no real *Virtue*, that all is but *Hypocrify*, *Disguise*, *Art*, or *Interest*. “ To be honoured, highly esteemed, valued, praised, or on the contrary, to be despised, undervalued, censured or condemned; to be proud or ashamed, are Words without any Meaning, if we take away a moral

* See *Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 4.*

† *Ibid.*

“ *Sense.*”

" Sense." Let this Sense be as *capricious, inconstant, different* in different Persons as they please to alledge, " a Sense of Morality there must be, and natural it must be, if the Desire of Esteem, Pride or Shame be natural."

To make this comparison between the publick and moral Senses on the one hand, and that of Honour on the other, it is to be observed, that all *Aversion to Evil* is stronger than *Desire of positive Good*. There are many sorts of positive Good, without which one may be easy, and enjoy others of a different kind: But Evil of almost any kind, in a high Degree, may make Life intolerable. The *avoiding of Evil* is always allowed a more extenuating Circumstance in a *Crime*, than the *Prospect of positive Good*: to make therefore just Comparisons of the Prevalence of several Desires or Senses, their several Goods should be opposed to each other, and their Evils to each other, and not the *Pleasures* of one compared with the *Pains* of another.

PUBLICK *Affections*, in their nearer Ties, frequently overcome not only the Pleasures of Honour, but even the *Pains of Shame*. This is the most common Event in Life,

S E C T. that for some apprehended Interest of *Offspring, Families, Friends,* Men neglect ~~many~~ Opportunities of gaining *Honour*, and even incur *Shame* and *Contempt*. In Actions done for the Service of a *Party*, there can be no comparison, for *Honour* is often a Motive on both sides.

IT is also certain, that the *Fear of Shame*, in some Instances, will overcome all other Desires whatsoever, even *natural Affection, Love of Pleasure, Virtue, Wealth*, and even of *Life* itself. This Fear has excited Parents to the Murder of their *Offspring*; has persuaded Men to the most dangerous Enterprizes; to squander away their *Fortunes*, to counteract their *Duty*, and even to throw away their *Lives*. The Distraction and Convulsion of Mind observable in these *Conflicts of Honour*, with *Virtue* and *publick Affection*, shows how *unnatural* that State is, wherein the strongest *Principles of Action*, naturally designed to co-operate and assist each other, are thus set in Opposition.

IT is perhaps impossible to pronounce any thing universally concerning the Superiority of the Desire of *Honour* on the one hand, or that of the Desire of *Virtue* and *publick Good* on the other. *Habits* or *Custom*

Custom may perhaps determine the Victory S E C T. on either side. Men in high Stations, who V. have long indulged the Desire of Honour, ~~and~~ and have formed the most frightful Apprehensions of *Contempt* as the worst of Evils; or even those in lower Stations, who have been long enured to value Reputation in any particular, and dread *Dishonour* in that point, may have *Fear of Shame* superior to all Aversions. Men, on the contrary, who have much indulged good *Nature*, or reflected much upon the Excellency of *Virtue* itself, abstracted from *Honour*, may find Affections of this kind prevalent above the Fear of Shame.

To compare the *moral Sense* with the Sense of *Honour*, we must find cases where the Agent condemns an Action with all its present Circumstances as evil, and yet fears *Infamy* by omitting it, without any unequal Motives of other kinds on either side: Or when one may obtain *Praise* by an Action, when yet the Omission of it would appear to himself as considerable a Virtue, as the World imagines the Action to be. The common Instances, in which some, who pretend deep Knowledge of *human Nature*, triumph much, have not these necessary Circumstances. When a Man con-
Duels no
proper In-
stances. dems *Duelling* in his private Sentiments, and yet practises it, we have indeed a con-

SECT. I. Siderable Evidence of the Strength of this
V. *Desire of Honour, or Aversion to Shame,*
~~and~~ since it surpasses the Fear of Death. But
here on one hand, besides the *Fear of Shame*, there is the *Fear of constant Insults*, of losing all the *Advantages* depending upon the Character of Courage, and sometimes even some *Species of Virtue* and *publick Good*, in restraining an insolent Villain: On the other hand is the *Fear of Death*. The *moral Sense* is seldom much concerned: for however Men may condemn *voluntary Duelling*; however they may blame the *Age* for the Custom, or censure the *Laws* as defective, yet generally, in their present Case, Duelling appears a necessary Piece of *Self-Defence*, against *opprobrious Injuries* and *Affronts*, for which the Law has provided no Redress, and consequently leaves Men to the natural Rights of *Self-Defence* and *Prosecution of Injuries*. The Case seems to them the same with that of *Thieves* and *Night-Robbers*, who may be put to Death by private Persons, when there is no hope of overtaking them by Law. These are certainly the Notions of those who condemn *Duelling*, and yet practise it.

IT is foreign to our present Purpose to detect the Fallacy of these Arguments, in defence of our *Duels*, when Men from a sudden

sudden Anger, upon some trifling or imaginary *Affronts* the despising of which would appear honourable in every wise ~~V.~~
 Man's Eyes, expose themselves, and often their dearest Friends to Death, and hazard the Ruin of their own Families, as well as that of their Adversary; though the *Success* in such Attempts can have no tendency to justify them against the dis-honourable *Charge*, or to procure any Honour from Men of worth.

THE magnified Instance of *Lucretia** Nor the
Case of
Lucretia.

is yet less to our Purpose. Some talk, as if "she indeed would rather have died than consented to the Crime; but the Crime did not appear so great an Evil as the Dishonour; to the Guilt she submitted to avoid the Shame." Let us consider this renowned Argument. Was there then no Motive on either side, but *Fear of Shame*, and a *Sense of Duty*? If we look into the Story, we shall find, that to persuade her to consent, there conspired, beside the *Fear of Shame*, and of *Death*, which she little regarded, the *Hope of noble Revenge*, or rather of *Justice* on the Ravisher, and the whole Tyrant's Family; nay, the Hopes of a

* Livy, Lib. I. c. 57.

SECT. nobler *Fame* by her future *Conduct*; the
V. Fear of suffering that contumely by
~~force~~, which she was tempted to consent
to, and that in such a manner as she
could have had no Redress. All these
Considerations concurred to make her con-
sent. On the other side, there was only
the moral *Sense* of a Crime thus extenuated
by the most grievous *Necessity*, and by
hopes of *doing Justice* to her Husband's
Honour, and *rescuing her Country*: Nay,
could she not have at once saved her *Cha-
racter* and her *Life* by consenting; when
in that virtuous Age she might have expected
Secrecy in the Prince, since boasting of such
Attempts would have been dangerous to the
greatest Man in *Rome*?

IT is not easy to find just Room for a
Comparison even in fictitious Cases, be-
tween these two *Principles*. Were there
a Person who had no Belief of any *DEITY*,
or of any reality in *Religion*, in a Country
where his *secular Interest* would not suffer
by a Character of *Atheism*; and yet he
knew that the Profession of zealous Devo-
tion would tend to his *Honour*: If such a
Person could have any Sense of *Morality*,
particularly an Aversion to *Dissimulation*,
then his *Profession of Religion* would evi-
dence the Superiority of the *Sense of Ho-
nour*;

nour; and his *Discovery* of his Sentiments, SECT. or Neglect of Religion, would evidence V. the Balance to be on the other side. I pre- ~~WW~~
sume in *England* and *Holland*, we have more Instances of the latter than the former. It is true, our Gentlemen who affect the Name of *Freedom*, may have now their Hopes of *Honour* from their own *Party*, as well as others.

THE Adherence to any particular *Religion* by one in a strange Country, where it was dishonourable, would not be allowed a good Instance of the Prevalence of a *moral Species*; it is a very common thing indeed, but here are *Interests* of another Life, and Regard to a *future Return* to a Country where this Religion is in repute.

IX. THE Pleasures of the *internal Senses*, *The Plea-*
or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, *sures of*
who have any tolerable Taste of them, as *Imagina-*
a much superior Happiness to those of the *external Senses*, though they were enjoyed *tion great-*
to the full. *er than*
those of
external
Senses.

OTHER Comparisons might be made but with less use, or certainty in any general Conclusions, which might be drawn from them.

THE

S E C T. THE Pleasures of *Wealth or Power*,
 V. are proportioned to the Gratifications of the
~~W^m~~ Desires or Senses, which the Agent intends
 to gratify by them: So that, for the Rea-
 sons above offered, Wealth and Power give
 greater Happiness to the *Virtuous*, than
 to those who consult only *Luxury* or *ex-
 ternal Splendor*. If these Desires are grown
enthusiastick and *habitual*, without regard
 to any other end than *Possession*, they are
 an endless Source of Vexation, without any
 real *Enjoyment*; a perpetual *Craving*, with-
 out *Nourishment* or *Digestion*; and they
 may surmount all other Affections, by
 Aids borrowed from other Affections them-
 selves.

THE *fantastick Desires* are violent, in
 proportion to the Senses from which the
associated Ideas are borrowed. Only it is
 to be observed, that however the Desires
 may be violent, yet the obtaining the *Ob-
 ject desired* gives little Satisfaction; the
Possession discovers the Vanity and Deceit,
 and the *Fancy* is turned toward different
 Objects, in a perpetual Succession of incon-
 stant Pursuits.

*A Compari-
 son of the
 several
 Pleasures
 us to Due-
 ration.*

X. THESE several kinds of Pleasure or
 Pain are next to be compared as to their
Duration. Here we are not only to con-
 sider

sider the *Certainty* of the Objects occasioning these Sensations, but the *Constancy* of our Relish or Fancy.



1. THE Objects necessary to remove the Pains of *Appetite*, and to give as grateful *external Sensations* as any others, to a Person of a *correct Imagination*, may be universally secured by common Prudence and Industry. But then the *Sensations* themselves are short and transitory; the *Pleasure* continues no longer than the *Appetite*, nor does it leave any thing behind it, to supply the *Intervals* of Enjoyment. When the Sensation is past, we are no happier for it, there is little pleasure in *Reflection*; and that almost solely arises from the return of *Appetite*; and some Prospect of repeated Enjoyment, or some moral Notions of *Love* or *Friendship* or *Communication of Pleasure*: without these the Remembrance of past sensual Enjoyments is more generally nauseous. Nor are past Sensations any security against, or support under either *external Pain*, or any other sort of evil incident to us. If we keep these Senses pure, and unmixed with *foreign Ideas*, they cannot furnish Employment for Life: If *foreign Ideas* come in, the Objects grow difficult and uncertain, and our *Relish* or *Fancy* full of Inconstancy and Caprice.

2. IN

SECT. 2. In like manner, the Pleasures of the V. *Imagination* may be enjoyed by all, and be a sure Foundation of Pleasure, if we abstract from *Property*, and keep our *Imagination* pure. Such are the Pleasures in the Observation of *Nature*, and even the Works of *Art*; which are ordinarily exposed to view. But as these give less Pleasure the more *familiar* they grow, they cannot sufficiently employ or entertain Mankind, much less can they secure us against, or support us under the *Calamities of Life*, such as *Anger*, *Sorrow*, *Dishonour*, *Remorse*, or *external Pain*. If the *monstrous* or *trifling Taste* take place, or the Ideas of *Property*, they may indeed give sufficient Employment, but they bring along with them little Pleasure, frequent *Disgusts*, *Anxieties*, and *Disappointments*, in the acquiring and retaining their Objects.

3. THE *publick Happiness* is indeed, as to external Appearance, a very uncertain Object; nor is it often in our power to remedy it, by changing the Course of *Events*. There are perpetual Changes in Mankind from Pleasures to Pains, and often from Virtue to Vice. Our *publick Desires* must therefore frequently subject us to *Sorrow*; and the Pleasures of the *publick Sense* must be

be very inconstant. 'Tis true indeed, that ~~SECT.~~ V.
a general *Good-will* to our kind, is the most
constant Inclination of the Mind, which ~~is~~
grows upon us by Indulgence; nor are we
ever dissatisfied with it: the *Uncertainty*
therefore is wholly owing to the *Objects*.
If there can be any Considerations found
out to make it probable, that in the Whole
all Events tend to Happiness, this implicit
Hope indeed may make our *publick Affe-*
tions the greatest and most constant Source
of Pleasure. Frequent *Reflection* on this, is
the best Support under the Sorrow arising
from particular evils, befalling our Fellow-
Creatures. In our *nearer Attachments*
brought upon ourselves, we may procure
to ourselves the greatest Enjoyments of this
kind, with considerable *Security* and *Con-*
stancy, by chusing for our *Friends*, or *dear-*
est Favourites, Persons of just Apprehen-
sions of Things, who are subjected only to
the *necessary Evils* of Life, and can enjoy all
the certain and constant Good. And in like
manner, our Attachment to a *Country* may
be fixed by something else than the *Chance*
of our Nativity. The Enjoyments of the
publick Sense cannot indeed secure us against
bodily *Pains* or *Loss*; but they are often a
considerable Support under them. Nothing
can more allay *Sorrow* and *Dejection* of
Mind for private Misfortunes, than good
Nature,

S E C T. Nature, and Reflection upon the Happiness
V. of those we love.



4. The *moral Sense*, if we form *true Opinions* of the Tendencies of Actions, and of the *Affections* whence they spring, as it is the Fountain of the most *intense Pleasure*, so it is in itself *constant*, not subject to Caprice or Change. If we resolutely encourage this Sense, it grows more acute by frequent *Gratification*, never cloys, never is surfeited. We not only are sure never to want *Opportunities* of doing good, which are in almost every one's power in the highest Degree ; * but each good Action is Matter of pleasant *Reflection* as long as we live. These Pleasures cannot indeed wholly secure us against all kinds of *Uneasiness*, yet they never tend naturally to increase them. On the contrary, their general Tendency is to lead the virtuous Agent into all Pleasures, in the highest Degree in which they are consistent with each other. Our *external Senses* are not weakened by Virtue, our *Imaginations* are not impaired ; the *temperate Enjoyment* of all external Pleasures is the highest. A virtuous Conduct is generally the most prudent, even as to outward *Prosperity*. Where Virtue costs us much, its own

* *Treat. II. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.*

Pleasures

Pleasures are the more sublime. It directly advances the Pleasures of the publick V. Sense, by leading us to promote the publick Happiness as far as we can ; and Honour is its natural and ordinary Attendant. If it cannot remove the necessary Pains of Life, yet it is the best Support under them. These moral Pleasures do some way more nearly affect us than any other : They make us delight in ourselves, and relish our very Nature. By these we perceive an internal Dignity and Worth ; and seem to have a Pleasure like to that ascribed often to the DEITY, by which we enjoy our own Perfection, and that of every other Being.

IT may perhaps seem too metaphysical to alledge on this Subject, that other *Sensations* are all dependent upon, or related by the Constitution of our Nature, to something different from *ourselves* ; to a *Body* which we do not call *Self*, but something belonging to this *Self*. That other *Perceptions* of Joy or Pleasure carry with them Relations to *Objects*, and *Spaces* distinct from this *Self* ; whereas "the Pleasures of Virtue are " the very *Perfection of this SELF*, and are " immediately perceived as such, independent of external Objects."

OUR Sense of Honour may afford very constant Pleasures by good Oeconomy : If
M our

SECT.our moral Sense be not perverted; if we
V. form just Apprehensions of the *Worth* of
~~the~~ others, Honour shall be pleasant to us in a
compound Proportion of the *Numbers* and
Worth of those who confer it. If therefore
we cannot approve ourselves to all, so as to
obtain *universal Honour* among all to whom
we are known, yet there are still Men of
just Thought and Reflection, whose *Esteem*
a virtuous Man may procure. Their *Dignity*
will compensate the Want of *Numbers*,
and support us against the Pains of *Censure*
from the Injudicious.

THE Inconstancy of the Pleasures of *Wealth* and *Power* is well known, and is occasioned, not perhaps by Change of Fancy, for these Desires are found to continue long enough, since they tend toward the *universal Means* of gratifying all other Desires; but by the Uncertainty of *Objects* or *Events* necessary to gratify such continually increasing Desires as these are, where there is not some fixed View different from the *Wealth* or *Power* itself. When indeed they are desired only as the Means of gratifying some other well-regulated Desires, we may soon obtain such a Portion as will satisfy us. But if once the *End* be forgotten, and *Wealth* or *Power* become grateful for themselves, no farther Limits are to be expected: the Desires are insatiable, nor is there any consi-

considerable *Happiness* in any given *Degree* S E C T.
of either.

V.

XI. WERE we to consider the *Duration* The Durations of the several Pains considered. of the several Pains, we may find it generally as the Duration of their Pleasures. As Pains con- to the external Senses, the old *Epicurean* considered. Consolation is generally just: “ Where the “ Pain is violent, it shortens our *Duration*; “ when it does not shorten our *Duration*, “ it is generally either *tolerable*, or admits “ of frequent *Intermissions*;” and then, when the external Pain is once past, no Mortal is the worse for having endured it. There is nothing uneasy in the *Reflection*, when we have no present *Pain*, or fear no *Return* of it.

THE *internal Senses* are not properly *Avenues of Pain*. No *Form* is necessarily the Occasion of positive Uneasiness.

THE Pains of the *moral Sense* and *Sense of Honour*, are almost perpetual; *Time*, the Refuge of other Sorrows, gives us least *Relief* from them. All other Pleasures are made insipid by these Pains, and Life itself an uneasy Burden. Our very *Self*, our *Nature* is disagreeable to us. 'Tis true, we do not always observe the Vicious to be uneasy. The *Deformity* of Vice often does not appear to those who continue in a Course of

S E C T. it. Their Actions are under some Disguise

V. of *Innocence*, or even of *Virtue* itself.

When this Mask is pulled off, as it often happens, nor can any vicious Man prevent its happening, Vice will appear as a *Fury*, whose Aspect no Mortal can bear. This we may see in one *Vice*, which perhaps has had fewer false or fantastick Associations of favourable Ideas than any, *viz.* *Cowardice*, or such a selfish Love of Life, and Aversion to Death, or to the very Hazard of it, as hinders a Man from serving his Country or his Friend, or supporting his own Reputation. How few of our gay Gentlemen can bear to be reputed *Cowards*, or even secretly to imagine themselves void of *Courage*? This is not tolerable to any, how negligent soever they may be about other Points in Morality. Other *Vices* would appear equally odious and despicable, and bear as horrid an Aspect, were they equally stript of the *Disguises of Virtue*. A vicious Man has no other Security against the Appearances of this terrifying Form, than *Ignorance* or *Inadvertence*. If *Truth* break in upon him, as it often must, when any *Adversity* stops his intoxicating Pleasures, or Spectators use *Freedom* with his Conduct, he is rendered perpetually miserable, or must fly to the only Remedy which Reason would suggest, all possible *Reparation* of Injuries, and a new Course of Life, the Necessity of which is

is not superseded by any Remedy suggested S E C T.
by the *Christian Revelation.*

V.



THE Pains of the *publick Sense* are very lasting. The *Misery* of others, either in past or present Ages, is matter of very uneasy *Reflection*, and must continue so, if their State appears in the whole *absolutely Evil*. Against this there is no Relief but the Consideration of a “*good governing MIND*, ordering all for good in the whole, “with the Belief of a *future State*, where “the particular seeming Disorders are rectified.” A firm Persuasion of these Things, with strong *publick Affections* interesting us strongly in this *Whole*, and considering this *Whole* as one great *System*, in which all is wisely ordered for good, may secure us against these Pains, by removing the Opinion of any *absolute Evil*.

THE Pains arising from foolish *Affociations of moral Ideas*, with the Gratifications of *external Senses*, or with the Enjoyment of Objects of *Beauty* or *Grandeur*, or from the Desires of *Property*, the Humour of *Distinction*, may be as constant as the Pains of the *Senses* from which these Ideas are borrowed. Thus what we gain by these Associations is very little. “The Desires of “Trifles are often made very strong and “uneasy; the *Pleasures of Possession* very

SECT. " small and of short Continuance, only till
V. " the Object be familiar, or the *Fancy*
~~VVV~~ " change: But the *Pains of Disappointment*
" are often very lasting and violent." Would we guard against these Associations, every real *Pleasure* in Life remains, and we may be easy without these things, which to others occasion the greatest Pains.

*Gemmas, Marmor, Ebur, Tyrrhenia Sigilla, Tabellas,
Argentum, vestes Getule Murice tintas,
Est qui non habeat, est qui nec curat habere. Hor.*

S E C T.

S E C T. VI.

*Some general Conclusions concerning
the best Management of our De-
sires. With some Principles ne-
cessary to Happiness.*

THUS, upon comparing the several Sect. kinds of Pleasures and Pains, both as VI.
to Intention and Duration, we see that "the ~~whole~~ whole Sum of Interest lies upon the Side
" of Virtue, Publick-spirit, and Honour :
" To forfeit these Pleasures in whole, or in
" part, for any other Enjoyment, is the most
" foolish Bargain ; and on the contrary, to
" secure them with the Sacrifice of all
" others, is the truest Gain."

THERE is one general Observation to be premised, which appears of the greatest Necessity for the just Management of all our Desires; viz. that we should, as much as possible, in all Affairs of Importance to ourselves or others, prevent the Violence of their confused Sensation, and stop their Propensities from breaking out into Action, till we have fully examined the real Moment of the Object, either of our Desires or Aver-
M 4 sions.

SECT. sions. The only way to effect this is, " a
VI. " constant *Attention* of Mind, an habitual
~~~~ " *Discipline* over ourselves, and a fixed Re-  
" solution to stop all Action, before a calm  
" Examination of every Circumstance at-  
" tending it; more particularly, the real  
" Values of external Objects, and the moral  
" Qualities or Tempers of rational Agents,  
" about whom our Affections may be em-  
" ployed." This Power we may obtain  
over ourselves, by a frequent Consideration  
of the great *Calamities*, and pernicious  
Actions, to which even the *best* of our *Pa-*  
*sions* may lead us, by the *confused Sensations*,  
and *fantaſtick Associations* of Ideas which  
attend them: Thus we may raise an *habi-*  
*tual Suspicion* and *Dread* of every violent  
*Passion*, which, recurring along with them  
continually, may in some measure counter-  
balance their *Propensities* and *confused Sen-*  
*sations*. This *Discipline* of our *Passions* is  
in general necessary: The *unkind* or *deſtru-*  
*ctive Affections*, our *Anger*, *Hatred*, or *A-*  
*version* to rational Agents, seem to need it  
most; but there is also a great Necessity for  
it, even about the *tender* and *benign Affe-*  
*cions*, lest we should be hurried into *uni-*  
*versal* and *absolute Evil*, by the Appearance  
of *particular Good*: And consequently it  
must be of the highest Importance to all,  
to strengthen as much as possible, by fre-  
quent Meditation and Reflection, the calm  
Desires

Desires either private or publick, rather S E C T. than the particular Passions, and to make VI. the *calm universal Benevolence* superior to ~~the~~ them.

THAT the necessary *Resignation* of other <sup>Resigna-</sup> Pleasures may be the more easy, we must <sup>tion of sen-</sup> frequently suggest to ourselves these Consi- <sup>sual Plea-</sup> derations above-mentioned. " *External* " *Pleasures* are short and transitory, leave " no agreeable *Reflection*, and are no man- " ner of *Advantage* to us when they are " past; we are no better than if we had " wanted them altogether."

IN like manner, " past Pains give us no " unpleasant *Reflection*, nor are we the " worse for having endured them. If they " are violent, our Existence will probably " be short; if not, they are tolerable, or " allow long Intervals of Ease." Let us join to these a *stoical Consideration*; " that " external Pains give us a noble Opportu- " nity of *moral Pleasures* in Fortitude, and " Submission to the Order of the whole, if " we bear them resolutely; but if we fret " under them, we do not alleviate the Suf- " fering, but rather increase it by *Discontent* " or *Sullenness*." When external Pains must be endured voluntarily to avoid *moral Evil*, we must, as much as possible, pre- sent to ourselves the *moral Species* itself with

SECT. with the *publick Good* to ensue, the *Honour*  
VI. and *Approbation* to be expected from all  
~~good~~ good Men, the *Deity*, and our own  
Hearts, if we continue firm; and on the  
contrary, the *Remorse*, *Shame* and *Appre-*  
*hension* of *future Punishments*, if we yield  
to this Temptation.

How necessary it is to break off the vain  
Associations of *moral Ideas*, from the Ob-  
jects of *external Senses*, will also easily ap-  
pear. This may be done, by considering  
how trifling the *Services* are which are done  
to our Friends or Acquaintances, by *splen-*  
*did Entertainments*, at an Expence, which,  
otherwise employed, might have been to  
them of considerable Importance. Men  
who are at ease, and of as *irregular Imagi-*  
*nations* as ourselves, may admire and  
praise our *Magnificence*; but those who  
need more *durable Services*, will never think  
themselves much obliged. We cannot ex-  
pect any *Gratitude* for what was done only  
to please our own *Vanity*: The *Indigent*  
easily see this, and justly consider upon the  
whole how much they have profited.

If the Wealth of the *Luxurious* fails, he  
is the Object of *Contempt*: No body pities  
him nor honours him: his *personal Digni-*  
*tity* was placed by himself in his *Table*, *E-*  
*quipage* and *Furniture*; his Admirers placed  
it

it also in the same: When these are gone all S E C T.  
is lost.

VI.

—*Non est melius quo insumere possis?*  
*Cur eget indignus quisquam te Divite? quare*  
*Templarunt antiqua Deum? cur improbecarae*  
*Non aliquid Patriae ex tanto emetiris acervo?*  
*Uni nimirum tibi recte semper erunt res:*  
*O magnus postbac inimicis Rijus.* — Hor.

THERE is no Enjoyment of external Pleasure, which has more imposed upon Men of late, by some confused *Species of Morality*, than *Gallantry*. The sensible Pleasure alone must, by all Men who have the least Reflection, be esteemed at a very low rate: But the Desires of this kind, as they were by Nature intended to found the most constant uninterrupted *Friendship*, and to introduce the most venerable and lovely *Relations*, by *Marriages* and *Families*, arise in our Hearts, attended with some of the sweetest *Affections*, with a disinterested *Love* and *Tenderness*, with a most gentle and obliging *Deportment*, with something great and heroick in our Temper. The Wretch who rises no higher in this Passion than the mean *sensual Gratification*, is abhorred by every one: But these sublimer Sensations and Passions often so fill the Imaginations of the *Amorous*, that they are unawares led into the

SECT. the most contemptible and cruel Conduct  
VI. which can be imagined. When for some  
~~trifling~~ trifling transitory *Sensations*, which they  
might have innocently enjoyed along with  
the highest moral *Pleasures* in Marriage,  
they expose the very Person they love and  
admire to the deepest *Infamy* and *Sorrow*, to  
the *Contempt* of the World, to perpetual  
*Confusion*, *Remorse*, and *Anguish*; or, to  
what is worse, an *Insensibility* of all Ho-  
nour or Shame, Virtue or Vice, Good or  
Evil, to be the Scorn and Aversion of the  
World; and all this coloured over with the  
gay Notions of *Pleasantry*, *Genteelness*, *Po-*  
*liteness*, *Courage*, *high Enjoyment of Life*.

WOULD Men allow themselves a little  
Time to reflect on the *whole Effect* of such  
capricious Pursuits, the *Anguish* and *Distra-  
ction* of Mind which these Sallies of Plea-  
sure give to *Husbands*, *Fathers*, *Brothers*;  
would they consider how they themselves  
would resent such Treatment of a *Wife*,  
a *Child*, a *Sister*; how much deeper such  
Distresses are, than those trifling Losses or  
Damages, for which we think it just to  
bring the Authors to the Gallows; sure  
none but a thorough Villain could either  
practice or approve the one more than the  
other.

A WISE


A WISE Man in his Oeconomy, must do S E C T. much even in Complaisance to the *Follies* of VI. others, as well as his own *Conveniency*, to support that general good *Opinion* which must be maintained by those who would be useful to the Publick. His *Expences* must be some way suited to his *Fortune*, to avoid the Imputation of *Avarice*. If indeed what is saved in *private Expences*, be employed in *generous Offices*, there is little danger of this Charge. Such a *Medium* may be kept as to be above *Censure*, and yet below any *Affectation of Honour or Distinction* in these matters. If one corrects his own *Imagination* in these things, he will be in no danger of doing any thing pernicious to please others. He is still in a State fit to judge of the real *Importance* of every thing which occurs to him, and will gratify the false *Relish* of others, no farther than it is consistent with, and subservient to *some nobler Views*.

II. To make the Pleasures of *Imagina-* Conduct *tion* a constant Source of *Delight*, as they necessary about the seem intended in the Frame of our Nature, Pleasures with no hazard of *Pain*, it is necessary to of Imagi- *keep* the Sense free from foreign *Ideas of* nation. *Property*, and the *Desire of Distinction*, as much as possible. If this can be done, we may receive Pleasure from every *Work of* *Nature*

**S E C T.** *Nature or Art around us.* We enjoy not  
 VI. only the whole of *Nature*, but the united  
 Labours of all about us. To prevent the  
 Idea of *Property*, let us consider " how lit-  
 " tle the *Proprietor* enjoys more than the  
 " *Spectator*: Wherein is he the better or  
 " the happier?" The *Poet*, or the *Connois-  
 seur*, who judges nicely of the Perfection  
 of the Works of Art, or the Beauties of  
 Nature, has generally a *higher Taste* than  
 the Possessor. The *magnificent Palace*, the  
*grand Apartments*, the *Vistas*, the *Fountains*,  
 the *Urns*, the *Statues*, the *Grottoes* and *Ar-  
 hours*, are exposed either in their own *Nature*, or by the Inclination of the *Proprie-  
 tor*, to the Enjoyment of others. The  
*Pleasure* of the *Proprietor* depends upon the  
*Admiration* of others; he robs himself of  
 his chief Enjoyment, if he excludes *Specta-  
 tors*: Nay, may not a *Taste* for *Nature* be  
 acquired, giving greater Delight than the  
 Observation of *Art*?

*Deterius Lybicus olet, aut nitet, Herba lapillis?  
 Purior in vicis aqua tendit rumpere Plumbeum,  
 Quam quæ per pronum trepidat cum murmure rivum?  
 Nempe inter varias nutritur Sylva Columnas,  
 Laudaturque Domus, longos quæ prospicit Agros.  
 Naturam expellas furca licet, usque recurret.* Hor.

Must an *artful Grove*, an *Imitation* of a  
 Wilderness, or the more confined Forms of  
 Ever-

Ever-greens, please more than the real Fo-SECT.  
rest, with the Trees of God? Shall a Statue VI.  
give more Pleasure than the *human Face*   
*Divine?*

WHERE the *Humour of Distinction* is not corrected, our Equals become our Adversaries: The Grandeur of another is our *Misery*, and makes our Enjoyments insipid. There is only one way of making this Humour tolerable, but this way is almost inconsistent with the *Inclination* itself, viz. "continually to haunt with our Inferiors, " and compare ourselves with them." But if inconstant Fortune, or their own Merit raise any of them to equal us, our *Pleasure* is lost, or we must sink ourselves to those who are still *Inferior*, and abandon the Society of every Person whose *Art* or *Merit* raises him. How poor a Thought is this!

THE Pursuits of the *Learned* have often as much Folly in them as any others, when Studies are not valued according to their *Use in Life*, or the real Pleasures they contain, but for the *Difficulty* and *Obscurity*, and consequently the *Rarity* and *Distinction*. Nay, an abuse may be made of the most noble and manly Studies, even of *Morals*, *Politicks*, and *Religion* itself, if our Admiration and Desire terminate upon the *Knowledge* itself, and not upon the Possession of the

SECT. the *Dispositions* and *Affections* inculcated in VI. these Studies. If these Studies be only matter of *Amusement* and *Speculation*, instead of leading us into a constant *Discipline* over ourselves, to correct our Hearts, and to guide our Actions, we are not much better employed, than if we had been studying some useless Relations of *Numbers*, or Calculations of *Chances*.

THERE is not indeed any part of Knowledge which can be called entirely *useless*. The most *abstracted Parts* of *Mathematicks*, and the Knowledge of *mythological History*, or antient *Allegories*, have their own Pleasures not inferior to the more gay Entertainments of *Painting*, *Musick*, or *Architecture*; and it is for the Advantage of Mankind that some are found, who have a Taste for these Studies. The only Fault lies, in letting any of those *inferior Tastes* engross the whole Man to the Exclusion of the nobler Pursuits of *Virtue* and *Humanity*.

CONCERNING all these Pleasures of the Imagination, let us consider also " how little support they can give Men under any of the Calamities of Life," such as the Treachery or Baseness of a *Friend*, a *Wife*, a *Child*, or the perplexing Intricacies of our common Affairs, or the Apprehension of *Death*.

*Re*

*Re veraque Metus hominum, Curæque sequaces S E C T.  
Nec metuunt sonitus Armorum, nec fera Tela; VI.  
Audacterque inter Reges, rerumque Potentes   
Versantur, nec fulgorem reverentur ab auro,  
Nec clarum vestis splendorem purpureaï  
Quid dubitas quin omne sit hoc rationis egestas?*

Luc.

III. UNDER this Head of our Internal Sense, we must observe one natural Effect of it, that it leads us into Apprehensions of a DEITY. Grandeur, Beauty, Order, Harmony, wherever they occur, raise an Opinion of a MIND, of Design, and Wisdom. Every thing great, regular, or proportioned, excites Veneration, either toward itself, if we imagine it animated, if not animated, toward some apprehended Cause. No Determination of our Mind is more natural than this, no Effect more universal. One has better Reason to deny the Inclination between the Sexes to be natural, than a Disposition in Mankind to Religion.

WE cannot open our Eyes, without discerning Grandeur and Beauty every where. Whoever receives these Ideas, feels an inward Veneration arise. We may fall into a Thousand vain Reasonings: foolish limited Notions of DIVINITY may be formed, as attatched to the particular Places or Objects, which strike us in the most lively manner.

N

SECT. manner. Custom, Prejudice of Sense or  
VI. Education, may confirm some foolish O-  
~~UN~~pinion about the *Nature* or *Cause* of these  
Appearances: But wherever a superior  
MIND, a governing INTENTION or DESIGN  
is imagined, there *Religion* begins in  
its most simple Form, and an inward *De-  
votion* arises. Our Nature is as much de-  
termined to this, as to any other Percep-  
tion or Affection. How we manage these  
Ideas and Affections, is indeed of the great-  
est Importance to our Happiness or Misery.

WHEN we have the Apprehension of an universal MIND with Power and Knowledge, we must also conceive something correspondent to our *Affections* in the DIVINITY, with some moral Apprehensions of the Actions and Tempers of his Creatures. The *Order of Nature* will suggest many Confirmations of this. We must conclude some *Worship* acceptable, and some Expressions of *Gratitude* as our Duty. Conceptions of the DEITY must be various, according to the different Degrees of *Atten-  
tion* and *Reasoning* in the Observers, and their own Tempers and Affections. Imagining the divine MIND, as *cruel*, *wrathful*, or *capricious*, must be a perpetual Source of Dread and Horror; and will be apt to raise a *Resemblance* of Temper in the Wor-  
shipper, with its attendant *Misery*. A con-  
trary

trary Idea of the DIVINITY, as good, and kind, delighting in universal Happiness, and ordering all Events of the Universe to this End, as it is the most delightful Contemplation, so it fills the good Mind with a constant *Security* and *Hope*, amidst either publick Disorders, or private Calamities.

To find out which of these two Representations of the DEITY is the true one, we must consult the *Universe*, the Effect of his Power, and the Scene of his Actions. After what has been observed by so many ingenious Authors, both *Ancient* and *Modern*, one cannot be at a loss which Opinion to chuse. We may only on this occasion consider the Evidences of divine Goodness appearing in the *Structure of our own Nature*, and in the Order of our *Passions* and *Senses*.

IT was observed above, how admirably our Affections are contrived for good in the *whole*. Many of them indeed do not pursue the *private Good* of the Agent; nay, many of them, in various Cases, seem to attend to his detriment, by concerning him violently in the Fortunes of others, in their *Adversity*, as well as their Prosperity. But they all aim at *good*, either private or publick: and by them each particular Agent is  
 N 2 made,

Evidences  
of the Good-  
ness of God  
in the  
Frame of  
our Senses  
and Affec-  
tions.

SECT. made, in a great measure, subservient to the  
VI. *good of the whole.* Mankind are thus insen-  
sibly linked together, and make one great  
System, by an invisible Union. He who  
voluntarily continues in this Union, and  
delights in employing his Power for his  
Kind, makes himself happy: He who does  
not continue this Union freely, but affects  
to break it, makes himself wretched; nor  
yet can he break the *Bonds of Nature.* His  
*publick Sense,* his *Love of Honour,* and the  
very *Necessities* of his Nature, will contin-  
ue to make him depend upon his *System,*  
and engage him to serve it, whether he inclines  
to it or not. Thus we are formed  
with a View to a general good *End;* and  
may in our own nature discern a universal  
Mind watchful for the whole.

THE same is observable in the Order of  
our *external Senses.* The simple Produc-  
tions of Nature, which are useful to any  
Species of Animals, are also *grateful* to  
them; and the pernicious or useless Objects  
are made disagreeable. Our external Sensa-  
tions are no doubt often *painful*, when our  
Bodies are in a dangerous State; when they  
want supplies of Nourishment; when any  
thing external would be injurious to them.  
But if it appears, "that the *general Laws*  
" are wisely constituted, and that it is ne-  
cessary to the Good of a System of  
" such

" such Agents, to be under the Influence **SECT.**  
" of general *Laws*, upon which there is **VI.**  
" occasion for *Prudence* and *Activity*;" **~~~**  
the particular *Pains* occasioned by a necessary  
*Law* of *Sensation*, can be no Objection  
against the Goodness of the Author. See  
Treat. I. Sect. ult.

Now that there is no room for complaint, that "our external Sense of *Pain*" is made too acute," must appear from the Multitudes we daily see so careless of preserving the Blessing of *Health*, of which many are so prodigal as to lavish it away, and expose themselves to the most severe external *Pain* for very trifling Reasons. Can we then repine at the friendly *Admonitions* of Nature, joined with some *Austerity*, when we see that they are scarce sufficient to restrain us from Ruin. The same may be said of Pain of other kinds, *Shame* and *Remorse* are never to be called too severe, while so many are not sufficiently restrained by them. Our *Compassion* and friendly *Sense of Sorrow*, what are they else but the *Alarms* and *Exhortations* of a kind impartial *Father*, to engage his *Children* to relieve a distressed *Brother*? Our *Anger* itself is a necessary Piece of Management, by which every pernicious Attempt is made dangerous to its Author.

SECT. WOULD we allow room to our Invention, to conceive what sort of *Mechanism*, what *Constitutions* of Senses or Affections a malicious powerful Being might have formed, we should soon see how few Evidences there are for any such Apprehension concerning the AUTHOR of this World. Our *Mechanism*, as far as we have ever yet discovered, is wholly contrived for good. No cruel *Device*, no *Art* or *Contrivance* to produce evil: No such *Mark* or *Scope* seems ever to be aimed at. How easy had it been to have contrived some necessary Engines of *Misery* without any use; some *Member* of no other service but to be matter of *Torment*; *Senses* incapable of bearing the surrounding Objects without Pain; Eyes pained with the *Light*; a Palate offended with the *Fruits* of the Earth; a Skin as tender as the Coats of the Eye, and yet some more furious Pain forcing us to bear these Torments? Human Society might have been made as uneasy as the Company of *Enemies*, and yet a perpetual more violent Motive of *Fear* might have forced us to bear it. *Malice*, *Rancour*, *Distrust*, might have been our natural Temper. Our *Honour* and *Self-Approval* might have depended upon *Injuries*; and the *Torments* of others been made our *Delight*, which yet we could not have enjoyed thro' perpetual

perpetual *Fear*. Many such Contrivances ~~S E C T.~~ we may easily conceive, whereby an evil *Mind* could have gratified his *Malice* by our ~~W W~~ *Misery*. But how unlike are they all to the Intention or Design of the Mechanism of this World?

OUR *Passions* no doubt are often Matter of Uneasiness to ourselves, and sometimes occasion Misery to others, when any one is indulged into a Degree of Strength beyond its *Proportion*. But which of them could we have wanted, without greater Misery in the whole? They are by Nature ballanced against each other, like the *Antagonist Muscles* of the Body; either of which separately would have occasioned *Distortion* and irregular *Motion*, yet jointly they form a Machine, most accurately subservient to the *Necessities, Convenience, and Happiness of a rational System*. We have a Power of *Reason* and *Reflection*, by which we may see what Course of Action will naturally tend to procure us the most valuable *Gratifications* of all our Desires, and prevent any intolerable or unnecessary *Pains*, or provide some support under them. We have Wisdom sufficient to form Ideas of *Rights, Laws, Constitutions*; so as to preserve large Societies in Peace and Prosperity, and promote a general *Good* amidst all the *private Interests*.

**S E C T.** If from the present Order of Nature,  
**VI.** in which *Good* appears far superior to *Evil*,  
 we have just ground to conclude the **D E I T Y** to be benevolent, it is not conceivable  
 " that any Being, who desires the **Happi-**  
 " ness of others, should not desire a *great-*  
*er Degree* of Happiness to them rather  
 " than a less; and that consequently the  
 " whole *Series of Events* is the best pos-  
 " sible, and contains in the whole the great-  
 " est possible *absolute Good*:" especially  
 since we have no Presumption of any *pri-*  
*vate Interest*, which an *universal MIND*  
 can have in view, in Opposition to the  
 greatest Good of the whole. Nor are the  
 particular Evils occurring to our Observation,  
 any just Objection against the perfect Good-  
 ness of the universal **P R O V I D E N C E** to us,  
 who cannot know how far these Evils may  
 be necessarily connected with the *Means* of  
 the greatest possible absolute Good.

*The Con-*  
*dact of our*  
*publick*  
*Sense and*  
*Affections.* IV. In managing our *publick Sense* of  
 the State of others, we must beware of one  
 common Mistake, *viz.* " apprehending e-  
 " very Person to be miserable in those Cir-  
 " cumstances, which we imagine would  
 " make ourselves miserable." We may  
 easily find, that the *lower Rank* of Man-  
 kind, whose only Revenue is their bodily La-  
 bour, enjoy as much *Chearfulness, Content-*  
*ment,*

ment, *Health*, *Gaiety*, in their own way, as S E C T. any in the highest Station of Life. Both VI. their Minds and Bodies are soon fitted to ~~the~~ their State. The *Farmer* and *Labourer*, when they enjoy the bare Necessaries of Life, are easy. They have often more *correct Imaginations*, through *Necessity* and *Experience*, than others can acquire by *Philosophy*. This Thought is indeed a poor Excuse for a base selfish *Oppressor*, who imagining Poverty a great Misery, bears hard upon those in a low Station of Life, and deprives them of the common Necessaries, or even of the natural Conveniences of Life, But this Consideration may support a compassionate Heart, too deeply touched with apprehended Miseries, of which the *Sufferers* are themselves insensible.

THE Pains of this *Sense* are not easily removed. They are not allayed by the Distinction of Pains into *real* and *imaginary*. Much less will it remove them, to consider how much of human Misery is owing to their own *Folly* and *Vice*. Folly and Vice are themselves the most pityable Evils. It is of more consequence to consider, what Evidences there are " that the Vice and Misery in the World are smaller than we sometimes in our melancholy Hours imagine." There are no doubt many furious

S E C T.ous Starts of Passion, in which Malice VI. may seem to have place in our Constitution; but how seldom, and how short, in comparison of Years spent in fixed kind Pursuits of the Good of a *Family*, a *Party*, a *Country*? How great a Part of human Actions flow directly from *Humanity* and *kind Affection*? How many censurable Actions are owing to the same Spring, only chargeable on *Inadvertence*, or an Attachment to too narrow a *System*? How few owing to any thing worse than *selfish Passions* above their Proportion?

HERE Men are apt to let their Imaginations run out upon all the *Robberies*, *Piracies*, *Murders*, *Perjuries*, *Frauds*, *Massacres*, *Affassinations*, they have ever either heard of, or read in History; thence concluding all Mankind to be very wicked: as if a *Court of Justice* were the proper Place of making an Estimate of the *Morals* of Mankind, or an *Hospital* of the *Healthfulness* of a Climate. Ought they not to consider, that the Number of honest *Citizens* and *Farmers* far surpasses that of all sorts of Criminals in any State; and that the innocent or kind Actions of even Criminals themselves, surpass their Crimes in Numbers? That it is the *Rarity* of Crimes, in comparison of innocent or good Actions, which

which engages our Attention to them, and SECT. makes them be recorded in History; while VI. incomparably more honest, generous, do- W<sup>W</sup> mestick Actions are overlooked, only because they are so common; as one great Danger, or one Month's Sickness, shall become a frequently repeated Story, during a long Life of Health and Safety.

THE Pains of the *external Senses* are pretty frequent, but how short in comparison of the long Tracts of Health, Ease and Pleasure? How rare is the Instance of a Life, with one tenth spent in violent Pain? How few want absolute Necessaries; nay, have not something to spend on *Gaiety* and *Ornament*? The Pleasures of *Beauty* are exposed to all in some measure. These kinds of Beauty, which require *Property* to the full Enjoyment of them, are not ardently desired by many. The Good of every kind in the Universe, is plainly superior to the Evil. How few would accept of *Annihilation*, rather than Continuance in Life in the middle State of Age, Health and Fortune? Or what separated Spirit, who had considered human Life, would not, rather than perish, take the hazard of it again, by returning into a Body in the State of Infancy?

—W<sup>o</sup>

S E C T.

VI.

~~~~~

*—Who would lose,
For fear of Pain, this intellectual Being,
These Thoughts which wander thro' Eternity,
To perish rather, swallowed up and lost
In the wide Womb of uncreated Night,
Devoid of Sense and Motion——?*

Milton's Par. lost, Book II.

THESE Thoughts plainly shew a *Prevalence* of Good in the World. But still our publick Sense finds much matter of compas-
nate Sorrow among Men. The *Many* are in a tolerable good State; but who can be unconcerned for the distressed *Few*? They are few in comparison of the whole, and yet a great *Multitude*.

WHAT Parent would be much concerned at the Pains of breeding of *Teeth*, were they sure they would be short, and end well? Or at the Pain of a Medicine, or an Incision, which was necessary for the Cure, and would certainly accomplish it? Is there then no *Parent* in NATURE, no *Physician* who sees what is necessary for the *Whole*, and for the good of each Individual in the whole of his Existence, as far as is consist-
ent with the general Good? Can we expect, in this our *Childhood* of Existence, to under-
stand all the Contrivance and Art of this Parent and Physician of Nature? May not some

some harsh Discipline be necessary to Good? S E C T R. May not many natural Evils be necessary VI. to prevent future moral Evils, and to correct the Tempers of the Agents, nay to introduce moral Good? Is not *Suffering* and *Distress* requisite, before there can be room for generous Compassion, *Succour*, and *Liberality*? Can there be *Forgiveness*, *Returns of good for evil*, unless there be some *moral Evil*? Must the whole want the eternally delightful *Consciousness* of such *Actions* and *Dispositions*, to prevent a few transient Sensations of Pain, or natural Evil? May there not be some unseen Necessity for the greatest universal Good, that * there should be an *Order of Beings* no more perfect than we are, subject to Error and wrong Affections sometimes? May not all the present Disorders which attend this State of *prevalent Order*, be rectified by the *directing Providence* in a future Part of our Existence? This belief of a DEITY, a PROVIDENCE, and a *future State*, are the only sure Supports to a good Mind. Let us then acquire and strengthen our Love and Concern for this *World*, and acquiesce in what the governing MIND, who presides in it, is ordering in the wisest Manner, though not yet fully known to us, for its most universal Good.

* See the Archibishop of Dublin, *de Origine Malorum*.

SECT. A FUTURE State, firmly believed, makes
VI. the greatest Difficulties on this Subject to
~~vanish~~ vanish. No particular *finite Evils* can be
The Necessity of believing a Good, infinite in Duration, Not can we
future State. looked upon as intolerable, which lead to
complain of the Conditions of Birth, if
the present Evils of Life have even a pro-
bable hazard of *everlasting Happiness* to
compensate them; much more if it be pla-
ced in our Power certainly to obtain it. Ne-
ver could the boldest Epicurean bring the
lightest Appearance of Argument against
the Possibility of such a State, nor was there
ever any thing tolerable advanced against
its Probability. We have no Records of
any Nation which did not entertain this O-
pinion. Men of Reflection in all Ages,
have found at least probable Arguments for
it; and the Vulgar have been prone to be-
lieve it, without any other Argument than
their natural Notions of Justice in the Ad-
ministration of the World. Present Hope is
present Good: and this very Hope has en-
livened human Life, and given ease to gene-
rous Minds, under Anxieties about the pub-
lick Good.

THIS Opinion was interwoven with all
Religions; and as it in many instances over-
ballanced the Motives to Vice, so it remo-
ved Objections against Providence. The
good

good Influence of this Opinion, however it ~~S E C T.~~ might not justify any *Frauds* in other points, VI. yet probably might overballance many Evils ~~as~~ flowing from even very *corrupt Religions*. How agreeable then must it be to every good Man, that this Opinion, were there even no more to be done, should be confirmed beyond question or doubt, by a well attested *divine Revelation*, for the perpetual *Security* of the virtuous, and for the constant Support of the *kind and compassionate*? How gladly must every honest Heart receive it; and rejoice that even those who have neither *Leisure* nor *Capacity* for deep *Reflection*, should be thus convinced of it?

As to the Management of those Passions *The Con-*
which seem *opposite* to the *Happiness* of o-*duct of the*
thers, such as *Anger*, *Jealousy*, *Envy*, *Ha-*unkind Affe-**
tred; it is very necessary to represent to our-*ctions.*
selves continually, the most *favourable Con-*
ceptions of others, and to force our Minds to
examine the *real Springs* of the resented
Actions. We may almost universally find,
that no Man acts from *pure Malice*; that
the Injurious only intended some *Interest of his own*, without any *ultimate Desire* of our
Misery; that he is more to be pitied for
his own mean *selfish Temper*, for the want
of true *Goodness*, and its attendant *Happi-*
ness, than to be hated for his Conduct,
which is really more pernicious to himself
than

SECT. than to others.* Our *Lenity*, *Forgiveness*, VI. and *Indulgence* to the Weakness of others, will be constant Matter of delightful *Consciousness*, and *Self-Approval*; and will be as probably effectual in most cases, to obtain *Reparation* of Wrongs, from an hearty *Remorse*, and thorow *Amendment of the Temper* of the Injurious, as any Methods of Violence. Could we raise our Goodness even to an higher Pitch, and consider "the Injurious as our *Fellow-Members* in this great intellectual Body, whose Interest and Happiness it becomes us to promote, as much as we can consistently with that of others, and not to *despise*, *scorn*, or *cut them off*, because of every *Weakness*, *Deformity*, or lighter *Disorder*;" we might bring ourselves to that divine Conduct, of even *returning good for evil*.

IN like manner, our *Emulation*, *Jealousy*, or *Envy*, might be restrained in a great measure, by a constant *Resolution* of bearing always in our Minds the + lovely Side of every Character: † "The compleatly Evil are as rare as the perfectly Virtuous: There is something amiable almost in every one." Could we enure ourselves con-

* See this Point handled with great Judgment, in *Plato's Gorgias*.

† Epictet. Enchir. Cap. 65.

‡ Plato Phædon.

constantly to dwell on these things, we SECT.
 might often bear patiently the *Success of a Rival*, nay, sometimes even rejoice in it, ~~and~~ ^{VI.}
 be more happy ourselves, and turn him into a real *Friend*. We should often find those *Phantoms of Vice and Corruption* which torment the *Jealous*, vanishing before the bright Warmth of a thorow *good Temper*, resolved to search for every thing *lovely and good*, and averse to think any *evil*.

V. In governing our *moral Sense*, and *De-* Conduct of
sires of Virtue, nothing is more necessary the moral
 than to study the *Nature and Tendency of* Sense, and
 human Actions; and to extend our views to Sense of
 the *whole Species*, or to all *sensitive Natures*, Honour.
 as far as they can be affected by our *Conduct*. Our moral Sense thus regulated, and constantly followed in our Actions, may be the most constant Source of the most *stable Pleasure*. The same *Conduct* is always the most probable Means of obtaining the *Pleasures of Honour*. If there be a Distinction between *Truth* and *Falshood*, Truth must be stronger than Falshood: It must be more probable that *Truth* will generally prevail; that the real *good Tendency* of our Actions, and the Wisdom of our *Intentions* will be known; and *Misrepresentations* or *partial Views* will vanish. Our Desire of *Honour* is not confined to our present State. The Prospect of *future Glory* is a strong Motive

S E C T. of Action. And thus the *Time*, in which VI. our Character may have the hazard of obtaining Justice, has no other Limits than those of the *Existence of rational Natures*. Whereas, *partial Notions* of Virtue, and *partial Conduct*, have no other Foundation for *Self-Approval*, than our *Ignorance, Error, or Inadvertence*; nor for *Honour*, than the like *Ignorance, Error, or Inadvertence* of others.

THAT we may not be engaged into any thing contrary to the publick Good, or to the true Schemes of Virtue, by the Desire of *false Honour*, or *Fear of false Shame*, it is of great use to examine the *real Dignity* of those we converse with, and to confine our *Intimacies* to the truly virtuous and wise. From such we can expect no Honour, but according to our sincere Pursuit of the *publick Good*; nor need we ever fear any *Shame* in such a Course. But above all, did we frequently, and in the most lively manner, present to ourselves that great, and wise, and good MIND, which presides over the Universe, sees every *Action*, and knows the true *Character* and *Disposition* of every Heart, approving nothing but sincere Goodness and Integrity; did we consider that the time will come, when we shall be as conscious of his *Presence*, as we are of our own *Existence*; as sensible of his *Approval* or *Condem-*

Condemnation, as we are of the Testimony S E C T .
of our own Hearts ; when we shall be en- VI.
gaged in a Society of Spirits, stripped of ~~the~~ these Prejudices and *false Notions* which so
often attend us in Flesh and Blood, how
should we despise that Honour which is
from Men, when opposite to the truest Ho-
nour from GOD himself ?

VI. CONCERNING the Desires of *Wealth* The Desires of Wealth and Power, besides what was suggested above and Pow-
to allay their Violence, from considering *er.*
the small Addition commonly made to the
Happiness of the Possessor, by the greatest
Degrees of them, and the *Uncertainty* of
their Continuance; if we have obtained any
share of them, let us examine their *true Use*,
and what is the best Enjoyment of them.

*Quid asper
Utile Nummus babet? Patriæ carisq; propinquis
Quantum elargiri decet?* — Persius.

WHAT moral Pleasures, what Delights
of Humanity, what Gratitude from Persons
obliged, what Honour, may a wise Man of
generous Temper purchase with them? How
foolish is the Conduct of heaping up Wealth
for *Posterity*, when smaller Degrees might
make them equally happy! when great Pro-
spects of this kind are the strongest Tempta-
tions to them, to indulge Sloth, Luxury,
O 2 *Debau-*

S E C T. *Debauchery, Insolence, Pride, and Contempt*

VI. of their Fellow-Creatures ; and to banish
 some noble Dispositions, *Humility, Compassion, Industry, Hardiness of Temper and Courage*, the Offspring of the sober rigid Dame *Poverty*. How often does the *Example*, and almost direct *Instruction* of Parents, lead Posterity into the basest Views of Life !

————— *Qui nulla exempla beati
Pauperis esse putat* —————
*Cum dicis Juveni stultum qui donat amico,
Qui paupertatem levat attollitque propinqui,
Et spoliare doces & circumscribere* —————
*Ergo Ignem, cuius scintillas ipse dedisti,
Flagrantem late, & rapientem cuncta videbis.*
 Juv. Sat. XIV.

How powerfully might the Example of a wisely generous Father, at once teach his Offspring the true *Value* of Wealth or Power, and prevent their *Neglect* of them, or foolish throwing them away, and yet inspire them with a generous *Temper*, capable of the just *Use* of them !

*Support
against
Death.*

DEATH is one Object of our *Aversion*, which yet we cannot avoid. It can scarcely be said, that “ the *Desire of Life* is as strong “ as the *Sum of all selfish Desires.*” It may be so with those who enure themselves to no Pleasures but those of the *external Senses.*

ses. But how often do we see Death endu-S E C T.
red, not only from Love of *Virtue*, or pub- VI.
lick Affections, in Heroes and Martyrs, but even from Love of *Honour* in lower Char-
acters! Many Aversions are stronger than
that to Death. *Fear of bodily Pain, fear of*
Dishonour, which are selfish Aversions, do
often surpass our Aversion to Death, as well
as *publick Affections* to Countries or Friends.
It is of the greatest Consequence to the *En-*
joyment of Life, to know its true *Value*; to
strip Death of its borrowed Ideas of Ter-
ror; to consider it barely as the *Cessation of*
both the Pains and Pleasures we now feel,
coming frequently upon us with no more
Pain than that of *Swooning*, with a noble
Hazard, or rather a certain *Prospect* of su-
perior Happiness to every good *Mind*. Death
in this view must appear an inconsiderable
Evil, in comparison of *Vice, Self-Abhor-*
rence, real Dishonour, the Slavery of one's
Country, the Misery of a Friend.

THE tender Regards to a *Family* and *Off-*
spring, are often the strongest Bands to re-
strain a generous Mind from submitting to
Death. What shall be the Fate of a *Wife*,
a Child, a Friend, or a Brother, when we
are gone, are the frequent Subjects of grie-
vous Anxiety. The Fortunes of such Per-
sons often depend much upon us; and when

SECT. they do not, yet we are more anxious about
VI. their State when we shall be absent.



*Ut affidens implumibus pullis avis,
Serpentium allapsus timet
Magis relictis, non ut adst auxili
Latura plus præsentibus.* Hor.

NEXT to the Belief of a good PROVIDENCE, nothing can support Men more under such *Anxieties*, than considering how often the *Orphan* acquires a *Vigor* of Mind, *Sagacity* and *Industry*, superior to those who are enfeebled by the constant *Care* and *Services* of others. A wise Man would desire to be provided with Friends against such an *Exigency*; Persons of such *Goodness*, as would joyfully accept the *Legacy* of a *Child*, or indigent *Friend* committed to their Protection.

IF Death were an *entire End* of the Person, so that no Thought or Sense should remain, all *Good* must cease at Death, but no *Evil* commence. The *Loss of Good* is Evil to us now, but will be no Evil to a Being which has lost all *Sense of Evil*. Were this the Case, the Consolation against Death would only be this, frequently to look upon *Life* and all its Enjoyments as granted to us only for a *short Term*; to employ this uncertain Time as much as we can in the Enjoyment

joyment of the nobleſt Pleaſures; and to S E C T. prevent Surprize at our Removal, by laying VI.
our Account for it.



BUT if we exist, and think after Death, and retain our *Senses* of Good and Evil, no Consolation against Death can be suggested to a *wicked Man*; but for the *virtuous*, there are the best Grounds of *Hope* and *Joy*. If the *Administration* of the whole be good, we may be sure “ that *Order* and *Happiness* “ will in the whole prevail: Nor will *Mi-
ſery* be inflicted any farther than is neces-
“ sary for some prepotent Good. Now there is no Presumption, that the *absolute
Misery* of any *virtuous Person* can be neces-
sary to any good End; Such Persons there-
fore are the most likely to enjoy a State of
perfect Happiness.

VII. To conclude: Let us consider that *What is
the natural
State of
Men.* common Character, which when ascribed to any *State, Quality, Disposition, or Action*, engages our *Favour* and *Approbation* of it, *viz.* its being *natural*. We have many Suspicions about Tempers or Dispositions formed by *Art*, but are some way prepossessed in favour of what is *natural*: We imagine it must be advantageous and delightful to be in a natural State, and to live according to Nature. This very Presumption in favour of what is natural, is a plain Indication that

S E C T. the Order of Nature is good, and that Men
VI. are some way convinced of it. Let us en-
quire then what is meant by it.

IF by natural we mean " that which we
" enjoy or do when we first begin to exist,
" or to think," it is impossible to know
what *State*, *Temper*, or *Actions*, are *natural*. Our *natural State* in this Sense differs
little from that of a *Plant*, except in some
accidental *Sensations of Hunger*, or of *Ease*,
when we are well nourished.

SOME elaborate Treatises of great Philosophers about *innate Ideas*, or Principles practical or speculative, amount to no more than this, " That in the Beginning of our
" Existence we have no *Ideas* or *Judg-
ments*;" they might have added too, no
Sight, *Taste*, *Smell*, *Hearing*, *Desire*, *Voli-
tion*. Such Dissertations are just as useful
for understanding *human Nature*, as it
would be in explaining the *animal Oeconomy*,
to prove that the *Fetus* is animated before
it has *Teeth*, *Nails*, *Hair*, or before it can
eat, *drink*, *digest*, or *breathe*: Or in a *natu-
ral History of Vegetables*, to prove that *Trees*
begin to grow before they have *Branches*,
Leaves, *Flower*, *Fruit*, or *Seed*: And con-
sequently that all these things were adventi-
tious, or the Effect of *Art*.

BUT if we call "that State, those *Dis-Sect.*"
"positions and Actions, natural, to which VI.
"we are inclined by some part of our Con- U
"stitution, antecedently to any *Volition of*
"our own; or which flow from some *Prin-*
"ciples in our Nature, not brought upon us
"by our own *Art*, or that of others;" then
it may appear, from what was said above,
that "a State of *Good-will, Humanity, Com-*
"passion, mutual Aid, propagating and sup-
"porting Offspring, Love of a Community
"or Country, Devotion, or Love and Gra-
"titude to some governing Mind, is our na-
"tural State," to which we are naturally
inclined, and do actually arrive, as univer-
sally, and with as much uniformity, as we
do to a certain *Stature and Shape.*

IF by natural we understand "the *high-*
"est Perfection of the Kind, to which any
"Species may be improved by cultivating
"its natural Dispositions or Powers;" as
few arrive at this in the Growth of their
Bodies, so few obtain it in their *Minds*. But
we may see what this Perfection is, to which
our natural *Dispositions* tend, when we im-
prove them to the utmost, as far as they
are consistent with each other, making the
weaker or meaner yield to the more excellent
and stronger. Our several *Senses* and *Affec-*
tions, publick and private, with our Powers
of

S E C T. of Reason and Reflection, shew this to be the VI. Perfection of our Kind, viz. “ to know,
 ~~~ “ love, and reverence the great AUTHOR of  
 “ all things ; to form the most extensive I-  
 “ deas of our own true Interests, and those  
 “ of all other Natures, rational or sensitive ;  
 “ to abstain from all Injury ; to pursue re-  
 “ gularly and impartially the most universal  
 “ absolute Good, as far as we can ; to enjoy  
 “ constant Self-Approbation, and Honour  
 “ from wise Men ; with Trust in divine  
 “ PROVIDENCE, Hope of everlasting Happi-  
 “ ness, and a full Satisfaction and Assurance  
 “ of Mind, that the whole Series of Events  
 “ is directed by an unerring Wisdom, for  
 “ the greatest universal Happiness of the  
 “ whole.”

To assert that “ Men have generally ar-  
 “ rived to the Perfection of their Kind in  
 “ this Life,” is contrary to Experience. But  
 on the other hand, to suppose “ no Order at  
 “ all in the Constitution of our Nature, or  
 “ no prevalent Evidences of good Order,”  
 is yet more contrary to Experience, and  
 would lead to a Denial of PROVIDENCE in  
 the most important Affair which can occur  
 to our Observation. We actually see such  
 Degrees of good Order, of social Affection,  
 of Virtue and Honour, as make the Gener-  
 ality of Mankind continue in a tolerable,  
 nay, an agreeable State. However, in some  
 Tempers

Tempers we see the *selfish Passions* by Habits S E C T .  
grown too strong ; in others we may ob- VL  
serve *Humanity, Compassion, and Good-nature* ~~and~~  
sometimes raised by Habits, as we say, to  
an Excess.

WERE we to strike a *Medium* of the several Passions and Affections, as they appear in the whole Species of Mankind, to conclude thence what has been the natural Balance previously to any Change made by Custom or Habit, which we see casts the Ballance to either side, we should perhaps find the *Medium* of the publick Affections not very far from a sufficient *Counterballance* to the *Medium* of the Selfish ; and consequently the *Overballance* on either side in particular Characters, is not to be looked upon as the *original Constitution*, but as the *accidental Effect* of Custom, Habits, or Associations of Ideas, or other preternatural Causes : So that an universal *increasing* of the Strength of either, might in the whole be of little advantage. The raising universally the *publick Affections*, the Desires of *Virtue and Honour*, would make the *Hero of Cervantes*, pining with *Hunger and Poverty*, no rare Character. The universal increasing of *Selfishness*, unless we had more accurate Understandings to discern our *nicest Interests*, would fill the World with universal *Rapine and War*. The Consequences of either

SECT. either universally *abating*, or *increasing* the  
VI. Desires between the *Sexes*, the *Love of Off-*  
~~spring~~ *or the several Tastes and Fancies in*  
*other Pleasures*, would perhaps be found  
more pernicious to the whole, than the pre-  
sent Constitution. What seems most truly  
wanting in our *Nature*, is greater *Know-*  
*ledge, Attention, and Consideration*: had we  
a greater Perfection this way, and were evil  
*Habits*, and foolish *Associations of Ideas*  
prevented, our *Passions* would appear in bet-  
ter order.

BUT while we feel in ourselves so much  
*publick Affection* in the various Relations of  
Life, and observe the like in others; while  
we find every one desiring indeed his *own*  
*Happiness*, but capable of discerning, by a  
little Attention, that not only his external  
*Conveniency, or worldly Interest*, but even  
the most immediate and lively *Sensations of*  
*Delight*, of which his *Nature* is susceptible,  
immediately flow from a *Publick Spirit*, a  
*generous, human, compassionate Temper*, and  
a suitable *Deportment*; while we observe so  
many Thousands enjoying a tolerable State  
*of Ease and Safety*, for each one whose Con-  
dition is made *intolerable*, even during our  
present *Corruption*: How can any one look  
upon this World as under the Direction of  
*an evil Nature*, or even question a perfectly  
*good PROVIDENCE*? How clearly does the  
*Order*

*Order of our Nature point out to us our true S E C T.  
Happiness and Perfection, and lead us to it VI.  
as naturally as the several Powers of the ~~W~~  
Earth, the Sun, and Air, bring Plants to  
their Growth, and the Perfection of their  
Kinds? We indeed are directed to it by our  
Understanding and Affections, as it becomes  
rational and active Natures; and they by me-  
chanick Laws.* We may see, that “Attention  
“ to the most universal Interest of all  
“ sensitive Natures, is the Perfection of  
“ each individual of Mankind:” That they  
should thus be like well-tuned Instruments,  
affected with every Stroke or Touch upon  
any one. Nay, how much of this do we  
actually see in the World? What generous  
Sympathy, Compassion, and Congratulation  
with each other? Does not even the flour-  
ishing State of the inanimate Parts of Na-  
ture, fill us with joy? Is not thus our Na-  
ture admonished, exhorted and commanded  
to cultivate universal Goodness and Love, by  
a Voice heard thro’ all the Earth, and Words  
sounding to the Ends of the World?



## T R E A T I S E II.

I L L U S T R A T I O N S  
U P O N T H E  
M O R A L S E N S E.

**T**H E Differences of Actions from which some are constituted *morally Good*, and others *morally Evil*, have always been accounted a very important Subject of Inquiry: And therefore, every Attempt to free this Subject from the usual Causes of Error and Dispute, the *Confusion of ambiguous Words*, must be excusable.

IN the following Discourse, *Happiness* denotes pleasant *Sensation* of any kind, or a continued State of such *Sensations*; and *Misery* denotes the contrary *Sensations*.

SUCH Actions as tend to procure Happiness to the Agent, are called for shortness, *privately*

*Illustrations upon the  
privately useful: and such Actions as pro-  
cure Misery to the Agent, privately hurtful.*

ACTIONS procuring Happiness to others may be called *publickly useful*, and the contrary Actions *publickly hurtful*. Some Actions may be both *publickly and privately useful*, and others both *publickly and privately hurtful*.

THESE different *natural Tendencies of Actions* are universally acknowledged; and in proportion to our *Reflection upon human Affairs*, we shall enlarge our Knowledge of these Differences.

*Two Ques-  
tions about  
Morality.*

WHEN these *natural Differences* are known, it remains to be inquired into; 1st, “What *Quality* in any Action determines “our *Election* of it rather than the contra-“ry?” Or, if the Mind determines itself, “What *Motives* or *Desires* excite to an “Action, rather than the contrary, or ra-“ther than to the *Omission*? ” 2dly, “What “Quality determines our *Approbation* of “one Action, rather than of the contrary “Action?”

THE Words *Election* and *Approbation* seem to denote simple Ideas known by *Consciousness*; which can only be explained by synonymous *Words*, or by concomitant or consequent

sequent Circumstances. *Election* is purposing to do an Action rather than its contrary, or than being inactive. *Approval* of our own Action denotes, or is attended with, a Pleasure in the *Contemplation* of it, and in *Reflection* upon the *Affections* which inclined us to it. *Approval* of the Action of another has some little Pleasure attending it in the Observer, and raises Love toward the *Agent*, in whom the Quality approved is deemed to reside, and not in the *Observer*, who has a Satisfaction in the Act of approving.\*

THE Qualities moving to *Election*, or exciting to *Action*, are different from those moving to *Approval*: We often do Actions which we do not approve, and approve Actions which we omit: We often desire that an Agent had omitted an Action which we approve; and wish he would do an Action which we condemn. *Approval* is employed about the Actions of others, where there is no room for our *Election*.

Now in our Search into the Qualities exciting either our *Election* or *Approval*, let us consider the several Notions advanced of moral Good and Evil in both these Respects; and what *Senses*, *Instincts*, or *Affec-*

\* See *Treat.* II. *Sec.* 2. *Parag.* ult.

*Aetions*, must be necessarily supposed to account for our *Approbation* or *Election*.

*The Epicurean Opinion.*

THERE are two Opinions on this Subject entirely opposite: The one that of the old *Epicureans*, as it is beautifully explained in the first Book of *Cicero, De finibus*; which is revived by *Hobbes, Rochefocault*, and others of the last Century, and followed by many better Writers: "That all the "Desires of the *human Mind*, nay of all "thinking Natures, are reducible to *Self-Love*, or *Desire of private Happiness*: "That from this Desire all Actions of any "Agent do flow." Our *Christian Moralists* of this Scheme introduce other sorts of Happiness to be desired, but still it is the "Prospect of *private Happiness*, which, "with some of them, is the sole Motive of "Election. And that, in like manner, what "determines any Agent to *approve* his own "Action, is its *Tendency to his private Happiness* in the whole, tho' it may bring "present Pain along with it: That the *Approval* of the Action of another, is "from an Opinion of its Tendency to the "Happiness of the *Approver*, either *immediately* or more *remotely*: That each Agent may discover it to be the surest way "to promote his private Happiness, to do "publickly useful *Aetions*, and to abstain "from those which are *publickly hurtful*: "That

" That the neglecting to observe this, and  
 " doing publicly hurtful Actions, does mis-  
 " chief to the whole of Mankind, by hurt-  
 " ing any one part; that every one has  
 " some little damage by this Action: Such  
 " an inadvertent Person might possibly be  
 " pernicious to any one, were he in his  
 " Neighbourhood; and the very Example  
 " of such Actions may extend over the  
 " whole World, and produce some perni-  
 " cious Effects upon any Observer. That  
 " therefore every one may look upon such  
 " Actions as hurtful to himself, and in this  
 " view does disapprove them, and hates the  
 " Agent. In the like manner, a publicly  
 " useful Action may diffuse some small Ad-  
 " vantage to every Observer, whence he  
 " may approve it, and love the Agent."

THIS Scheme can never account for the principal Actions of human Life:<sup>\*</sup> Such as the Offices of Friendship, Gratitude, natural Affection, Generosity, publick Spirit, Compassion. Men are conscious of no such Intentions or acute Reflections about these Actions. Ingenious speculative Men, in their straining to support an Hypothesis, may contrive a thousand subtle selfish Motives, which a kind generous Heart never dreamed of. In like manner, this Scheme can never account for

\* See Treat. III. Se. 7. 1.

*Illustrations upon the*

the sudden *Approbation*, and violent *Sense* of something amiable in Actions done in distant Ages and Nations, while the Approver has perhaps never thought of these distant *Tendencies* to his *Happiness*. Nor will it better account for our want of *Approbation* toward publicly useful Actions done casually, or only with Intention of *private Happiness* to the Agent. And then, in these Actions reputed *generous*, if the Agent's Motive was only a view to his own *Pleasure*, how come we to approve them more than his *enriching himself*, or his *gratifying his own Taste* with good Food? The whole *Species* may receive a like Advantage from both, and the Observer an equal Share.

WERE our *Approbation* of Actions done in *distant Ages and Nations*, occasioned by this Thought, that such an Action done toward ourselves would be useful to us, why do not we approve and love in like manner, any Man who *finds a Treasure*, or *indulges himself* in any exquisite *Sensation*, since these Advantages or Pleasures might have been conferred on *ourselves*; and tend more to *our Happiness* than any Actions in distant Ages?

THE *Sanctions of Laws* may make any Agent chuse the Action required, under the Conception of *useful to himself*, and lead him

him into an Opinion of *private Advantage* in it, and of detriment in the contrary Actions ; but what should determine any Person to approve the *Actions of others*, because of a Conformity to a Law, if Approbation in any Person were only an Opinion of private Advantage ?

THE other Opinion is this, “ That we <sup>The opposite</sup> have not only *Self-Love*, but *benevolent* <sup>Opinion</sup> *Affections* also toward others, in various <sup>does plainly</sup> degrees, making us desire their Happiness as an *ultimate End*, without any view to private Happiness : That we have a moral Sense or Determination of our Mind, to approve every kind Affection either in ourselves or others, and all publickly useful Actions which we imagine flow from such Affection, without our having a view to our *private Happiness*, in our Approval of these Actions.”

THESE two Opinions seem both intelligible, each consistent with itself. The former seems not to represent human Nature as it is ; the other seems to do it.

THERE have been many ways of speaking Schemes introduced, which seem to signify something <sup>seemingly</sup> different from both the former Opinions. <sup>different from both.</sup> Such as these, that “ Morality of Actions consists in *Conformity to Reason*, or *Dif-*  
P 3                           “ *formity*

"*formity from it :*" That "*Virtue* is acting according to the *absolute Fitness and Unfitness of Things*, or agreeably to the "*Natures or Relations of Things*," and many others in different Authors. To examine these is the Design of the following Sections; and to explain more fully how the *Moral Sense* alledged to be in Mankind, must be pre-supposed even in these Schemes.

S E C T.

## S E C T. I.

*Concerning the Character of Virtue,  
agreeable to Truth or Reason.*

SINCE Reason is understood to denote our Power of finding out true Propositions, Reasonableness must denote the same thing, with Conformity to true Propositions, or to Truth.

REASONABLENESS in an Action is a very common Expression, but yet upon inquiry, it will appear very confused, whether we suppose it the Motive to Election, or the Quality determining Approbation.

THERE is one sort of Conformity to Truth which neither determines to the one or the other; viz. that Conformity which is between every true Proposition and its Object. This sort of Conformity can never make us chuse or approve one Action more than its contrary, for it is found in all Actions alike: Whatever Attribute can be ascribed to a generous kind Action, the contrary Attribute may as truly be ascribed to a selfish cruel Action: Both Propositions are equally true,

SECT. and the two contrary Actions, the Objects  
I. of the two *Truths* are equally *conformable* to  
their several Truths, with that sort of *Con-*  
*formity* which is between a Truth and its  
Object. This *Conformity* then cannot make  
a Difference among Actions, or recommend  
one more than another either to *Election* or  
*Approval*, since any Man may make as  
many Truths about Villany, as about He-  
roism, by ascribing to it contrary *Attributes*.

FOR Instance, these are *Truths* concern-  
ing the *Preservation of Property*. "It  
" tends to the Happiness of human Society :  
" It encourages Industry: It shall be reward-  
" ed by God." These are also *Truths* con-  
cerning *Robbery*. "It disturbs Society : It  
" discourages Industry : It shall be punished  
" by God." The former *three Truths* have  
the *Preservation of Property* for their *Ob-*  
*ject*: the latter *three* have *Robbery*. And  
each Class of *Truths* hath that sort of *Con-*  
*formity* to its Objects, which is common to  
all *Truths* with their Objects. The *moral*  
*Difference* cannot therefore depend upon this  
*Conformity*, which is common to both.

THE *Number* of *Truths* in both cases  
may be plainly the same; so that a good  
Action cannot be supposed to agree to *more*  
*Truths* than an evil one, nor can an evil  
Action be disagreeable to any *Truth* or *Com-*  
*pages*

*pages of Truths* made about it; for what-S E C T. ever Propositions do not agree with their I. Objec<sup>t</sup>s are not Truths.



If Reasonableness, the Character of Virtue, denote some other sort of Conformity to Truth, it were to be wished that these Gentlemen, who make it the original Idea of moral Good, antecedent to any Sense or Affections, would explain it, and shew how it determines us antecedently to a Sense, either to Election or Approbation.

THEY tell us, " we must have some Standard antecedently to all Sense or Affections, since we judge even of our Senses and Affections themselves, and approve or disapprove them : This Standard must be our Reason, Conformity to which must be the original Idea of moral Good."

BUT what is this Conformity of Actions to Reasons or Reason? When we ask the Reason of an Action, we sometimes mean, " What Truth <sup>ther justifying or explaining.</sup> shews a Quality in the Action, exciting the Agent to do it?" Thus, why does a Luxurious Man pursue Wealth? The Reason is given by this Truth, " Wealth is useful to purchase Pleasures." Sometimes for a Reason of Actions we shew the Truth expressing a Quality, engaging our Approbation. Thus the Reason of hazarding Life in just War, is, that " it tends to preserve our honest

**S E C T.** “ honest Countrymen, or evidences publick  
 I. “ Spirit:” The *Reason* for *Temperance*, and  
 ↵ against *Luxury* is given thus, “ Luxury evi-  
 “ dences a selfish base Temper.” The for-  
 mer sort of Reasons we will call *exciting*,  
 and the latter *justifying*.\* Now we shall  
 find that all *exciting Reasons* pre-suppose  
*Instincts* and *Affections*; and the *justifying*  
 pre-suppose a *Moral Sense*.

*Exciting Reasons suppose Affections.* As to *exciting Reasons*, in every calm rational Action some *end* is desired or intended; no end can be intended or desired previously to some one of these Classes of Affections, *Self-Love*, *Self-Hatred*, or desire of private Misery, (if this be possible) *Benevolence* toward others, or *Malice*: All Affections are included under these: no *end* can be previous to them all; there can therefore be no *exciting Reason* previous to *Affection*.

WE have indeed many confused Harangues on this Subject, telling us, “ We “ have two Principles of Action, *Reason*, “ and *Affection* or *Passion*: the former in “ common with Angels, the latter with “ Brutes: No Action is wise, or good, or “ reasonable, to which we are not excited

\* Thus *Grotius* distinguishes the Reasons of War, into the *Justificæ*, and *Suasoriæ*, or these, *sub ratione utilit.*

" by Reason, as distinct from all *Affections*; SECT.  
" or, if any such Actions as flow from I.  
" *Affections* be good, it is only by chance, *or*  
" or materially and not formally." As if indeed Reason, or the Knowledge of the Relations of things, could excite to Action when we proposed no End, or as if Ends could be intended without Desire or Affection.

WRITERS on these Subjects should remember the common Divisions of the Faculties of the Soul. That there is 1. *Reason* presenting the natures and relations of things, antecedently to any Act of *Will* or *Desire*: 2. The *Will*, or *Appetitus Rationalis*, or the disposition of Soul to pursue what is presented as good, and to shun Evil. Were there no other Power in the Soul, than that of mere contemplation, there would be no *Affection*, *Volition*, *Desire*, *Action*. Nay without some motion of *Will* no Man would voluntarily persevere in Contemplation. There must be a *Desire* of Knowledge, and of the Pleasure which attends it: this too is an Act of *Willing*. Both these Powers are by the Antients included under the Λόγος or λογικὸν μέρος. Below these they place two other powers dependent on the Body, the *Sensus*, and the *Appetitus Sensitivus*, in which they place the particular Passions: the former answers to the *Understanding*, and

S E C T. and the latter to the *Will*. But the *Will* is

I. forgot of late, and some ascribe to the *Intellect*, not only *Contemplation* or *Knowledge*, but *Choice*, *Desire*, *Prosecuting*, *Loving*. Nay some are grown so ingenious in uniting the Powers of the Soul, that *contemplating with Pleasure*, *Symmetry* and *Proportion*, an *Act of the Intellect* as they plead, is the same thing with *Goodwill* or the virtuous *Desire* of publick Happiness.

*No exciting Reasons for ultimate Ends.* But are there not also exciting Reasons, even previous to any end, moving us to propose one end rather than another? To this Aristotle long ago answered, “ that “ there are *ultimate Ends* desired without “ a view to any thing else, and *subordinate Ends* or Objects desired with a view to “ something else.” To *subordinate Ends* those *Reasons* or *Truths* excite, which shew them to be conducive to the *ultimate End*, and shew one *Object* to be more effectual than another: thus *subordinate Ends* may be called *reasonable*. But as to the *ultimate Ends*, to suppose exciting *Reasons* for them, would infer, that there is no *ultimate End*, but that we desire one thing for another in an infinite Series.

THUS ask a Being who desires *private Happiness*, or has *Self-Love*? “ what Reasons

“ son

" son excites him to desire Wealth?" He will S E C T. give this Reason, that " Wealth tends to I. procure Pleasure and Ease." Ask his      Reason for desiring Pleasure or Happiness: One cannot imagine what Proposition he could assign as his *exciting Reason*. This Proposition is indeed true, " There is " an *Instinct* or *Desire* fixed in his Nature, " determining him to pursue his Happi- " ness;" but it is not this *Reflection* on his own Nature, or this *Proposition* which ex- cites or determines him, but the *Instinct itself*. This is a Truth, " Rhubarb strength- " ens the Stomach :" But it is not a *Propo-* *sition* which strengthens the Stomach, but the *Quality* in that Medicine. The Effect is not produced by *Propositions* shewing the Cause, but by the *Cause* itself.

IN like manner, what *Reason* can a benevolent Being give, as exciting him to hazard his Life in just War? This perhaps, " such Conduct tends to the Happiness of " his Country." Ask him, " why he serves " his Country?" he will say, " His Coun- " try is a very valuable Part of Mankind." Why does he study the Happiness of Man- kind? If his Affections be really *disinterested*, he can give no *exciting Reasons* for it: The Happiness of Mankind in general, or of any valuable Part of it, is an *ultimate End* to that Series of Desires.

WE


SECT. WE may transiently observe a Mistake

I. some fall into; They suppose, because they  
 have formed some Conception of an *infinite Good, or greatest possible Aggregate, or Sum of Happiness*, under which all *particular Pleasures* may be included; that there is also some *one great ultimate End*, with a view to which every *particular Object* is desired; whereas, in truth, each *particular Pleasure* is desired without farther view, as an *ultimate End* in the *selfish Desires*. It is true, the *Prospect* of a greater inconsistent Pleasure may surmount or stop this Desire; so may the *Fear* of a prepotent Evil. But this does not prove " that all Men have for-  
 " med Ideas of *infinite Good, or greatest pos-  
 " sible Aggregate*, or that they have any *In-  
 " flinct or Desire*, actually operating with-  
 " out an Idea of its Object. Just so in the benevolent Affections, the Happiness of any one Person is an *ultimate End*, desired with no farther view: and yet the observing its *Inconsistency* with the Happiness of another more beloved, or with the Happiness of *many*, though each one of them were but equally beloved, may overcome the former Desire. Yet this will not prove, that in each *kind Action* Men form the abstract Conception of *all Mankind, or the System of Rationals*. Such Conceptions are indeed useful, that so we may gratify either our *Self-Love*

*Self-Love or kind Affections* in the fullest SECT. manner, as far as our Power extends; and I. may not content ourselves with smaller De- ~~~~~  
grees either of *private* or *publick Good*, while greater are in our power: But when we have formed these *Conceptions*, we do not serve the *Individual* only from Love to the *Species*, no more than we desire *Grapes* with an Intention of the greatest Aggregate of Happiness, or from an Apprehension that they make a Part of the General Sum of our Happiness. These Conceptions only serve to suggest greater Ends than would occur to us without Reflection; and by the *Prepollency* of one Desire toward the greater *Good*, to either private or publick, to stop the Desire toward the smaller *Good*, when it appears inconsistent with the greater.

LET us examine the Truths assigned as *The common Reasons examined.* exciting to the Pursuit of publick Good, even by those, who, though they allow disinterested Affections, and a moral Sense, yet suppose something reasonable in it antecedently. They assign such as these, “ publick Good is the End proposed by the DEITY.” Then what Reason excites Men to concur with the DEITY? It is this, “ Concurring with the DEITY will make “ the Agent happy?” This is an exciting Reason indeed, but plainly supposes Self-Love:

S E C T. *Love*: And let any one assign the exciting Reason to the Desire of Happiness. Is the Reason exciting to concur with the DEITY this, "The DEITY is our Benefactor?" Then what *Reason excites* to concur with Benefactors? Here we must recur to an *Instinct*. Is it this Truth, "The divine Ends are reasonable Ends?" Then what means the Word [*reasonable?*] Does it mean, that "the Deity has Reasons exciting him to promote the publick Good?" What are these *Reasons*? Why, perhaps "we do not know them particularly, but in general are sure that the DEITY has Reasons for them." Then the Question recurs, What Reason excites us to *implicit Concurrence* with the Ends of the DEITY? The Reasons which excite *one Nature* may not excite another: The Tendency of an Action to the Happiness of *one Agent* may excite him, but will not excite another *Agent* to concur, unless there appears a like Tendency to the Happiness of *that other*. They may say, "they are sure the *divine Ends* are good." What means *Goodness*? Is it *moral* or *natural*? If the divine Ends be *natural Good*, i. e. *pleasant*, or the *Cause of Pleasure*, to whom is this *Pleasure*? If to the DEITY, then why do we study the Happiness or the pleasing of the DEITY? What *Reason excites* us? All the possible Reasons must either presuppose some *Affection*, if they are exci-

exciting; or some *moral Sense*, if they are ju-S E C T.  
stifying.—Is the divine End naturally good I.  
to us? This is an exciting Reason, but supposes   
*Self-Love*. If we say the divine Ends are *morally good*, we are just where we began. What  
is *moral Goodness*? *Conformity to Reason*.  
What are the *Reasons* exciting or *justifying*.


If any alledge as the Reason exciting us to pursue publick Good, this Truth, that "the Happiness of a System, a Thousand, or a Million, is a greater Quantity of Happiness than that of one Person: and consequently, if Men desire Happiness, they must have stronger Desires toward the greater Sum, than toward the less." This Reason still supposes an *Instinct* toward Happiness as previous to it: And again, To whom is the Happiness of a System a greater Happiness? To one *Individual*, or to the *System*? If to the Individual, then his Reason exciting his Desire of a happy System supposes *Self-Love*: If to the *System*, then what Reason can excite to desire the greater Happiness of a System, or any Happiness to be in the Possession of others? None surely which does not presuppose publick Affections. Without such Affections this Truth, "that an hundred Felicities is a greater Sum than one Felicity," will no more excite to study the Happiness of the Hundred, than this Truth, "an hundred Stones

SECT. "Stones are greater than one," will excite  
 I. a Man, who has no *desire of Heaps*, to cast  
 them together.

THE same may be observed concerning that *Proposition*, assigned by some as the *ultimate Reason* both exciting to, and *justifying* the Pursuit of publick Good, *viz.* "It is best that all should be happy." *Best* is most good: Good to whom? To the *Whole*, or to each *Individual*? If to the former, when this Truth excites to Action, it must presuppose *kind Affections*; if it is good to each *Individual*, it must suppose *Self-Love*.

*The true Meaning of Desires previously implanted in our Nature: and we shall easily understand the Actions, and citing Reasons for Actions, viz. These reasonable Actions.* LET us once suppose *Affections*, *Instincts* or *Desires* previously implanted in our *Nature*: and we shall easily understand the *Actions*, and *citing Reasons for Actions*, *viz.* "These reasonable Actions" "Truths which shew them to be conducive toward some *ultimate End*, or toward the greatest *End* of that kind in our Power." He acts reasonably, who considers the various Actions in his Power, and forms true *Opinions* of their *Tendencies*; and then chuses to do that which will obtain the highest Degree of that, to which the *Instincts* of his *Nature* incline him, with the smallest Degree of those things from which the *Affections* in his *Nature* make him averse.

MORE

MORE particularly, the *exciting Reasons* SECT.  
 to a Nature which had only *selfish Affections*, are those Truths which shewed  “what Object or Event would occasion to “it the greatest Quantity of *Pleasure*:” these would excite to the Prosecution of it. The *exciting Truths* about *Means*, would be only those which pointed out some Means as more certainly effectual than any other, or with less *Pain* or *Trouble* to the *Agent*. *Publick Usefulness* of *Ends* or *Means*, or *publick Hurtfulness* would neither excite nor dissuade, farther than the *publick State* might affect *that of the Agent*.

IF there is any Nature with *publick Affections*: the Truths exciting to any *End* in this Order, are such as shew, “that any “Event would promote the Happiness of “others.” That *End* is called most *reasonable*, which our Reason discovers to contain a greater Quantity of *publick Good*, than any other in our power.

WHEN any Event may affect both the *Agent* and *others*, if the *Agent* have both *Self-Love* and *publick Affections*, he acts according to that Affection which is *strongest*, when there is any *Opposition* of *Interests*; if there be no *Opposition*, he follows both. If he discovers this Truth, that “his con-

SECT. "stant pursuit of *publick Good* is the most  
I. " probable way of promoting his own *Hap-*  
~~pineſſ~~ " *pineſſ*," then his Pursuit is truly reasonable  
and constant; thus both Affections are  
at once gratifyed, and he is consistent with  
himſelf. Without knowledge of that Truth  
he does not act *reasonably* for his own Happi-  
ness, but follows it by *Means* not tending  
effectually to this *End*: and must frequent-  
ly from the Power of *Self-Love*, neglect or  
counteract his other *End*, the *publick Good*.  
If there be also a *moral Sense* in such an Agent,  
while yet he is inadvertent to the *Connexion* of *private Happiness* with the *Study*  
of the *publick*; he must be perpetually yet  
more uneasy, either through the apprehended  
*Neglect* of *private Interest* when he serves in  
*Publick*; or when he pursues only *private Interest*, he will have perpetual *Remorse* and *Dis-  
satisfaction* with his own Temper, through his  
*moral Sense*. So that the Knowledge of this  
*Connexion* of *private Interest*, with the *Study*  
of *publick Good*, seems absolutely necessary  
to preserve a constant *Satisfaction* of Mind,  
and to prevent an *alternate Prevalence* of  
seemingly contrary Desires.

SHOULD any one ask even concerning  
these two *ultimate Ends*, *private Good* and  
*publick*, is not the latter more *reasonable*  
than the former?—What means the  
Word *reasonable* in this Question? If we  
are

are allowed to presuppose *Instincts* and *Af-Sect. fections*, then the Truth just now supposed to be discoverable concerning our State, is ~~one~~<sup>I.</sup> an exciting Reason to serve the publick Interest, since this Conduct is the most effectual Means to obtain both ends. But I doubt if any Truth can be assigned which excites in us either the Desire of *private Happiness* or *publick*. For the former none ever alledged any exciting Reason: and a benevolent Temper finds as little Reason exciting him to the latter; which he desires without any view to *private Good*. If the meaning of the Question be this, "does "not every Spectator approve the Pursuit "of publick Good more than private?" The Answer is obvious, that he does: but not for any Reason or Truth, but from a moral Sense in the Constitution of the Soul.

THIS leads to consider *Approbation of Actions*, whether it be for *Conformity to any Truth*, or *Reasonableness*, that Actions are ultimately approved, independently of any moral Sense? Or if all *justifying Reasons* do not presuppose it?

IF *Conformity to Truth*, or *Reasonable*, denote nothing else but that "an Action is the Object of a true Proposition," it is plain, that all Actions should be approved

Q 3

equally,

Justifying  
Reasons  
suppose a  
moral  
Sense.

**S E C T.** equally, since as many Truths may be made  
I. about the worst, as can be made about the  
~~worst~~ best. See what was said above about exciting Reasons.

BUT let the *Truths* commonly assigned as *justifying* be examined. Here it is plain, “*A Truth shewing an Action to be fit to attain an End,*” does not justify it; nor do we approve a subordinate *End* for any *Truth*, which only shews it to be fit to promote the *ultimate End*; for the worst Actions may be conducive to their *Ends*, and *reasonable* in that Sense. The *justifying Reasons* then must be about the *Ends* themselves, especially the *ultimate Ends*. The Question then is, “Does a *Conformity to any Truth* make us *approve* an *ultimate End*, previously to any moral Sense?” For example, we approve *pursuing the publick Good*. For what *Reason*? Or what is the *Truth* for Conformity to which we call it a *reasonable End*? I fancy we can find none in these Cases, more than we could give for our liking any *pleasant Fruit*.\*

THE Reasons assigned are such as these; “*It is the End proposed by the DEITY.*” But why do we *approve* concurring with

\* This is what Aristotle so often asserts that the Προστίτος or βελτίτος is not the End, but the Means.

the divine Ends? This Reason is given, SECT. "He is our Benefactor:" But then, for I. what Reason do we approve *Concurrence* ~~with~~ *with a Benefactor?* Here we must recur to a Sense. Is this the Reason moving to *Approval*, "Study of publick Good tends to the Advantage of the Approver?" Then the Quality moving us to approve an Action, is its being *advantageous to us*, and not *Conformity to a Truth*. This Scheme is intelligible, but not true in fact. Men approve without Perception of *private Advantage*; and often do not condemn or disapprove what is plainly pernicious; as in the Execution of a *just Sentence*, which even the Sufferer may approve.

If any alledge, that this is the *justifying Reason* of the *Pursuit of publick Good*, "that it is best all be happy," then we approve Actions for their *Tendency to that State which is best*, and not for *Conformity to Reason*. But here again, what means *best*? *morally best*, or *naturally best*? If the former, they explain the same Word by itself in a Circle: If they mean the latter, that "it is the most happy State where all are happy;" then, *most happy*, for whom? the *System*, or the *Individual*? If for the former, what Reason makes us approve the *Happiness of a System*? Here we must recur to a *Sense* or *kind Affections*. Is

SECRET it most happy for the Individual? Then the

I. Quality moving *Approbation* is again *Tendency to private Happiness*, not *Reasonableness*.

*Obligation supposes either Affections or a moral Sense.* THERE are some other Reasons assigned in Words differing from the former, but more confused, such as these: "It is our Duty to study publick Good. We are obliged to do it. We owe Obedience to the Deity. The whole is to be preferred to a Part." But let these Words, *Duty*, *Obligation*, *Owing*, and the meaning of that Gerund or Participle, *is to be preferred*, be explained; and we shall find ourselves still at a Loss for exciting Reasons previously to *Affections*, or *justifying Reasons* without recourse to a *moral Sense*.

*The meaning of Obligation.* WHEN we say one is obliged to an Action, we either mean, 1. That the Action is necessary to obtain Happiness to the Agent, or to avoid Misery: Or, 2. That every Spectator, or he himself upon Reflection, must approve his Action, and disapprove his omitting it, if he considers fully all its Circumstances. The former Meaning of the Word *Obligation* presupposes selfish *Affections*, and the *Senses of private Happiness*: The latter Meaning includes the moral *Sense*. Mr. Barbeyrac, in his Annotations upon *Grotius*,

*tius,\* makes Obligation denote an indispensable Necessity to act in a certain manner.* I.

Whoever observes his Explication of this ~~law~~ <sup>law</sup> Necessity, (which is not natural, otherwise no Man could act against his Obligation) will find that it denotes only “ such a Constitution of a powerful Superior, as will make it impossible for any Being to obtain Happiness, or avoid Misery, but by such a Course of Action.” This agrees with the former Meaning, though sometimes he also includes the latter.

MANY other confused Definitions have been given of Obligation, by no obscure Names in the learned World. But let any one give a distinct Meaning, different from the two above-mentioned. To pursue them all would be endless; only let the Definitions be substituted in place of the Word OBLIGATION, in other parts of each Writer, and let it be observed whether it makes good Sense or not. †

BEFORE we quit this Character *Reasonableness*, let us consider the Arguments brought to prove that there must be some Standard of moral Good antecedent to any Sense. Say

Arguments  
for some  
Standard  
of Morals  
prior to a  
Sense con-  
sidered.

\* *Lib. I. Chap. 1. Sect. 10.*

† The common Definition *Vinculum Juris que necessitate astringimur alicujus rei praestanda*, is wholly metaphorical, and can settle no Debate precisely.

they,

SECT. they, " *Perceptions of Sense* are deceitful,  
I. " we must have some Perception or Idea  
of *Virtue* more stable and certain; this  
must be *Conformity to Reason*: *Truth*  
discovered by our *Reason* is certain and  
invariable: *That* then alone is the Ori-  
nal Idea of *Virtue*, *Agreement with Rea-*  
*son.*" But in like manner our *Sight* and  
*Sense of Beauty* is deceitful, and does not al-  
ways represent the true *Forms* of Objects.  
We must not call that *beautiful* or *regular*,  
which pleases the *Sight*, or an *internal Sense*;  
but *Beauty* in external *Forms* too, consists  
in *Conformity to Reason*. So our *Taste* may  
be vitiated: we must not say that *Savour* is  
perceived by *Taste*, but must place the ori-  
ginal Idea of *grateful Savours* in *Conformity*  
to *Reason*, and of *ungrateful* in *Contrariety*  
to *Reason*. We may mistake the real *Extent*  
of Bodies, or their *Proportions*, by making  
a Conclusion upon the first sensible Appear-  
ance: Therefore *Ideas of Extension* are not  
originally acquired by a *Sense*, but consist in  
*Conformity to Reason*.

IF what is intended in this *Conformity to Reason* be this, " That we should call no  
" Action *virtuous*, unless we have some  
" *Reason* to conclude it to be *virtuous*, or  
" some *Truth* shewing it to be so." This  
is very true; but then in like manner we  
should count no Action *vicious*, unless we  
have

have some *Reason* for counting it so, or *SECT.* when it is *Truth* "that it is vicious." If I. this be intended by *Conformity to Truth*, *then at the same rate we may make Conformity to Truth the original Idea of Vice as well as Virtue; nay, of every Attribute whatsoever.* That *Taste* alone is *sweet*, which there is *Reason* to count *sweet*; that *Taste* alone is *bitter*, concerning which it is *true* that it is *bitter*; that *Form* alone is *beautiful*, concerning which it is *true* that it is *beautiful*; and that alone *deformed*, which is truly *deformed*. Thus *Virtue, Vice, Sweet, Bitter, Beautiful, or Deformed*, originally denote *Conformity to Reason*, antecedently to Perceptions of any *Sense*. The *Idea of Virtue* is particularly that concerning which it is *Truth*, that it is *Virtue*; or *Virtue is Virtue*; a wonderful Discovery!


So when some tell us, "that *Truth* is naturally pleasant, and more so than any sensible Perception; this must therefore engage Men more than any other Motive, if they attend to it." Let them observe, that as much *Truth* is known about *Vice* as *Virtue*. We may demonstrate the publick Miseries which would ensue upon *Perjury, Murder, and Robbery*. These Demonstrations would be attended with that *Pleasure* which is peculiar to *Truth*; as well as the Demonstrations of the publick Happiness to ensue

SECT. ensue from *Faith, Humanity and Justice.*

I. There is equal Truth on both sides.

*Whence it  
is that Vir-  
tue, scallid  
reasonable  
and not  
Vice.* WE may transiently observe what has occasioned the Use of the Word *reasonable*, as an Epithet of only *virtuous Actions*. Tho' we have *Instincts* determining us to desire *Ends*, without supposing any previous *Reasoning*; yet it is by use of our *Reason* that we find out the *Means* of obtaining our *Ends*. When we do not use our *Reason*, we often are disappointed of our *End*. We therefore call those Actions which are *effectual* to their *Ends*, *reasonable* in one Sense of that Word.

AGAIN, in all Men there is probably a *moral Sense*, making publickly useful Actions and kind Affections *grateful* to the Agent, and to every Observer: Most Men who have thought of human Actions, agree, that the *publickly useful* are in the whole also *privately useful* to the Agent, either in this Life or the next: We conclude, that all Men have the *same Affections and Senses*: We are convinced by our *Reason*, that it is by publickly useful Actions alone that we can promote *all our Ends*. Whoever then acts in a contrary manner, we presume is *misktaken, ignorant of, or inadvertent to*, these Truths which he might know; and say he acts *unreasonably*. Hence some have been

been led to imagine, some *Reasons* either *SECT.*  
exciting or justifying previously to all *Affe-* I.  
*tions* or a *moral Sense*. 

Two Arguments are brought in defence <sup>Objections</sup>  
of this Epithet, as antecedent to any Sense, <sup>from our</sup> *judging*  
*viz.* "That we judge even of our *Affe-* even of our  
" *tions and Senses* themselves, whether they <sup>Affections</sup> and <sup>Senses</sup>  
" are morally *Good or Evil*." <sup>themselves.</sup>

THE second Argument is, that "if all  
" *moral Ideas* depend upon the *Constitution*  
" of our *Sense*, then all *Constitutions* would  
" have been alike reasonable and good to  
" the *DEITY*, which is absurd."

As to the first Argument, it is plain we <sup>That we</sup> judge our  
judge of our own *Affections*, or those of <sup>& sens</sup> *others* by our *moral Sense*, by which we ap- <sup>them selves.</sup>  
prove kind Affections, and disapprove the  
contrary. But none can apply *moral Attri-*  
*butes* to the very *Faculty* of perceiving moral  
*Qualities*; or call his *moral Sense* morally  
*Good or Evil*, any more than he calls the  
*Power of Tasting*, *sweet or bitter*; or of  
*Seeing, strait or crooked, white or black*.

EVERY one judges the *Affections* of others <sup>Answered.</sup>  
by his own *Sense*; so that it seems not im-  
possible that in these *Senses* Men might dif-  
fer as they do in *Taste*. A *Sense approving*  
*Benevolence* would disapprove that *Temper*,  
which

S E C T. which a *Sense approving Malice* would delight in. The *former* would judge of the ~~latter~~ latter by his own *Sense*, so would the latter of the former. Each one would at first view think the *Sense* of the other perverted. But then, is there no difference? Are both Senses equally *good*? No certainly, any *Man* who observed them would think the *Sense* of the *former* more desirable than of the *latter*; but this is, because the *moral Sense* of every *Man* is constituted in the former manner. But were there any Nature with no *moral Sense* at all observing these two Persons, would he not think the State of the *former* preferable to that of the *latter*? Yes, he might: but not from any Perception of *moral Goodness* in the one *Sense* more than in the other. Any rational Nature observing two Men thus constituted, with *opposite Senses*, might by reasoning see, not *moral Goodness* in one *Sense* more than in the contrary, but a *Tendency to the Happiness of the Person himself*, who had the former *Sense* in the one *Constitution*, and a *contrary Tendency* in the opposite *Constitution*: nay, the Persons themselves might observe this; since the *former Sense* would make these Actions grateful to the Agent which were useful to others; who, if they had a like *Sense*, would *love him, and return good Offices*; whereas the *latter Sense* would make all such Actions as are *useful to others, and apt*

apt to engage their *good Offices*, ungrateful S E C T. to the Agent ; and would lead him into I. publickly hurtful Actions, which would not ~~only~~ only procure the Hatred of others, if they had a *contrary Sense*, but engage them out of their *Self-Love* to study his *Destruction*, tho' their *Senses* agreed. Thus any *Observer*, or the *Agent* himself with this latter *Sense*, might perceive that the *Pains* to be feared, as the Consequence of *malicious Actions*, did over-ballance the *Pleasures* of this *Sense*; so that it would be to the *Agent's Interest* to counteract it. Thus one Constitution of the *moral Sense* might appear to be more *advantageous* to those who had it, than the contrary ; as we may call that *Sense of Tasting healthful*, which made wholsome Meat pleasant ; and we would call a *contrary Taste pernicious*. And yet we should no more call the *moral Sense morally good or evil*, than we call the *Sense of Tasting savoury or unsavoury, sweet or bitter*.

BUT must we not own, that we judge of all our *Senses* by our *Reason*, and often correct their *Reports* of the *Magnitude, Figure, Colour, Taste* of Objects, and pronounce them *right or wrong*, as they agree or disagree with *Reason*? This is true. But does it then follow, that *Extension, Figure, Colour, Taste*, are not *sensible Ideas*, but only denote *Reasonableness, or Agreement with Reason*?

*S E C T. Reason?* Or that these Qualities are perceivable antecedently to any Sense, by our Power of finding out Truth? Just so a compassionate Temper may rashly imagine the Correction of a Child, or the Execution of a Criminal, to be cruel and inhuman: but by reasoning may discover the superior Good arising from them in the whole; and then the same moral Sense may determine the Observer to approve them. But we must not hence conclude, that it is any reasoning antecedent to a moral Sense, which determines us to approve the Study of publick Good, any more than we can in the former Case conclude, that we perceive Extension, Figure, Colour, Taste, antecedently to a Sense. All these Sensations are often corrected by Reasoning, as well as our Approbations of Actions as Good or Evil: \* and yet no body ever placed the Original Idea of Extension, Figure, Colour, or Taste, in Conformity to Reason.

'Tis manifest we have in our Understanding moral Ideas, or they are Perceptions of the Soul: we reason about them, we compare, we judge; but then we do all the same Acts about Extension, Figure, Colour, Taste, Sound, which Perceptions all Men call Sensations. All our Ideas, or the ma-

\* See Sect. 4. of this Treatise.

terials of our reasoning or judging, are received by some immediate Powers of Perception internal or external, which we may call *Senses*; by these too we have Pleasure and Pain. All Perception is by the Soul, not by the Body, tho' some Impressions on the bodily Organs are the Occasions of some of them; and in others the Soul is determined to other sorts of *Feelings* or *Sensations*, where no bodily Impression is the immediate Occasion. A certain *incorporeal Form*, if one may use that Name, a *Temper* observed, a *Character*, an *Affection*, a *State* of a sensitive Being, known or understood, may raise *Liking*, *Approbation*, *Sympathy*, as naturally from the very Constitution of the Soul, as any bodily Impression raises external Sensations. Reasoning or *Intellect* seems to raise no new Species of Ideas, but to discover or discern the *Relations* of those received. Reason shews what Acts are conformable to a *Law*, a *Will* of a Superior; or what Acts tend to Private Good, or to Publick Good: In like manner, Reason discovers contrary Tendencies of contrary Actions. Both Contraries are alike the Object of the Understanding, and may give that sort of Pleasure which arises upon Discovery of Truth. A Demonstration that certain Actions are detrimental to Society is attended with the peculiar *Pleasure of new Knowledge*, as much as a like Demonstration of

SECT. the Benefit of Virtue. But when we ap-

I. prove a kind beneficent Action, let us consider whether this *Feeling*, or *Action*, or *Modification* of the Soul more resembles an Act of *Contemplation*, such as this [when strait Lines intersect each other, the vertical Angles are equal;] or that *Liking* we have to a beautiful Form, an harmonious Composition, a grateful Sound.

THUS tho' no Man can immediately either approve or disapprove as morally good or evil his own moral Sense, by which he approves only *Affections* and *Actions* consequent upon them ; yet he may see whether it be *advantageous* to him in other respects, to have it constituted one way rather than another. One Constitution may make these Actions grateful to this Sense which tend to procure other *Pleasures* also. A contrary Constitution may be known to the very Person himself to be *disadvantageous*, as making these Actions immediately grateful, which shall occasion all other sorts of Misery. His *Self-Love* may excite him, tho' with *Dissatisfaction*, to counteract this Sense, in order to avoid a greater *Evil*. Mr. Hobbes seems to have had no better Notions of the natural State of Mankind. An Observer, who was *benevolent*, would desire that all had the former sort of *Sense*; a *malicious* Observer, if he feared no *Evil to himself*, from

from the Actions of the Persons observed SECT. would desire the latter Constitution. If this I. Observer had a moral Sense, he would think ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> that Constitution which was contrary to his own, strange and surprizing, or unnatural. If the Observer had no Affections toward others, and were disjoined from Mankind, so as to have neither Hopes nor Fears from their Actions, he would be indifferent about their Constitutions, and have no Desire or Preference of one above another; tho' he might see which were advantageous to them, and which pernicious.

As to the second Argument, What means *The 2d Ob-* [alike reasonable or good to the DEITY?] Does *jection,* it mean, " that the DEITY could have had <sup>that all</sup> *Constitu-* " no Reasons exciting him to make one *tions would* " Constitution rather than another?" 'Tis <sup>have been</sup> plain, if the DEITY had nothing *essential* <sup>alike reaso-</sup> *able, an-* to his Nature, resembling or analogous to *suered.* our sweetest and most kind Affections, we can scarce suppose he could have any Reason exciting him to any thing he has done: but grant such a Disposition in the DEITY, and then the manifest Tendency of the present Constitution to the Happiness of his Creatures was an exciting Reason for chusing it before the contrary.\* Each sort of Constitution might

\* A late Author on *the Foundation of Moral Goodness, &c.* p. 9. thus argues: " If such a Disposition is in the Deity, is R 2      " it

SECT. might have given Men an equal immediate

I. *Pleasure* in present *Self-Approbation* for any  
 sort of Action; but the Actions approved  
 by the *present Sense*, procure all *Pleasures* of  
 the *other Senses*; and the Actions which  
 would have been approved by a *contrary*  
*moral*

" it a Perfection, or is it not? is it better than the contrary,  
 " more worthy of his Nature, more agreeable to his other  
 " Perfections? If not, let us not ascribe it to him: If it be,  
 " then for what Reason, Account, or Ground is it better?  
 " That Reason, Account, or Ground, must be the Founda-  
 " tion of moral Goodness. If there be no Reason why it is  
 " better, then God is acted by a blind unaccountable Im-  
 " pulse." In Answer, one may first ask the precise Meaning  
 of these vague Words, *Perfection*, *Betterness*, *Wortbiness*, *Ag-  
 reement*. If these Terms denote " whatever makes the Be-  
 " ing possessed of them happier, than he would be without  
 " them;" then, 1. It is plain, kind Dispositions are Perfe-  
 ctions to Men in our present Frame; are better for us than the  
 contrary, and agree better with our other Powers; i. e. they  
 tend to preserve them, and procure us many Enjoyments.  
 2. Our apprehending such Dispositions in God, according to  
 our Frame makes us esteem and love him. 3. Our Knowledge  
 of God is so imperfect, that it is not easy to prove that such  
 Dispositions tend to make or preserve him happy, or to pro-  
 cure him other Enjoyments. And yet, 4. We may have  
 good Reason, Ground, or Evidence, from his Works and Ad-  
 ministration to believe him Benevolent. 5. If he has real  
 Good-will to his Creatures, their Perfection or Happiness is  
 to him an ultimate End, intended without farther View or  
 Reason: And yet, 6. He is not *acted by a blind Impulse*: the  
 ultimate End is known to him, and the best Means chosen;  
 which never happen in what we call blind Impulses; unless  
 one calls *willing any ultimate End* a blind Impulse. For thus  
 each Man should desire his own Happiness by a blind Impulse:  
 And God's willing to regard the *Fitness of Things*, must be a  
 blind Impulse, unless he have a *prior Reason* why he wills  
 what his Understanding represents as *fit*, rather than what  
 is *unfit*; for his Understanding represents both. And there  
 must be a prior *Fitness* or *Reasonableness* that he should will  
 what

*moral Sense*, would have been productive of S E C T .  
all Torments of the other Senses.

I.



If it be meant, that “ upon this Supposition, that all our Approbation pre-supposes in us a moral Sense, the DEITY could not have approved one Constitution more than another :” where is the Consequence ? Why may not the Deity have something of a superior Kind, analogous to our *moral Sense*, essential to him ? How does any Constitution of the *Senses of Men* hinder the DEITY to reflect and judge of his own Actions ? How does it affect the divine Apprehension, which way soever *moral Ideas* arise with Men ?

If it means “ that we cannot approve one Constitution more than another, or approve the DEITY for making the present Constitution : ” This Consequence is also false. The present Constitution of our *moral Sense* determines us to approve all kind Affections :

what is fit, and a yet prior *Fitness* that he should regard the *Fitness* of willing what is fit, and so on.

If in these Questions is meant, not by what Argument do we prove that the Deity is benevolent ; but, “ what is the efficient Cause of that Disposition in God ? ” Those Gentlemen must answer for us, who tell us also of the *Reason or Ground of the Divine Existence* ; and that not as a Proof that he does exist, or the *Causa Cognoscendi*, as the Schoolmen speak ; but the *Causa Effendi* of that Being which they acknowledge uncaused and independent. See Dr. Sam. Clarke’s *Boyle’s Lectures*.

SECTR. This Constitution the DEITY must have  
 I. foreseen as tending to the *Happiness* of his  
~~own~~ Creatures; it does therefore evidence *kind Affection* or *Benevolence* in the DEITY, this  
 therefore we must *approve*.

*The meaning of antecedent Reasonableness.* WE have got some strange Phrases, “*that some things are antecedently reasonable in the Nature of the thing;*” which some insist upon: “That otherwise, say they, if “before Man was created, any Nature “without a moral Sense had existed, this “Nature would not have approved as morally good in the Deity, his constituting “our Sense as it is at present.” Very true; and what next? If there had been no *moral Sense* in that Nature, there would have been no *Perception of Morality*. But “could not such Natures have seen something reasonable in one Constitution more than in another?” They might no doubt have reasoned about the various *Constitutions*, and foreseen that the *present* one would tend to the *Happiness* of Mankind, and would evidence *Benevolence* in the DEITY; So also they might have reasoned about the *contrary Constitution*, that it would make Men miserable, and evidence *Malice* in the Deity. They would have reasoned about both, and found out *Truths*: are both Constitutions alike *reasonable* to these Observers? No, say they, “the benevolent one is *reasonable*, and “the

"the malicious unreasonable :" And yet these S E C T. Observers reasoned and discovered Truths I. about both: An Action then is called by us ~~unreasonable~~ reasonable when it is benevolent, and ~~unreasonable~~ unreasonable when malicious. This is plainly making the Word *reasonable* denote whatever is *approved* by our moral Sense, without Relation to true *Propositions*. We often use that Word in such a confused Manner ; But these antecedent *Natures*, supposed without a moral Sense, would not have *approved* one Constitution of the DEITY as morally better than another.

HAD it been left to the Choice of these antecedent *Minds*, what manner of Sense they would have desired for Mankind, would they have seen no difference ? Yes they would, according to their *Affections* which are pre-supposed in all *Election*. If they were benevolent, as we suppose the DEITY, the *Tendency of the present Sense to the Happiness of Men* would have excited their Choice. Had they been malicious, as we suppose the Devil, the *contrary Tendency* of the *contrary Sense* would have excited their *Election* of it. But is there nothing preferable, or eligible antecedently to all *Affections* too ? No certainly, unless there can be *Desire* without *Affections*, or *superior Desire*, i. e. *Election* antecedently to all *Desire*.

SECT. SOME farther perplex this Subject, by asserting, that "the same Reasons determining

*Reasons for Election* "Approbation, ought also to excite to *Election*." Here, 1. We often see *justifying Reasons* where we can have no *Election*; viz. when we observe the *Actions of others*, which were even prior to our *Existence*.

2. The *Quality* moving us to *Election* very often cannot excite *Approbation*; viz. *private usefulness*, not publickly pernicious. This both does and ought to move *Election*, and yet I believe few will say, "they *prove* as virtuous the *eating a Bunch of Grapes*, taking a *Glass of Wine*, or *sitting down* when one is tired. *Approbation* is not what we can *voluntarily* bring upon ourselves. When we are contemplating *Actions*, we do not *choose* to approve, because *Approbation* is pleasant; otherwise we would always approve, and never condemn any *Action*; because this is some way uneasy. *Approbation* is plainly a *Perception* arising without previous *Volition*, or *Choice* of it, because of any *concomitant Pleasure*. The Occasion of it is the *Perception of benevolent Affections* in ourselves, or the discovering the like in others, even when we are incapable of any *Action* or *Election*. The Reasons determining *Approbation* are such as shew that an *Action* evidenced *kind Affections*, and that in *others*, as often as in *ourselves*.

*selves.* Whereas, the *Reasons* moving to SECT. Election are such as shew the *Tendency of I. an Action to gratify some Affection in the ~~the~~ Agent.*

THE *Prospect* of the Pleasure of *Self-Approbation*, is indeed often a Motive to *choose* one Action rather than another; but this supposes the *moral Sense*, or Determination to *approve*, prior to the *Election*. Were *Approbation voluntarily chosen*, from the *Prospect* of its concomitant *Pleasure*, then there could be no *Condemnation* of our own Actions, for that is *unpleasant*.

As to that confused Word [ought] it is needless to apply to it again all that was said about *Obligation*.

## S E C T. II.

*Concerning that Character of Virtue  
and Vice, The Fitness or Unfitness  
of Actions.*

SECT. II. **W**E come next to examine some other Explications of Morality, which have been much insisted on of late. \* We are told, " that there are eternal and immutable Differences of Things, absolutely and antecedently: that there are also eternal and unalterable Relations in the Natures of the Things themselves, from which arise Agreements and Disagreements, Congruities and Incongruities, Fitness and Unfitness of the Application of Circumstances, to the Qualifications of Persons; that Actions agreeable to these Relations are morally Good, and that the contrary Actions are morally Evil." These Expressions are sometimes made of the same Import with those more common ones: " acting agreeably to the eternal Reason and Truth of Things." It is asserted, that

\* See Dr. Samuel Clarke's Boyle's Lectures; and many late Authors.

" God who knows all these *Relations*, &c. S E C T. II.  
" does guide his Actions by them, since he  
" has no wrong Affection" the (Word ~~wrong~~  
[wrong] should have been first explained):  
" and that in like manner these *Relations*,  
" &c. *ought*" (another unlucky Word in  
Morals) " to determine the *Choice* of all  
" *Rationals*, abstractly from any *Views of*  
" *Interest*. If they do not, these *Creatures*  
" are insolently *counteracting their Creator*,  
" and as far as they can, *making things to*  
" *be what they are not*, which is the great-  
" est *Impiety*."

THAT Things are now *different* is certain. That *Ideas*, to which there is no *Object* yet existing conformable, are also *different*, is certain. That upon comparing two *Ideas* there arises a *relative Idea*, generally when the two *Ideas* compared have in them any *Modes of the same simple Idea*, is also obvious. Thus every *extended Being* may be compared to any other of the same *Kinds of Dimensions*; and *relative Ideas* be formed of *greater, less, equal, double, triple, subdouble, &c.* with infinite variety. This may let us see that *Relations* are not *real Qualities* inherent in external Natures, but only *Ideas* necessarily accompanying our *Perception* of two *Objects* at once, and comparing them. *Relative Ideas* continue, when the external *Objects* do not exist, provided

we

*SECT.* we retain the two Ideas. But what the *e-*  
 II. *ternal Relations*, in the Natures of Things  
 do mean, is not so easy perhaps to be con-  
 ceived.

*Three sorts of Relations considered.* To shew particularly how far *Morality* can be concerned in *Relations*, we may consider them under these Three Classes. 1. The *Relations of inanimate Objects*, as to their *Quantity*, or *active* and *passive Powers*, as explained by Mr. *Locke*. 2. The *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents*, as to their *active* or *passive Powers*. 3. The *Relations of rational Agents among themselves* founded on their *Powers* or *Actions* past or continued. Now let us examine what *Fitnesses* or *Unfitnesses* arise from any of these *Sorts of Relations*, in which the *Morality* of Actions may consist; and whether we can place *Morality* in them, without presupposing a *moral Sense*. It is plain, that ingenuous Author says nothing against the Supposition of a *moral Sense*: But many imagine, that his Account of moral Ideas is independent upon a *moral Sense*, and therefore are less willing to allow that we have such an immediate Perception, or *Sense* of Virtue and Vice. What follows is not intended to oppose his Scheme, but rather to suggest what seems a necessary Explication of it; by shewing that it is no otherwise intelligible

gible, but upon Supposition of a *moral Sect.*  
*Sense.*

II.



1. RELATIONS of *inanimate Objects* being known, puts it in the Power of a rational Agent often to diversify them, to change their Forms, Motions or Qualities of any kind, at his pleasure: but no body apprehends any *Virtue* or *Vice* in such Actions, where no Relation is apprehended to a *rational* or *sensitive Being's Happiness* or *Misery*; otherwise we should have got into the Class of Virtues all the practical *Mathematicks* and the Operations of *Chymistry*.

2. As to the *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents*; the Knowledge of them equally puts it in one's Power to *destroy Mankind*, as to preserve them. Without presupposing *Affections*, this Knowledge will not excite to one Action rather than another; nor without a *moral Sense* will it make us approve any Action more than its contrary. The Relation of *Corn* to human Bodies being known to a Person of *kind Affections*, was perhaps the *exciting Reason* of teaching Mankind *Husbandry*: But the Knowledge of the *Relations of Arsenick* would excite a *malicious Nature*, just in the same manner, to the greatest Mischief. A *Sword*, an *Halter*, a *Musket*, bear the *same Relation* to the Body of an *Hero*, which they do

S E C T. do to a *Robber*. The killing of either is equally agreeable to *these Relations*, but not equally good. The Knowledge of *these Relations* neither excites to Actions, nor justifies them, without presupposing either *Affections* or a moral sense. *Kind Affections* with such Knowledge makes *Heroes*; *malicious Affections*, *Villains*.

3. THE last sort of *Relations* is that among rational Agents, founded on their Actions or Affections; whence one is called *Creator*, another *Creature*; one *Benefactor*, the other *Beneficiary* (if that Word may be used in this general Sense;) the one *Parent*, the other *Child*; the one *Governour*, the other *Subject*, &c. Now let us see what *Fitnesses* or *Unfitnesses* arise from these Relations.

THERE is certainly, independently of *Fancy* or *Custom*, a *natural Tendency* in some Actions to give *Pleasure*, either to the Agent or others; and a *contrary Tendency* in other Actions to give *Pain*, either to the Agent or others. This sort of Relation of Actions to the Agents or Objects is indisputable. If we call these Relations *Fitnesses*, then the most contrary Actions have equal *Fitnesses* for contrary Ends; and each one is *unfit* for the End of the other. Thus *Compassion* is *fit* to make others *happy*, and *unfit* to make others *miserable*. *Violation of Property*

Property is fit to make Men miserable, and Sect. II. unfit to make them happy. Each of these is both fit and unfit. with respect to different Ends. The bare Fitness then to an End, is not the Idea of moral Goodness.

PERHAPS the *virtuous Fitness* is that of *Ends*. The Fitness of a subordinate *End* to the ultimate, cannot constitute the Action good, unless the ultimate *End* be good. To keep a Conspiracy secret is not a good *End*, though it be fit for obtaining a farther *End*, the Success of the Conspiracy. The moral Fitness must be that of the ultimate *End* itself: The publick Good alone is a fit *End*, therefore the Means fit for this *End* alone are good.


WHAT means the *Fitness of an ultimate End*? For what is it fit? Why, it is an ultimate *End*, not fit for any thing farther, but absolutely fit. What means that Word fit? If it notes a simple Idea it must be the Perception of some Sense: thus we must recur, upon this Scheme too, to a moral Sense.\*

\* A late Author who pleads that *Wisdom* is chiefly employed in choosing the ultimate Ends themselves, and that *Fitness* is a proper Attribute of ultimate *Ends*, in answer to this short Question, "What are they fit for?" answers, "they are fit to be approved by all rational Agents." Now his meaning of the word [Approved] is this, discerned to be fit. His Answer then is "they are fit to be perceived fit." When Words are used at this rate one must lose his Labour in Replies to such Remarkers. See a Paper called *Wisdom the sole Spring of Action in the Deity*.

**S E C T.** If Fitness be not a *simple Idea*, let it be  
 II. defined. Some tell us, that it is "an *A-*  
 ~~~~ *greement of an Affection, Desire, Action,*  
 " or *End, to the Relations of Agents.*" But
 what means *Agreement?* Which of these
 four Meanings has it? 1. We say one *Quan-*
tity agrees with another of equal Dimen-
sions every way. 2. A *Corollary agrees with a*
Theorem; when our knowing the latter to
 be Truth, leads us to know that the former is
 also a *true Proposition.* 3. *Meat agrees with*
 that *Body which it tends to preserve.* 4. *Meat*
 agrees with the *Taste of that Being in whom*
 it raises a *pleasant Perception.* If any one
 of these are the Meanings of *Agreement* in
 the Definition, then one of these is the Idea
 of *Fitness.* 1. That an *Action or Affection*
 is of the same *Bulk and Figure with the Re-*
lation. Or, 2. When the *Relation is a true*
Proposition, so is the Action or Affection. Or,
 3. The *Action or Affection tends to preserve*
 the *Relation; and contrary Actions would*
 destroy it: So that, for Instance, God would
 be no longer related to us as *Creator and Be-*
nefactor, when we disobeyed him. Or, 4. The
 Action raises *pleasant Perceptions in the*
Relation. All these Expressions seem ab-
 furd. †

THESE

† Several Gentlemen who have published Remarks or An-
 swers to this Scheme, continue to use these words *Agreement,*
Conformity,

THESE Gentlemen probably have some S E C T. other Meanings to these Words *Fitness* or II. *Agreement*. I hope what is said will shew  the need for *Explication* of them, though they be so common. There is one Meaning perhaps intended, however it be obscurely expressed, " That certain *Affections* or " *Actions* of an Agent, standing in a cer- " tain Relation to other Agents, is *approved* " by every *Observer*, or raises in him a grate- " ful Perception, or moves the Observer to " love the Agent." This Meaning is the same with the Notion of pleasing a *moral Sense*.

WHOEVER explains *Virtue* or *Vice* by *Justice* or *Injustice*, *Right* or *Wrong*, uses only more ambiguous Words, which will equally lead to acknowledge a *moral Sense*.

Conformity, *Congruity*, without complying with this just Request of explaining or fixing precisely the meaning of these words, which are manifestly ambiguous.

S E C T III.

Mr. Woolaston's Significancy of Truth, as the Idea of Virtue considered.

SECT. III. **M**R. WOOLASTON * has introduced a new Explication of moral *Virtue*, viz. *Significancy of Truth in Actions*, supposing that in every Action there is some *Significancy*, like that which *Moralists* and *Civilians* speak of in their *Tacit Conventions*, and *Quasi Contractus*!

Significa-
tion.
wherein it
consists.

THE Word *Signification* is very common, but a little Reflection will shew it to be very ambiguous. In *Signification of Words* these things are included: 1. An *Association of an Idea with a Sound*, so that when any *Idea* is formed by the Speaker, the *Idea of a Sound* accompanies it. 2. The *Sound perceived* by the Hearer excites the *Idea* to which it is connected. 3. In like manner a *Judgment* in the Speaker's Mind is accompanied with the *Idea of a Combination of Sounds*. 4. This *Combination of Sounds* heard raises the *Apprehension* of that *Judg-*

* In his *Religion of Nature delineated*.

ment

ment in the Mind of the Hearer. Nothing S E C T . farther than these Circumstances seems to be III.
denoted by *Signification.*



HEARING a Proposition does not of Conclusions itself produce either *Affent* or *Dissent*, or drawn from *Opinion* in the Hearer, but only presents to Speech. his Apprehension the *Judgment*, or *Thema Complexum*. But the Hearer himself often forms *Judgments* or *Opinions* upon this occasion, either *immediately* without Reasoning, or by some short *Argument*. These *Opinions* are some one or more of the following *Propositions*. 1. *That a Sound is perceived, and a Judgment apprehended.* 2. *Such a Person caused the Sound heard.* 3. *The Speaker intended to excite in the Hearer the Idea of the Sound, and the Apprehension of the Judgment, or Thema Complexum.* This Judgment is not always formed by the Hearer, nor is it always true, when Men are heard speaking. 4. *The Speaker intended to produce Affent in the Hearer:* This Judgment is not always true. 5. *The Speaker assents to the Proposition spoken:* This Judgment in the Hearer is often false, and is formed upon Opinion of the Speaker's *Veracity*, or speaking what expresses his Opinion usually. 6. *The Speaker does not assent to the Proposition spoken:* This Judgment of the Hearer is often false, when what is spoken is every way

- S E C T. true. 7. *The Speaker intended that the Hear-*
 III. *er should believe or judge, "that the Proposi-*
~~tion spoken was assented to by the Speaker."~~
 8. *The Speaker had the contrary Intention, to*
that supposed in the last Judgment: Both
these latter Judgments may be false, when
the Proposition spoken is every way true.
 9. *The Proposition spoken represents the Object*
as it is, or is logically true. 10. *The Proposi-*
tion spoken does not represent the Object as it
is, or it is logically false.

Morality
does not
consist in
Signifi-
cancy.

As to the first four Circumstances which make up the proper Significancy of Speech, 'tis scarce possible that any one should place moral Good or Evil in them. Whether the Proposition were logically true or false, the having a bare Apprehension of it as a *Thema Complexum*, or raising this in another, without intending to produce Assent or Dissent, can have no more moral Good or Evil in it, than the Reception of any other Idea, or raising it in another. This Significancy of Falshood is found in the very Propositions given in Schools, as Instances of Falshood, Absurdity, Contradiction to Truth, or Blasphemy. The pronouncing of which, are Actions signifying more properly than most of our other Actions; and yet no body condemns them as immoral.

Not in
Conclusi-
ons form-
ed by Hear-
ers.

As to the Opinions formed by the Hear-
er, they are all his own Action as much as
any

any other Conclusion or Judgment formed from Appearances of any sort whatsoever. SECT. III.
 They are *true* or *false*, according to the ~~truth~~ Sagacity of the *Observer*, or his *Caution*. The Hearer may form perfectly true *Opinions* or *Judgments*, when the Speaker is guilty of the basest *Fraud*; and may form *false* *Judgments*, when the Speaker is perfectly *innocent*, and spoke nothing *false* in any Sense.

THE Evils which may follow from the false Judgments of the Hearer, are no otherwise chargeable on the Speaker, than as the evil Consequences of another's Action of any kind may be chargeable upon any Person who *co-operated*; or, by his *Action*, or *Omission*, the Consequence of which he might have *foreseen*, did either actually *intend* this Evil, or wanted that *Degree of kind Affection*, which would have inclined him to have prevented it.

THE Intention of the Speaker is what The Mo- all *Moralists* have hitherto imagined, the rality of *Virtue* or *Vice* of Words did depend upon, Speech in *the Inten-* and not the bare *Significancy* of Truth or *tion*.
 Falshood. This *Intention* is either, 1. *To lead the Hearer into a true or false Opinion about the Sentiments of the Speaker.* 2. *To make the Hearer assent to the Proposition spoken.* Or, 3. *Both to make the Hearer assent to the Proposition, and judge that the Speaker*

SECT. Speaker also assents to it. Or, 4. To accomplish some End, by means of the Hearer's assent to the Proposition spoken. This End may be known by the Speaker to be either publickly useful or publickly hurtful.

SOME Moralists * of late have placed all *Virtue in Speech* in the *Intention* of the last kind, viz. accomplishing some publickly useful End, by speaking either *logical Truth* or *Falshood*: and that all *Vice* in speaking, consists in intending to effect something publickly *hurtful* by Speech, whether *logically true* or *false*, and known to be such; or by using Speech in a manner which we may foresee would be *publickly hurtful*, whether we actually *intend* this evil Consequence or not. Some stricter Moralists assert that the *publick Evils* which would ensue from destroying mutual Confidence, by allowing to speak *Propositions known to be false* on any occasion, are so great, that no particular *Advantage* to be expected from speaking *known logical Falshoods*, can ever over-ballance them; that all use of Speech supposes a *tacit Convention of Sincerity*, the *Violation* of which is always evil. Both sides in this Argument agree, that the *moral Evil* in Speech consists either in some *direct malicious Intention*, or a *Tendency to the publick Detriment of*

* Barberack's Notes on Puffendorf, Lib. iv. c. 1, 7.

Society;

Society; which Tendency the Agent might ~~SECT.~~
have *foreseen*, as connected with his Action, had he not wanted that Degree of *good* ~~good~~
Affections which makes Men attentive to the Effects of their Actions. Never was bare Significancy of *Falshood* made the Idea of *moral Evil*. Speaking *logical Falshood* was still looked upon as innocent in many cases. Speaking *contrary to Sentiment*, or *moral Falshood*, was always proved Evil, from some publickly hurtful Tendency, and not supposed as evil *immediately*, or the same Idea with *Vice*. The *Intention to deceive* was the Foundation of the Guilt. This Intention the Speaker studies to *conceal*, and does not *signify* it: It is an *Act of the Will*, neither signified by his Words, nor itself signifying anything else.

THIS Point deserved Consideration, because if any Action be *significant*, it is certainly the *Act of Speaking*: And yet even in this the *Virtue* is not the *signifying of Truth*, nor the *Vice* the *signifying Falshood*.

THE Signification of some Actions depends upon a like Association of Ideas with them, made either by Nature, or arbitrarily, and by Custom, as with Sounds. Letters are by Custom the Signs of Sounds. A Sbriek or Groan is a natural Sign of Fear or Pain: A Motion of the Hand or Head may signify

SECT. Assent, Dissent, or Desire. The cutting down
 III. tall Poppies was an answer: The sending
 ~~~~ Spurs, advice to Flight: Kindling many Fires  
 raises the Opinion of an Encampment: Rais-  
 ing a Smoke will raise Opinion of Fire.

*Three Sorts of Signifying.* THE most important Distinction of Signs

is this, that \* 1. "Some Appearances are the  
 " Occasion upon which an Observer, by his  
 " own Reasoning, forms a Judgment, with-  
 " out supposing, or having reason to be-  
 " lieve, that the Agent, who caused these  
 " Appearances, did it with *design to commu-*  
*nicate his Sentiments to others; or when*  
 " the Actions are such as are usually done  
 " by the Agents, without *professing a Design*  
 " to raise Opinions in Observers. 2. Some  
 " Actions are never used but with *professed*  
 " *Design to convey the Opinions of the A-*  
*gent to the Observer; or such as the Ob-*  
*serving infers nothing from, but upon ha-*  
*ving reason to believe that the Causa of*  
 " the Appearance intended to convey some  
 " Sentiment to the Observer." 3. Other  
 Signs are used, when "the Signifier gives  
 " no Reason to conclude any other Inten-  
 " tion, but only to raise an *Apprehension of*  
 " the Judgment, or the *Thema Complexum,*  
 " without *professing any Design to communi-*

\* *Ecc Grotius de Jure Bell. Lib. 3. c. 1.*

" cate his Sentiments, or to produce any *Aſſeſſment*.  
" ſent in the Observer.

III.



To do Actions from which the Observer will form *false Opinions*, while yet the Agent is not understood to *profess any Intention of communicating to him his Opinions or Designs*, is never of itself imagined *evil*, let the Signs be *natural* or *inſtituted*; provided there be no *malicious Intention*, or *neglect of publick Good*. It is never called a Crime in a *Teacher*, to pronounce an *absurd Sentence* for an instance; in a *Nobleman*, to travel without *Coronets*; or a *Clergyman* in *Lay-habit*, for private Conveniency, or to avoid troubleſome Ceremony; to leave *Lights in a Lodge*, to make People conclude there is a *Watch kept*. This *Significancy* may be in any Action which is obſerved; but as *true Conclusions argue no Virtue* in the Agent, so *false ones argue no Vice*.

RAISING *false Opinions* designedly by the *second Sort of Signs*, which reasonably lead the Observer to conclude a *Profession of communicating Sentiments*, whether the Signs be *customary, inſtituted, or natural*, is generally *evil*, when the Agent knows the Falſhood; since it tends to diminish *mutual Confidence*. To *ſend Spurs* to a Friend, whom the *Sender* imagines to be in no danger, to deceive by *Hieroglyphicks or Painting*, is as criminal

SECT. nal as a *false Letter*. This Significancy occurs in very few human Actions: Some of the most important *Virtues* profess no design of communicating Sentiments, or raising Opinions either true or false: Nor is there any more Intention in some of the most vicious Actions. Again, who can imagine Virtue, in all Actions, where there is this Significancy of Truth with Intention? Is it Virtue to say at *Christmas*, that "the Mornings are sharp?" to beckon with the hand, in sign of Agent to such an Assertion? And in *false Propositions* thus signified by Actions or Words, there is no Evil apprehended where the *Falshood* is only logical. When the Falshood is known by the Agent, the Evil is not imagined in the Significancy, but in doing what one may foresee tends to breed *Distrust in Society*. And did all moral Evil consist in moral Falshood, there could be no Sins of Ignorance. If Mr. Woolaston alledges, that "Ignorance of some things signifies this Falshood, viz. 'We are not obliged to know the Truth': This Falshood is not signified with Intention; nor is it moral Falshood, but only logical: since no Man in an Error knows that 'he is obliged to know the contrary Truth,'" Mr. Woolaston's use of the Words [ought] or [obliged] without a distinct Meaning, is not peculiar to this Place.

THE third sort of Significancy of *false*-  
hood is never apprehended as morally *Evi*: III.  
if it were, then every Dramatick Writer ~~with~~  
drawing evil Characters, every History  
Painter, every Writer of Allegories, or E-  
picks, every Philosopher teaching the Nature  
of contradictory Propositions, would be  
thought criminal.

BUT since only the first sort of Signifi-  
cancy can be in all Actions, and that too Signifi-  
cancy dif-  
ferent from  
the Moral-  
ity.  
supposing that every Action whatsoever is  
*observed* by some Being or other: Let us  
see if this will account for Morality. Per-  
haps either, 1st, " Every Action is good  
" which leads the Observer into *true Opini-*  
" *ons concerning the Sentiments of the A-*  
" *gent, whether the Agent's Opinions be*  
" *true or false.*" Or, 2dly. " That Action  
" is good which leads the Observer into *true*  
" *Opinions concerning the Object, the Ten-*  
" *dency of the Action, and the Relation be-*  
" *tween the Agent and the Object.*"

DID Virtue consist in this first sort of Sig-  
nificancy of Truth, it would depend not up-  
on the Agent but the Sagacity of the Obser-  
ver: The acute Penetration of one would  
constitute an *Action virtuous*, and the Rash-  
ness or Stupidity of another would make it  
*vicious*: and the most *barbarous Actions*  
would

*SECT.* would raise no *false Opinion* of the *Sentiments of the Agent*, in a judicious Observer.

THE second sort of Significancy would also make *Virtue* consist in the *Power of Observers*. An exact Reasoner would receive no *false Opinion* from the worst Action concerning the *Object* or *Relation* of the Agent to it: And a *false Opinion* might be formed by a weak Observer of a *perfectly good Action*.—An Observer who knew an Agent to have the *basest Temper*, would not from his worst Action conclude any thing *false* concerning the *Object*: And all such *false Opinions* would arise only upon Supposition that the *Agent was virtuous*.

BUT may it not be said, that “ whether “ Men reason well about Actions or not, “ there are some *Conclusions really deducible from every Action*? It is a *Datum* “ from which something may be inferred “ by *just Consequence*, whether any one actually infers it or not. Then may not “ this *Quality* in Actions, whether we call “ it *Significancy* or not, *that only true Propositions can be inferred from them* “ by *just Reasoning*, be *moral Goodness*? “ And may it not be the *very Idea* of *moral Evil* in Actions, that *some false Conclusions*

“ *clusions can by just Consequence, be de-* S E C T.  
 “ *duced from them?*” Or if we will not al- III.  
 low these to be the *very Ideas* of moral Good ~~and~~  
 and Evil, “ are they not *universal just*  
 “ *Characters* to distinguish the one from the  
 “ other?”

ONE may here observe in general, that since the Existence of the Action is supposed to be a true *Premise* or *Datum*, no *false Conclusion* can possibly be inferred from it by *just Reasoning*. We could perhaps often justly infer, that the Agent had *false Opinions*; but then this Conclusion of the Observer, *viz.* “ that the Agent has *false O-* “ *pinions*” is really true.

BUT again, it will not make an *univer-* True Con-  
*sal Character* of good Actions, that a just clusions  
 Reasoner would infer from them, that *deducible*  
 “ *the Opinions of the Agent are true.*” *tions, no*  
 For it is thus Men must reason from Ac-just Cha-  
 tions; *viz.* When the Constitution of Na- racter of  
 ture, the Affections of Agents, and the Ac- Virtue.  
 tion, are given, to conclude concerning the O-  
 pinions: Or more generally given any three  
 of these to conclude the forth. Thus sup-  
 pose the “ *Constitution of Nature such,*  
 “ *that the private Interest of each Indi-*  
 “ *vidual is connected with the publick*  
 “ *Good:*” Suppose an Agent’s Affections  
*selfish* only, then from a *publickly useful*  
*Action*

S E C T. *Action we infer, that "the Agent's Opinions are true:" And from a publickly hurtful Action conclude his Opinions to be false.*

THE same *Constitution* supposed with *publick Affections* as well as *selfish*. The observing a *kind or publickly useful Action*, will not immediately infer, that the Agent's *Opinions* are either *true or false*: With *false Opinions* he might do *publickly useful Actions* out of his *publick Affections*, in those cases wherein they are not apparently opposite to his *Interest*. A *publick Action* opposite to some present *private Interest*, would generally evidence *true Opinions*; or if the *Opinions were false*, that his *publick Affections* were in this Case much stronger than his *Self-Love*. A *cruel Action* would indeed evidence *false Opinions*, or a very violent unkind *Passion*.

SUPPOSE the *same Constitution* in all other respects, with *malicious Affections* in an Agent. A *cruel or ungrateful Action* would not always prove the *Opinions of the Agent to be false*; but only that his *Malice* in this instance, was more violent than regard to his *Interest*. A *beneficent Action* would prove only one of these two, either that his *Opinions of the Constitution were true*; or, that if he

he was mistaken about the *Constitution*, he SECT. had also a *false Opinion* of the natural Ten- III.  
dency of the Action. Thus *false Opinions* ~~and~~ may be evidenced by contrary Actions.

SUPPOSE “*a Constitution wherein a private Interest could be advanced in Opposition to the publick*” (this we may call an evil *Constitution*:) Suppose only *Self-Love* in the Agent, then a *publickly useful Action*, any way *toilsome* or *expensive* to the Agent, would evidence *false Opinions*: And the most *cruel selfish Actions* would evidence *true Opinions*.

IN an *evil Constitution*, suppose *kind Affections* in the Agent; a *publickly useful Action* would not certainly argue either *true* or *false Opinions*. If his *Opinions* were *true*, but *kind Affections* stronger than *Self-Love*, he might act in the same manner, as if his *Opinions* were *false*, and *Self-Love* the *reigning Affection*.

IN an *evil Constitution*, suppose *malicious Affections* in an Agent, all *publickly useful Actions* would argue *false Opinions*; and *publickly hurtful Actions* would argue *true ones*.

THIS

**S E C T.** THIS may shew us that Men's Actions  
 III. are generally *publickly useful*, when they  
 have *true Opinions*, only on this account ;  
 that we neither have *malicious Affections* na-  
 turally, nor is there any probability, in our  
 present *Constitution*, of promoting a *private*  
*Interest* separately from, or in Opposition to  
 the *Publick*. Were there contrary *Affec-*  
*tions* and a contrary *Constitution*, the most  
 cruel Actions might flow from *true Opini-*  
*ons* ; and consequently *publickly useful Ac-*  
*tions* might flow from *false ones*.

*How far it is a Character of Virtue, that it flows from true Opinions.* IN our *present Constitution*, it is probable no Person would ever do any thing *publickly hurtful*, but upon some *false Opinion*. The *flowing from true Opinions* is indeed a tolerable Character or Property of *Virtue*, and *flowing from some false Opinion* a tolerable Character of *Vice*; tho' neither be strictly universal. But, 1. This is not *proper Signification*. A judicious Observer never imagines any *Intention to communicate Opinions* in some of the most important Actions, either *good* or *evil*. 2. Did an Action signify *Falshood*, it is generally only *logical*. 3. The *false Opinion* in the Agent is not the *Quality* for which the *evil Action* is *condemned*; nor is the *true Opinion* that for which the *good Action* is *approved*. True Opinions in Agents

gents often aggravate Crimes, as they shew S E C T. higher Degrees of *evil Affection*, or total III. *Absence of good*. And *false Opinions* generally extenuate Crimes, unless when the very Ignorance or Error has flowed from *evil Affection*, or total *Absence of good*.

IT is surprizing, for instance, how any should place the *Evil of Ingratitude* in denying the Person injured, to have been a *Benefactor*. The Observer of such an Action, if he supposed the Agent had really that *false Opinion*, would think the Crime the less for it: But if he were convinced that the Agent had a *true Opinion*, he would think his *Ingratitude* the more *odious*. Where we most abhor Actions, we suppose often *true Opinions*: And sometimes admire Actions flowing even from *false Opinions*, when they have evidenced no want of good Affection.

To write a Censure upon a Book so well designed as Mr. Woolaston's, and so full of very good Reasoning upon the most useful Subjects, would not evidence much *good Nature*. But allowing him his *just Praise*, to remark any *Ambiguities* or *Inadvertencies* which may lead Men into Confusion in their Reasoning, I am confident would have been acceptable to a Man of so much Goodness, when he was living.

SECT. ONE may see that he has had some other  
 III. Idea of *moral Good*, previous to this *Signifi-*  
~~cancy~~ *of Truth*, by his introducing, in the  
 very Explication of it, Words pre-supposing  
 the *Ideas of Morality* previously known :  
 Such as [Right,] [Obligation,] [Lye,] [his]  
 denoting [Property.]

Signifying of Truth equal in unequal Virtue.

MR. Woolaston acknowledges that there may be very little *evil* in some Actions signifying Falshood ; such as *throwing away that which is of but little Use or Value*. It is objected to him, that there is equal *Contrariety to Truth* in such Actions, as in the greatest *Villany* : He, in answer to it, really unawares gives up his whole Cause. He must own, that there may be the *strictest Truth* and *Certainty* about Trifles ; so there may be the most *obvious Falshood* signified by *trifling Actions*. If then *Significancy of Falshood* be the very same with *moral Evil*, all Crimes must be equal. He answers, that *Crimes increase according to the Importance of the Truth denied* ; and so the *Virtue increases*, as the *Importance of the Truths affirmed*. Then

*Virtue and Vice increase, as the Importance of Propositions affirmed or denied ;*

But

But *Signification of Truth and Falshood does Sect.*  
not so increase: III.

Therefore *Signification of Truth or Falshood,* ~~Truth~~  
are not the same with *Virtue and Vice.*

BUT what is this *Importance of Truth?* Nothing else but the *Moment or Quantity of* good or evil, either *private or publick,* which should be produced by Actions, concerning which these *true Judgments* are made. But it is plain, the *Signification of Truth or Falshood* is not varied by this *Importance;* therefore *Virtue or Vice* denote something different from this *Signification.*

BUT farther, The *Importance of Actions* toward publick Good or Evil, is not the *Idea of Virtue or Vice:* Nor does the one prove *Virtue* in an Action, any farther than it evidences *kind Affections;* or the other *Vice,* farther than it evidences either *Malice* or *Want of kind Affections:* Otherwise a *casual Invention,* an Action wholly from *views of private Interest,* might be as *virtuous* as the most *kind and generous Offices:* And *Chance-Medley,* or *kindly-intended,* but *unsuccessful Attempts* would be as *vicious* as *Murder or Treason.*

ONE of Mr. Woolaston's Illustrations that *Significancy of Falshood* is the Idea of moral Evil, Some Ambiguities in Mr. Woolaston.

SECT. Evil, ends in this, “ ‘Tis acting a Lye.”  
 III. What then? Should he not first have shewn  
 what was moral Evil, and that every Lye  
 was such?

ANOTHER Illustration or Proof is, that  
 “ it is acting contrary to that Reason which  
 “ GOD has given us as the Guide of our Ac-  
 “ tions.” Does not this place the original  
 Idea of moral Evil in counteracting the DEI-  
 TY, and not in signifying Falshood? But,  
 he may say, “ Counteracting the DEITY  
 “ denies him to be our Benefactor, and sig-  
 “ nifies Falshood.” Then why is signifying  
 Falshood evil? Why, it is counteracting the  
 DEITY, who gave us Reason for our Guide.  
 Why is this evil again? It denies the Truth,  
 that “ he is our Benefactor.”

ANOTHER Illustration is this, “ That sig-  
 “ nifying Falshood is altering the Natures of  
 “ Things, and making them be what they are  
 “ not, or desiring at least to make them be  
 “ what they are not.” If by altering the  
 Natures be meant destroying Beings, then  
 moral Evil consists in desiring the Destruction  
 of other Natures, or in Evil Affections. If  
 what is meant be altering the Laws of Na-  
 ture, or desiring that they were stopped;  
 this is seldom desired by any but Madmen,  
 nor is this Desire evidenced by some of the  
 worst

worst Actions, nor is such *Desire* always criminal; otherwise it were as great a Crime as any, to wish, when a *Dam* was broken down, that the Water would not overflow the Country.

If making *Things* be what they are not, means "attempting or desiring that any Subject should have two opposite Qualities at once, or a Quality and its Privation;" it is certain then, that according to the Stoicks, all vicious Men are thoroughly mad. But it is to be doubted, that such Madness never happened to even the worst of Mankind. When a Man murders, he does not desire his Fellow-Creature to be both dead and living. When he *robs*, he does not desire that both he and the Proprietor should at the same time possess. If any says, that he desires to have a Right to that, to which another has a Right; it is probably false, Robbers neither think of Rights at all, nor are sollicitous about acquiring them: Or, if they retain some wild Notions of Rights, they think their Indigence, Conquest or Courage gives them a Right, and makes the other's Right to cease. If attempting to make old Qualities or Rights give place to new, be the Idea of moral Evil, then every Artificer, Purchaser, or Magistrate invested with an Office is criminal.

SECT. MANY of Mr. Woolaston's Propositions  
 III. contradicted by Actions, are about *Rights*,  
~~as~~ *Duties, Obligation, Justice, Reasonableness*. These are long Words, principal Names, or Attributes in Sentences. The little Word [his,] or the Particles [as, according] are much better: they may escape Observation, and yet may include all the Ambiguities of *Right, Property, Agreement, Reasonableness*: “Treating Things as they are, and not as they are not:” Or, “According to what they are, or are not,” are Expressions he probably had learned from another truly great Name, who has not explained them sufficiently.

*In Quasi Contracts, or Tacit, no Signification of Truth.*

IT may perhaps not seem improper on this occasion to observe, that in the *Quasi Contractus*, the *Civilians* do not imagine any Act of the Mind of the Person obliged to be really signified, but by a sort of *Fictio juris* supposing it, order him to act as if he had contracted, even when they know that he had contrary Intentions. .

IN the *Tacit Conventions*, it is not a *Judgment* which is signified, but an *Act of the Will transferring Right*, in which there is no Relation to *Truth* or *Falshood* of itself. The *Non-performance of Covenants* is made *penal*,

*penal*, not because of their *signifying Fal-Sect. shoods*, as if this were the Crime in them: III. But it is necessary, in order to preserve *Commerce* in any Society, to *make effectual all Declarations of Consent to transfer Rights by any usual Signs*, otherwise there could be no *Certainty* in Men's Transactions.

## S E C T. IV.

*Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense.*

SECT. IV. **H**A D those who insist so much upon the antecedent Reasonableness of *Virtue*, told us distinctly what is *reasonable* or *provable* concerning it, many of our Debates had been prevented. Let us consider what *Truths* concerning Actions Men could desire to know, or prove by *Reason*. I fancy they may be reduced to these Heads. 1. "To know whether there are not some Actions or Affections which obtain the Approval of any Spectator or Observer, and others move his Dislike and Condemnation?" This Question, as every Man can answer for himself, so universal Experience and History shew, that in all Nations it is so; and consequently the moral Sense is universal. 2. "Whether there be any particular Quality, which, wherever it is apprehended, gains Approbation, and the contrary raises Disapprobation?" We shall find this Quality to be kind Affection, or

*about Morals, four sorts.*

or Study of the Good of others; and thus S E C T. the moral Senses of Men are generally uniform. About these two Questions there is little reasoning; we know how to answer them from reflecting on our own Sentiments, or by consulting others. 3. "What Actions do really evidence kind Affections, or do really tend to the greatest publick Good?" About this Question is all the special Reasoning of those who treat of the particular Laws of Nature, or even of Civil Laws: This is the largest Field, and the most useful Subject of Reasoning, which remains upon every Scheme of Morals, and here we may discover as certain, invariable, or eternal Truths, as any in Geometry. 4. "What are the Motives which, even from Self-Love, would excite each Individual to do those Actions which are publickly useful?" It is probable indeed, no Man would approve as virtuous an Action publickly useful, to which the Agent was excited only by Self-Love, without any kind Affection: It is also probable that no view of Interest can raise that kind Affection, which we approve as virtuous; nor can any Reasoning do it, except that which shews some moral Goodness, or kind Affections in the Object; for this never fails, where it is observed or supposed in any Person to raise the Love of the Observer.

SECT. YET since all Men have naturally *Self-Love* as well as *kind Affections*, the former may often counteract the latter, or the latter the former; in each case the Agent is uneasy, and in some degree unhappy. The first *rash Views* of human Affairs often represent *private Interest* as opposite to the *Publick*: When this is apprehended, *Self-Love* may often engage Men in *publickly hurtful Actions*, which their *moral Sense* will condemn; and this is the ordinary Cause of Vice. To represent these Motives of *Self-Interest*, to engage Men to *publickly useful Actions*, is certainly the most necessary Point in Morals. This has been so well done by the *antient Moralists*, by Dr. *Cumberland*, *Puffendorf*, *Grotius*, *Shaftesbury*; it is made so certain from the *divine Government of the World*, the *State of Mankind*, who cannot subsist without Society, from universal *Experience* and *Consent*, from inward *Consciousness* of the Pleasure of *kind Affections*, and *Self-Approval*, and of the *Torments of Malice*, or *Hatred*; or *Envy*, or *Anger*; that no Man who considers these things, can ever imagine he can have any possible *Interest* in opposing the *publick Good*; or in checking or restraining his *kind Affections*; nay, if he had no *kind Affections*, his very *Self-Love* and *Regard* to his *private Good* might excite him to *publickly*

lickly useful Actions, and dissuade from the S E C T.  
contrary.

IV.



WHAT farther should be provable concerning Virtue, whence it should be called *reasonable antecedently to all Affection, or Interest, or Sense,* or what it should be fit for, one cannot easily imagine.


PERHAPS what has brought the Epithet *Reasonable*, or *flowing from Reason*, in opposition to what flows from *Instinct*, *Affection*, or *Passion*, so much into use, is this, " That it is often observed, that the very best of our particular *Affections* or *Desires*, when they are grown violent and *passionate*, through the confused *Sensations* and *Propensities* which attend them, make us incapable of considering calmly the whole *Tendency* of our Actions, and lead us often into what is *absolutely pernicious*, under some Appearance of *relative* or *particular Good*." This indeed may give some ground for distinguishing between *passionate Actions*, and those from *calm Desire* or *Affection* which employs our *Reason* freely: But can never set *rational Actions* in Opposition to those from *Instinct*, *Desire* or *Affection*. And it must be owned, that the most perfect Virtue consists in the *calm, unpassionate Benevolence*, rather than in particular *Affections*.

I F

**S E C T.** If one asks " how do we know that our **IV.** " *Affections are right when they are kind?*"   
 ~~~~~ What does the Word [right] mean? Does   
^{How we judge of our Moral Sense.} it mean *what we approve?* This we know by *Consciousness of our Sense.* Again, how do we know that our *Sense* is right, or that we *approve our Approbation?* This can only be answered by another Question, viz. " How do we know we are pleased when " we are pleased?" — Or does it mean, " how do we know that we shall *always* ap- " prove what we *now* approve?" To answer this, we must first know that the *same Constitution* of our *Sense* shall always remain: And again, that we have applied ourselves carefully to consider the *natural Tendency* of our Actions. Of the *Continuance* of the same Constitution of our *Sense*, we are as sure as of the *Continuance* of *Gravitation*, or any other *Law of Nature*: The *Tendency* of our own Actions we cannot always know; but we may know certainly that we *heartily* and *sincerely* study to act according to what, by all the Evidence now in our Power to obtain, appears as most *probably tending to publick Good*. When we are conscious of this *sincere Endeavour*, the *evil Consequences* which we could not have foreseen, never will make us *condemn* our *Conduct*. But without this *sincere Endeavour*, we

we may often approve at present what we S E C T.
shall afterwards condemn.


IV.



If the Question means, “ How are we *sure* that what *we* approve, *all others* shall *also* approve ? ” Of this we can be sure upon *no Scheme*; but it is highly probable *by Reason*, that the *Senses* of all Men are pretty *uniform*: That the *Deity* also approves *kind Affections*, otherwise he would not have implanted them in us, nor determined us by a *moral Sense* to approve them. Now since the *Probability* that *Men shall judge truly*, abstracting from any presupposed *Prejudice*, is greater than that *they shall judge falsely*; it is more probable, when our *Actions* are really *kind* and *publickly useful*, that *all Observers* shall judge *truly* of our *Intentions*, and of the *Tendency* of our *Actions*, and consequently approve what *we* approve ourselves, than that they shall judge *falsely* and condemn them.

If the Meaning of the Question be, “ Will the doing what our *moral Sense* approves tend to *our Happiness*, and to the avoiding *Misery* ? ” It is thus we call a *Taste wrong*, when it makes that *Food* at present *grateful*, which shall occasion *future Pains*, or *Death*. This Question concerning our *Self-Interest* must be answered by such *Reasoning* as was mentioned above,
to

SECT. to be well managed by our *Moralists* both
IV. antient and modern.



THUS there seems no part of that *Reasoning* which was ever used by *Moralists*, to be superseded by supposing a *moral Sense*. And yet without a *moral Sense* there is no *Explication* can be given of our *Ideas of Morality*; nor of that *Reasonableness* supposed *antecedent* to all *Instincts, Affections, or Sense*.

“ But may there not be a *right* or *wrong*
“ *State* of our *moral Sense*, as there is in
“ our other *Senses*, according as they repre-
“ sent their *Objects* to be as they *really are*,
“ or represent them otherwise?” So may
not our *moral Sense* approve that which is
vicious, and *disapprove* *Virtue*, as a *sickly Palate* may dislike *grateful Food*, or a *vitiated Sight* misrepresent *Colours* or *Dimensions*? Must we not know therefore *antece- dently* what is *morally Good* or *Evil* by our *Reason*, before we can know that our *moral Sense* is *right*?

To answer this, we must remember that of the *sensible Ideas*, some are allowed to be only *Perceptions* in our *Minds*, and not *Imag- es* of any like *external Quality*, as *Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure, Pain*. Other Ideas are *Images* of something *external*,
as

as *Duration, Number, Extension, Motion, S E C T.*
Rest: These latter, for distinction, we may call *concomitant Ideas of Sensation*, and the former *purely sensible*. As to the *purely sensible Ideas*, we know they are altered by any Disorder in our *Organs*, and made *different* from what arise in us from the same Objects at other times. We do not denominate Objects from our *Perceptions during the Disorder*, but according to our *ordinary Perceptions*, or those of others in *good Health*: Yet no body imagines that therefore *Colours, Sounds, Tastes*, are not *sensible Ideas*. In like manner many *Circumstances* diversify the *concomitant Ideas*: But we denominate Objects from the Appearances they make to us in an *uniform Medium, when our Organs are in no disorder, and the Object not very distant from them*. But none therefore imagines that it is *Reason* and not *Sense* which discovers these *concomitant Ideas, or primary Qualities*.

JUST so in our *Ideas of Actions*. These three Things are to be distinguished, 1. The Idea of the *external Motion*, known first by *Sense*, and its *Tendency to the Happiness or Misery* of some *sensitive Nature*, often inferred by *Argument or Reason*, which on these Subjects, suggests as invariable eternal or necessary Truths as any whatsoever. 2. *Apprehension or Opinion of the Affections in the*

S E C T. the Agent, inferred by our *Reason*: So far
IV. the Idea of an *Action* represents something
~~as~~ external to the Observer, really existing
whether he had perceived it or not, and ha-
ving a real Tendency to certain Ends. 3.
The Perception of *Approbation* or *Disapproba-
tion* arising in the Observer, according as
the *Affections* of the Agent are apprehended
kind in their *just Degree*, or *deficient*, or *ma-
licious*. This *Approbation* cannot be suppo-
sed an *Image* of any *tbing* external, more
than the *Pleasures* of *Harmony*, of *Taste*, of
Smell. But let none imagine, that calling
the *Ideas* of *Virtue* and *Vice* Perceptions of
a *Sense*, upon apprehending the *Actions* and
Affections of another does diminish their *Re-
ality*, more than the like *Assertions* concerning
all *Pleasure* and *Pain*, *Happiness* or *Mis-
sery*. Our *Reason* often corrects the *Report*
of our *Senses*, about the *natural Tendency* of
the external Action, and corrects *rash Con-
clusions* about the *Affections* of the Agent.
But whether our *moral Sense* be subject to
such a Disorder, as to have *different Percep-
tions*, from the same apprehended *Affections*
in an Agent, at *different times*, as the *Eye*
may have of the Colours of an unaltered
Object, it is not easy to determine: Perhaps
it will be hard to find any Instances of such
a *Change*. What *Reason* could correct, if
it fell into such a *Disorder*, I know not;
except suggesting to its *Remembrance* its *for-
mer*

mer Approbations, and representing the general Sense of Mankind. But this does not prove Ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice* to be previous to a Sense, more than a like Correction of the Ideas of *Colour* in a Person under the Jaundice, proves that *Colours* are perceived by Reason, previously to Sense.

If any say, “this moral Sense is not a ‘Rule’:” What means that Word? It is not a *strait rigid Body*: It is not a *general Proposition, shewing what Means are fit to obtain an end*: It is not a *Proposition, asserting, that a Superior will make those happy who act one way, and miserable who act the contrary way*. If these be the Meanings of Rule, it is no Rule; yet by reflecting upon it our Understanding may find out a Rule. But what Rule of Actions can be formed, without Relation to some End proposed? Or what End can be proposed, without presupposing *Instincts, Desires, Affections, or a moral Sense*, it will not be easy to explain.

S E C T. V.

Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit ; and be rewardable upon the Supposition, that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection or Instinct.

SECT. V. **S**OME will not allow any *Merit* in Actions flowing from *kind Instincts*:
 ~~~ " Merit, say they, attends Actions to which  
 " we are excited by *Reason* alone, or to  
 " which we *freely* determine ourselves.  
 " The Operation of *Instincts* or *Affections*  
 " is *necessary*, and not *voluntary*; nor is  
 " there more *Merit* in them than in the  
 " *Shining of the Sun*, the *Fruitfulness of a Tree*, or the *Overflowing of a Stream*,  
 " which are all *publickly useful*."

*Merit, what.* BUT what does *Merit* mean? or *Praiseworthiness*? Do these Words denote the " Quality in Actions, which gains *Approval* from the Observer, according to " the present Constitution of the human " Mind?" Or, 2dly, Are these Actions called

led meritorious, " which, when any Ob- SECT.  
 " sever does *approve*, all other *Observers* V.  
 " approve him for his *Approbation* of ~~the~~  
 " it; and would condemn any *Observer*  
 " who did not *approve* these Actions ?"  
 These are the only Meanings of *meritorious*,  
 which I can conceive as distinct from *re-  
 wardable*, which is considered hereafter se-  
 parately. Let those who are not satisfied  
 with either of these Explications of *Merit*,  
 endeavour to give a Definition of it redu-  
 cing it to its simple Ideas: and not, as a  
 late Author has done, quarrelling these De-  
 scriptions, tell us only that it is *Deserving*  
 or *being worthy of Approbation*, which is  
 defining by giving a synonymous Term.

Now we endeavoured already to shew,  
 that " no *Reason* can excite to Action pre-  
 viously to some *End*, and that no *End* can  
 " be proposed without some *Instinct* or Af-  
 " fection." What then can be meant by  
 being *excited* by *Reason*, as distinct from all  
 Motion of *Instincts* or *Affections*? Some per-  
 haps take the Word [Instinct] solely for  
 such Motions of *Will*, or bodily Powers, as  
 determine us without Knowledge or Inten-  
 tion of any End. Such Instincts cannot be  
 the Spring of Virtue. But the Soul may be  
 as naturally determined to *Approbation* of  
 certain Tempers and Affections, and to the  
 Desire of certain Events when it has an Idea

SECT. of them, as Brutes are, by their lower Instincts, to their Actions. If any quarrel the Application of the Word *Instinct* to anything higher than what we find in Brutes, let them use another Word. Though there is no Harm in the Sound of this Word, more than in a *Determination to pursue Fitness*, which they must allow in the Divine Will, if they ascribe any Will to him at all.

THEN determining ourselves freely, does it mean *acting without any Motive or exciting Reason*? If it did not mean this, it cannot be opposed to *acting from Instinct or Affections*, since all *Motives or Reasons* presuppose them. If it means this, that "Merit is found only in Actions done without Motive or Affection, by mere Election, without prepollent Desire of one Action or End rather than its opposite, or without Desire of that Pleasure which \* some suppose follows upon any Election, by a natural Connexion :" Then let any Man

\* This is the Notion of *Liberty* given by the Archbishop of Dublin, in his most ingenious Book, *De Origine Mali*. This Opinion does not represent Freedom of Election, as opposite to all *Instinct* or *Desire*; but rather as arising from the *Desire of that Pleasure supposed to be connected with every Election*. Upon his Scheme there is a *Motive* and *End* proposed in every Election, and a natural *Instinct* toward Happiness presupposed: Though it is such a *Motive* and *End* as leaves us in perfect *Liberty*. Since it is a *Pleasure* or *Happiness*, not connected with one thing more than another, but following upon the *Determination* itself.


consider whether he ever acts in this manner S E C T .  
by mere *Election*, without any previous *De-* V.  
*fire*? And again, let him consult his own ~~own~~ Breast, whether such kind of Action gains  
his *Apprehension*? Upon seeing a Person not  
more disposed by *Affection*, *Compassion*, or  
*Love or Desire*, to make his Country happy  
than miserable, yet chusing the one rather  
than the other, from no *Desire of publick*  
*Happiness*, nor *Aversion to the Torments of*  
*others*, but by such an *unaffectionate Determination*, as that by which one moves his  
*first Finger* rather than the *second*, in giving  
an Instance of a *trifling Action*; let any one  
ask if this Action should be *meritorious*:  
and yet that there should be no *Merit* in a  
*tender compassionate Heart*, which shrinks at  
every *Pain* of its *Fellow-Creatures*, and triumphs in their *Happiness*; with *kind Affections* and *strong Desire* labouring for the  
publick Good. If this be the Nature of *meritorious Actions*; every honest Heart would  
disclaim all *Merit in Morals*, as violently as  
the old *Protestants* rejected it in *Justification*.

BUT let us see which of the two Senses of  
*Merit* or *Praise-worthiness* is founded on this  
(I will not call it *unreasonable* or *casual*, but)  
*unaffectionate Choice*. If *Merit* denotes the  
*Quality moving the Spectator to approve*,  
then there may be *unaffectionate Election* of  
the greatest Villany, as well as of the most

SECT. useful Actions; but who will say that they  
V. are equally approved?—But perhaps it is  
~~not~~ not the mere Freedom of Choice which is ap-  
proved, but the free Choice of publick Good,  
without any Affection. Then Actions are  
approved for publick Usefulness, and not for  
Freedom. Upon this Supposition, the Heat  
of the Sun, the Fruitfulness of a Tree, would  
be meritorious: or if one says, “these are  
“ not Actions;” they are at least meritorious  
Qualities, Motions, Attractions, &c. And a  
casual Invention may be meritorious.—  
Perhaps Free Election is a *Conditio sine qua non*, and publick Usefulness the immediate  
Cause of Approbation; neither separately,  
but both jointly are meritorious: Free Elec-  
tion alone is not Merit; Publick Usefulness  
alone is not Merit; but both concurring.  
Then should any Person by mere Election,  
without any Desire to serve the publick, set  
about Mines, or any useful Manufacture; or  
should a Person by mere Election stab a Man  
without knowing him to be a publick Rob-  
ber; here both free Election and publick Use-  
fulness may concur: Yet will any one say  
there is Merit or Virtue in such Actions?  
Where then shall we find Merit, unless in  
kind Affections, or Desire and Intention of  
the publick Good? This moves our Appre-  
bation wherever we observe it: and the want  
of this is the true Reason why a Searcher  
for Mines, a free Killer of an unknown  
Robber,

Robber, the *warming Sun*, or the *fruitful S E C T . Tree*, are not counted *meritorious*.

V.



BUT it may be said, that to make an Action *meritorious*, it is necessary not only that the Action be *publickly useful*, but that it be *known* or *imagined* to be *such*, before the Agent freely chuses it. But what does this add to the former Scheme? Only a *Judgment* or *Opinion* in the *Understanding*, concerning the *natural Tendency* of an Action to the publick Good: Few, it may be presumed, will place *Virtue* in *Affent* or *Difsent*, or *Perceptions*. And yet this is all that is superadded to the former Case. The Agent must not *desire the publick Good*, or have any kind *Affections*. This would spoil the *Freedom of Choice*, according to their Scheme, who insist on a *Freedom opposite to Affections or Instincts*: But he must *barely know* the Tendency to publick Good, and without any *Propensity to, or Desire of the Happiness of others*, by an *arbitrary Election*, acquire his Merit. Let every Man judge for himself, whether these are the Qualities which he *approves*.

WHAT has probably engaged many into this way of speaking, " that Virtue is " the Effect of *rational Choice*, and not " of *Instincts or Affections*," is this; they

S E C T. find, that "some Actions flowing from V. "particular kind Affections, are sometimes condemned as *evil*," because of their *bad Influence* upon the State of larger Societies; and that the *Hurry* and *confused Sensation* of any of our Passions, may divert the Mind from considering the *whole Effect* of its Actions: They require therefore to *Virtue* a *calm and undisturbed Temper*.

THERE is indeed some ground to recommend this Temper as very necessary in many Cases; and yet some of the most *passionate Actions* may be perfectly good. But in the *calmest Temper* there must remain *Affection* or *Desire*, some implanted *Instinct* for which we can give no *reason*; otherwise there could be no Action of any kind. As it was shewn above in the first Section.

IF *meritorious Actions* are these which whosoever does not *approve*, is himself condemned by others: the Quality by which they are constituted *meritorious* in this Sense, is the same which moves our *Appreciation*. We condemn any Person who does not *approve* that which we ourselves *approve*: We presume the *Sense* of others to be constituted like our own; and that any other Person, would he attend to the Actions

Actions which we *approve*, would also ~~S E C T.~~  
*approve* them, and love the Agent; when V.  
we find that another does not *approve* what ~~we~~  
we approve, we are apt to conclude, that  
he has not had *kind Affections* toward the  
Agent, or that some *evil Affection* makes  
him overlook his Virtues, and on this ac-  
count condemn him.

PERHAPS by meritorious is meant the same thing with another Word used in like manner, *viz.* *rewardable*. Then indeed the *Quality* in which Merit or Rewardableness is founded, is different from that which is denoted by Merit in the former Meanings.

R E W A R D A B L E, or *deserving Reward*, What Actions re-  
denotes either that *Quality* which would incline a superior *Nature* to make an Agent wardable.  
happy: Or, 2dly, That *Quality* of Actions which would make a Spectator approve a superior *Nature*, when he conferred Happiness on the Agent, and disapprove that Superior, who inflicted Misery on the Agent, or punished him. Let any one try to give a meaning to the Word *rewardable* distinct from these, and not satisfy himself with the Words *worthy of*, or *deserving*, which are of very complex and ambiguous Signification.

Now

SECT. Now the Qualities of an Action determining a powerful Nature to reward it, must be various according to the Constitution and Affections of that Superior. If he has a moral Sense, or something analogous of a more excellent sort, by which he is determined to love those who evidence kind Affections, and to desire their Happiness, then kind Affection is a Quality moving to Reward.

BUT farther, if this Superior be benevolent, and observes that inferior Natures can by their mutual Actions promote their mutual Happiness; then he must incline to excite them to publickly useful Actions, by Prospects of private Interest, if it be needful: Therefore he will engage them to such Actions by Prospects of Rewards, whatever be the internal Principle of their Actions, or whatever their Affections be. These two Qualities in Actions, viz. flowing from kind Affections, and publick Usefulness concurring, undoubtedly incline the benevolent Superior to confer Happiness: The former alone, where, through want of Power, the Agent is disappointed of his kind Intentions, will incline a benevolent Superior to reward; and the want of Power in the Agent will never incline him to punish. But the want of kind Affections, although there

there be *publickly useful Actions*, may be so ~~SECT.~~  
offensive to the *moral Sense* of the *superior V.*  
*Nature*, as to prevent *Reward*, or excite to ~~~~~  
*punish*; unless this Conduct would occasion  
*greater publick Evil*, by withdrawing from  
many Agents a *necessary Motive* to *publick*  
*Usefulness*, *viz.* the *Hope of Reward*.

BUT if the Superior were *malicious* with  
a *moral Sense contrary to ours*, the contrary  
*Affections* and *Tendency of Actions* would  
excite to reward, if any such thing could be  
expected from such a *Temper*.

IF Actions be called *rewardable*, when  
“ a *Spectator* would approve the *superior*  
“ *Mind* for conferring Rewards on such  
“ Actions:” Then various Actions must be  
rewardable, according to the *moral Sense* of  
the Spectator. Men approve rewarding all  
*kind Affections*: And if it will promote pub-  
lick Good to promise Rewards to *publickly*  
*useful Actions* from whatsoever *Affections*  
they proceed, it will evidence Benevolence  
in the Superior to do so. And this is the  
Case with *human Governors*, who cannot  
dive into the *Affections* of Men.

*Whether  
Motives or  
Inclina-*

SOME strongly assert (which is often the  
only Proof) that “ to make an Action re-  
wardable, the Agent should have had In-  
clinations to evil as well as to good.” *Agent re-  
wardable?*  
*What*

S E C T. What means this? That a good governing MIND is only inclined to make an Agent happy, or to confer a *Reward* on him when he has some *evil Affections*, which yet are surmounted by the *benevolent Affections*? But would not a *benevolent Superior* incline to make any *benevolent Agent* happy, whether he had any weaker evil Inclinations or not? Evil Inclinations in an Agent would certainly rather have some Tendency to *diminish* the Love of the superior Mind. Cannot a good Mind *love* an Agent, and *desire* his Happiness, unless he observes some Qualities, which, were they alone, would excite *Hatred* or *Aversion*? Must there be a Mixture of *Hatred* to make *Love* strong and effectual, as there must be a Mixture of Shade to set off the Lights in a Picture? Is there any *Love*, where there is no *Inclination to make happy*? Or is strong *Love* made up of *Love* and *Hatred*?

IT is true indeed, that *Men* judge of the Strength of kind Affections generally by the contrary Motives of *Self-Love*, which they surmount: But must the DEITY do so too? Is any Nature the less lovely, for its having no Motive to make itself *odious*? If a Being which has no Motive to evil can be *beloved* by a Superior, shall he not *desire the Happiness* of that Agent whom he loves? It is true, such a Nature will do good Actions without

without Prospect of any *Self-Interest*; but Sect. V. would any benevolent Superior study the less to make it happy on that account?—~~~~~ But if they apply the Word *rewardable* to those Actions alone, which an Agent would not do without Prospect of Reward: then indeed to make an Action in this Sense *rewardable*, it is necessary that the Agent should either have no kind *Affections*, or that he should live in such Circumstances, wherein Self-Love should lead to Actions contrary to the publick Good, and overpower any kind Affections; or that he should have evil *Affections*, which even in a good Constitution of the World, his *Self-Love* could not over-ballance without Reward.

THIS poor Idea of *Rewardableness* is taken from the *Poverty* and *Impotence* of *human Governors*: Their Funds are soon exhausted; they cannot make happy all those whose Happiness they desire: Their little *Stores* must be frugally managed; none must be rewarded for what good they will do without Reward, or for abstaining from Evils to which they are not inclined. Rewards must be kept for the *insolent Minister*, who without reward would fly in the Face of his Prince; for the *turbulent Demagogue*, who will raise Factions if he is not bribed; for the *covetous, mean-spirited, but artful Citizen*, who will serve his Country no farther

S E C T. ther than it is for his private Interest. But

V. let any kind honest Heart declare what *sort* of Characters it loves? Whose Happiness it most desires? Whom it would reward if it could? Or what these *Dispositions* are, which if it saw rewarded by a superior Nature, it would be most pleased, and most *approve* the Conduct of the Superior? When these Questions are answered, we shall know what makes Actions *rewardable*.

If we call all Actions *rewardable*, the rewarding of which we *approve*; then indeed we shall approve the rewarding of all *Actions which we approve*, whether the Agent has had any *Inclinations or Motives to Evil* or not: We shall also approve the *promising of Rewards* to all *publickly useful Actions*, whatever were the Affections of the Agents. If by this *Prospect of Reward* either *malignicous Natures* are restrained from *Mischief*, or *selfish Natures* induced to serve the *Publick*, or *benevolent Natures* not able without reward to surmount real or apparent *selfish Motives*: In all these Cases, the *proposing Rewards* does really advance the *Happiness* of the *Whole*, or diminish its *Misery*; and evidences *Benevolence* in the superior Mind, and is consequently *approved* by our *moral Sense*.

IN this last Meaning of the Word *re-S E C T. wardable*, these Dispositions are rewardable. V.

1. *Pure unmixed Benevolence.* 2. *Prepollent*  *good Affections.* 3. *Such weak Benevolence, as will not without Reward overcome apparently contrary Motives of Self-Love.* 4. *Unmixed Self-Love, which by Prospect of Reward may serve the publick.* 5. *Self-Love, which by Assistance of Rewards, may overballance some malicious Affections.* If in these Cases proposing Rewards will increase the Happiness of the System, or diminish its Misery, it evidences *Goodness* in the Governor, when he cannot so well otherwise accomplish so much good for the whole.

IF we suppose a Necessity of making all virtuous Agents *equally happy*, then indeed a *Mixture of evil Dispositions*, tho' surmounted by the good, or of *strong contrary Motives* overbalanced by *Motives to Good*, would be a Circumstance of some Importance in the Distribution of Rewards: Since such a Nature, during the *Struggle of contrary Affections* or Motives, must have had less *Pleasure* than that virtuous Nature which met with no Opposition: But as this very Opposition gave this Nature *full Evidence* of the Strength of its Virtue, this *Consciousness* may be a peculiar *Recompence* to which the unmixed Tempers are Strangers:

S E C T. gers: And there seems no such necessity of  
V. an equal Happiness of all Natures. It is no  
~~way~~ way inconsistent with perfect Goodness, to  
make different Orders of Beings; and, pro-  
vided all the Virtuous be at last fully con-  
tent, and as happy as they desire, there is  
nothing absurd in supposing different Capac-  
ties and different Degrees; and during the  
Time of Probation, there is no necessity,  
not the least shew of it, that all be equal.

THOSE who think “no Person punishable  
“ for any Quality or Action, if he had it not  
“ in his Power to have had the opposite Qua-  
“ lity, or to have abstained from the Action  
if he had willed it;” perhaps are not mis-  
taken: but then let them not assert on the  
other Hand, that it is unjust to reward or  
make happy those, who neither had any  
Dispositions to Evil, nor could possibly de-  
sire any such Dispositions. Now if Men’s  
Affections are naturally good, and if there  
be in their Fellows no Quality which would  
necessarily raise Malice in the Observer; but,  
on the contrary, all Qualities requisite to  
excite at least Benevolence or Compassion: It  
may be justly said to be in the Power of  
every one, by due Attention, to prevent any  
malicious Affections, and to excite in himself  
kind Affections toward all. So that the in-  
tricate Debates about human Liberty do not  
affect what is here alledged, concerning our  
moral

*moral Sense* of Affections and Actions, any S E C T.  
more than any other Schemes.

V.



SOME alledge, that MERIT supposes, beside *kind Affection*, that the Agent has a *moral Sense*, reflects upon his own Virtue, delights in it, and chuses to adhere to it for the *Pleasure* which attends it.\* We need not debate the Use of this Word *Merit*: it is plain, we *approve* a generous kind Action, tho' the Agent had not made this *Reflection*. This Reflection shews to him a Motive of Self-Love, the joint View to which does not increase our *Approbation*: But then it must again be owned, that we cannot form a just Conclusion of a *Character* from one or two kind, generous Actions, especially where there has been no very strong *Motives to the contrary*. Some apparent Motives of *Interest* may afterwards overballance the *kind Affections*, and lead the Agent into vicious Actions. But the *Reflection* on Virtue, the being once charmed with the lovely Form, will discover an *Interest* on its side, which, if well attended to, no other Motive will overballance. This Reflection is a great Security to the *Character*; and must be supposed in such Creatures as *Men* are, before we can well depend upon a *Constancy in Virtue*. The same may be said of many other Mo-

\* See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue. Part 1.

S E C T. tives to Virtue from *Interest*; which, tho'  
V. they do not immediately influence the *kind*  
~~V V~~ *Affections* of the Agent, yet remove these  
*Obstacles* to them, from *false Appearances*  
*of Interest*. Such are these from the San-  
ctions of *divine Laws* by future Rewards and  
Punishments, and even the manifest *Advan-*  
*tages of Virtue in this Life*: without *Reflec-*  
*tion* on which, a steady *Course of Virtue* is  
scarce to be expected amidst the present  
Confusion of human Affairs.

## S E C T. VI.

*How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action virtuous.*

I. **S**OME imagine, that "to make an **SECT.**  
" Action virtuous, it is necessary that **VI.**  
" the Agent should have previously known **~~~**  
" his Action to be *acceptable to the DEITY*,  
" and have undertaken it chiefly with de-  
" sign to please or obey him. We have  
" not, say they, reason to imagine a *mali-*  
" *cious Intention* in many of the worst Ac-  
" tions: the very *want of good Affections in*  
" *their just Degree*, must constitute *moral*  
" *Evil*. If so, then the *moral Evil* in the  
" *want of Love or Gratitude*, must increase  
" in proportion to the *Causes of Love or*  
" *Gratitude* in the Object: by the Causes of  
" Love, they mean *those Qualities in the*  
" *Object* upon Observation of which Love  
" or Gratitude arise in every good Temper.  
" Now the *Causes of Love* toward the **DE-**  
" **ITY** are infinite; therefore the want of  
" the highest possible Degree of Love to  
" him, must be infinitely evil.—To be  
" excited more by *smaller Motives or Causes*  
X 2                  " than

SECT. " than by greater ; to love those who are  
 VI. " less *lovely*, while we neglect him in whom  
 ~~~~ " are *infinite Causes of Love*, must argue  
 " great *Perverseness* of Affections. But the
 " *Causes of Love* in the DEITY, his infinite
 " *Goodness* toward all, and even toward
 " ourselves, from whence springs all the
 " Happiness of our Lives, are infinitely
 " above any *Causes of Love* to be found in
 " *Creatures* : Therefore to act from Love
 " to them without *Intention* to please God,
 " must be infinitely evil."

IF this Reasoning be just, the best of Men are infinitely evil. The Distinction between *habitual* and *actual Intention* will not remove the Difficulty, since these Arguments require *actual Intention*. An *habitual Intention* is not a present act of Love to the DEITY, influencing our Actions more than actual Love to *Creatures*, which this Argument requires ; but a prior general *Resolution* not at present repeated.

TO find what is just on this Subject, we may premise some Propositions of which Men must convince themselves by *Reflection*.

How we compute the Goodness of Temper. II. THERE is in Mankind such a *Disposition* naturally, that they desire the Happiness of any known *sensitive Nature*, when it is not inconsistent with something more strongly

strongly desired; so that were there no *Op- Sect.*
positions of Interest either private or publick,
and *sufficient Power*, we would confer upon ~~every~~
every Being the highest Happiness which it
could receive.

BUT our *Understanding* and *Power* are li-
mited, so that we cannot know many other
Natures, nor is our utmost *Power* capable
of promoting the Happiness of many: our
Actions are therefore influenced by some
stronger Affections than this general *Benevo-
lence*. There are certain *Qualities* found in
some Beings more than in others, which ex-
cite stronger *Degrees of Good-will*, and de-
termine our *Attention* to their Interests,
while that of others is neglected. The Ties
of *Blood*, *Benefits conferred* upon us, and
the Observation of *Virtue* in others, raise
much more vigorous *Affections*, than that ge-
neral *Benevolence* which we may have toward
all. These *Qualities* or *Relations* we may
call the *Causes of Love*.

HOWEVER these *Affections* are very diffe-
rent from the general *Benevolence* toward all,
yet it is very probable, that there is a *Regu-
larity* or *Proportion* observed in the Consti-
tution of our Nature; so that, abstracting
from some acquired *Habits*, or *Affociations*
of Ideas, and from the more sudden *Emo-
tions* of some particular Passions, that Tem-

SECT. per which has the most lively *Gratitude*,
VI. or is the most suscepitive of *Friendship*
with virtuous Characters, would also have
the strongest general *Benevolence* toward in-
different Persons: And on the contrary,
where there is the weakest general *Bene-
volence*, there we could expect the least
Gratitude, and the least *Friendship*, or *Love*
toward the Virtuous. If this *Proportion* be
observed, then we may denote the Propen-
sity of mind, or the disposition to receive
or to be moved with any tender or kind Af-
fections by the *Goodness of Temper*. Then,

THE degree of kind *Affection* toward any Person is in a compound Proportion of the apprehended *Causes of Love* in him, and of the *Goodness of Temper* in the Obser-
ver.

WHEN the *Causes of Love* in two ob-
jects are apprehended equal, the *Love* to-
ward either in different Persons is as the
Goodness of Temper.

WHEN the *Goodness of Temper* is the same or equal, the *Love* toward any Ob-
jects will be proportioned to the *Causes*.

THE *Goodness of any Temper* is there-
fore as the *Quantity of Love*, divided by
the apprehended *Causes*. And since we
cannot

cannot apprehend any Goodness in having **S E C T.**
the *Degree of Love* above the *Proportion VI.*
of its Causes, the most virtuous Temper 
is that in which the *Love* equals its *Causes*, which may therefore be expressed by
Unity *.

HENCE it follows, that if there were any Nature incomparably more excellent than any of our *Fellow-Creatures*, from whom also we our selves, and all others had received the greatest *Benefits*; there would be less Virtue in any small Degree of *Desire of his Happiness*, than in a like *Degree of Love* toward our *Fellow-Creature*. But *not loving* such a Being, or having a *smaller Degree of Love*, must evidence a much greater *Defect* in Virtue, than a like *want of Love* toward our *Fellow-Creatures*. For the *Causes of Love* being very great, unless the *Love* be also very great, there must be some depravation of the Temper, some want of the natural Proportion, or of that calm Deliberation and calm Affections, toward Objects of the Understanding.

III. To apply this to the **DEITY** is very *The gene-*
obvious. Our *Affections* toward him arise in *real Rules*
applied to the same manner as toward our Fellows, in *the Love*
of God.

* See *Treat. 2. Sect. 3. Art. 11.* last Paragraph.

S E C T. proportion to our *Attention to the Causes*
VI. of *Love* in him, and the *Goodness of our*
Temper. The Reflection on his Goodness
raises *Approval* and *Complacence*, his
Benefits raise *Gratitude*, and both occasion
Good-will or *Benevolence*. “ His *Happi-*
“ *ness* is perhaps imagined wholly de-
“ tached from all Events in this World,
“ absolute, and unvaried in himself.” And
yet the same *Inclination* of Mind might
remain in us, tho’ we had this Opinion.
When the *Happiness of a Friend* is in *Sus-*
pense, we desire it; when he has obtained
all that which we desired, the same *Incli-*
nation of Mind seems to remain toward
him, only without that *Uneasiness* accom-
panying Desire of an *uncertain Object*:
Thus *Gravity* may be said to be the same
when a Body is resting on a fixed Base, as
when it caused descent.

UPON this Scheme of the divine *Hap-*
pines, it is not easy to account how our
Love to him could excite us to promote the
Happiness of our Fellows. Our frequent
Contemplation of such an amiable excellent
Nature, might indeed tend to *reform* or
improve our Temper, by presenting an Ex-
ample engaging our Imitation.

IF we imagine that the *DEITY* has such
Perceptions of Approval or *Dislike* to-
ward

ward Actions as we have our selves, then *Sect.* indeed our *Love* to him would directly excite us to do whatever he approves, and shun what he condemns. We can scarce avoid imagining, that the frequent recurring of Events *disapproved*, must be uneasy to any Nature, and that the observing *approved Actions* must be delightful.

IF we imagine that the *divine Happiness*, or any part of it is connected with the Happiness of his Creatures, so that their Happiness is constituted the Occasion of his; then indeed our *Love to the DEITY* will directly excite us to all manner of *beneficent Actions*. 'Tis true, many good Men deny these two last Opinions, yet it is probable, when their Minds are diverted from *Speculations*, by Opportunities of Action, there recurs some Imagination of *Offence*, *Uneasiness*, and *Resentment* in the DEITY, upon observing *evil Actions*; of *Delight* and *Joy* in beholding good Actions; of *Sorrow* upon observing the *Misery* of his Creatures, and *Joy* upon seeing them happy: So that by their *Love to the DEITY* they are influenced to beneficent Actions, notwithstanding their *speculative Opinions*. In our Conceptions of the DEITY, we are continually led to imagine a Resemblance to what we feel in our selves.

SECT. WHOEVER maintains these Opinions of
 VI. the DEITY to be true, must also suppose
 ~~ " a particular *Determination* of all Events
 " in the Universe;" otherwise this part of
 the divine Happiness is made *precarious* and
uncertain, depending upon the *undetermined*
Will of Creatures.

THE Diversity of Opinions concerning
 the *divine Happiness*, may lead men into
 different ways of accounting for the *Influence*
 which the *Love of GOD* may have
 upon our Actions toward our Fellows: But
 the Affections toward the DEITY would
 be much the same upon both Schemes.
 Where there were the same just *Apprehensions*
 of the *divine Goodness* in two Persons,
 the *Love* to the DEITY in both
 would be proportioned to the *Goodness of Temper*.
 Though the highest possible *Degree* of Love to a perfectly good DEITY,
 would evidence no more *Virtue of Temper*, than a proportioned *Love to Creatures*;
 yet the having only *smaller Degrees* of
 Love to the DEITY, would evidence a
 greater *Defect* of Goodness in the Temper,
 than any want of *Affection* toward
 Creatures.

HERE it must be remembred, that in
 arguing concerning the *Goodness of Temper*
 from

from the *Degree* of Love directly, and the *SECT.* *Causes* of Love inversly, *actual Attention* VI. to the *Causes* of Love is supposed in the ~~the~~ Person. For 'tis plain, that in the best Temper no one *Affection* or *Idea* can always continue present, and there can be no *Affection* present to the Mind, toward any Object, while the *Idea* of it is not present. The bare *Absence* therefore of *Affection*, while the Mind is employed upon a different Object, can argue no *evil* in the Temper, farther than want of *Attention* may argue want of *Affection*. In like manner, in the *best Temper*, there can be no Love toward an Object *unknown*: The want therefore of Love to an *Object unknown*, can argue no evil in the Temper farther than *Ignorance* may argue want of *Affection*. It is certain indeed, that he who knows that there is a good *DEITY*, and actually thinks of him, and of all his Benefits, yet has not the *strongest Love and Gratitude* toward him, must have a Temper void of all Goodness; but it will not follow, that the Mind is void of Goodness which is not *always thinking* of the *DEITY*, or actually *loving* him, or even does not know him. How far the want of *Attention* to the *DEITY*, and *Ignorance* of him, may argue an *evil Temper*, must be shown from different *Topicks*, to be considered hereafter.

SECT. IV. But previously to these Inquiries we
VI. must consider "what Degrees or Kinds of
What De- "Affection are necessary to obtain the
grees of "simple *Approbation of Innocence.*" "Tis
Affection plain, the bare *Absence* of all *Malice* is
necessary not enough. We may have the general
to Innocence. *Benevolence* toward a mere *sensitive Nature*, which had no other desire but *Self-Love*; but we can apprehend no *moral Goodness* in such a Being: Nay, 'tis not every *small Degree* of kind Affections which we *approve*. There must be some *proportion* of kind Affections to the *other Faculties* in any *Nature*, particularly to its *Understanding* and *active Powers* to obtain *Approbation*. Some *Brutes* evidence small Degrees of *Good-will*, which make them be *approved in their Kind*; but the same Degrees would not be approved in a *Man*. There is an higher Degree expected in *Mankind*, to which, if they do not come up, we do not account them *innocent*. It is not easy to fix precisely that *Degree* which we approve as *innocent* by our moral Sense. Every kind Affection, if it be considered only with relation to its own Object, is indeed approved; such as *natural Affection, Gratitude, Pity, Friendship*: And yet when we take a more extensive View of the Tendency of some Actions proceeding even from these *Affections*, we

we may often condemn these Actions when S E C T. VI.
they are apprehended as pernicious to lar-
ger Systems of Mankind. In the same man- ~~anner~~
ner we often condemn Actions done from
Love to a particular Country, when they
appear to be *pernicious to Mankind* in ge-
neral. In like manner, *Self-Preservation*
and pursuing *private Advantage* abstract-
ly considered, is *innocent*: But when it
is apprehended as very pernicious in any
case to the Safety of others, it is con-
demned.

MANKIND are capable of large exten-
sive Ideas of *great Societies*. And it is ex-
pected of them, that their *general Bene-*
volence should continually direct and limit,
not only their *selfish Affections*, but even
their *nearer Attachments* to others: that
their Desire of *publick Good*, and Aver-
sion to *publick Misery*, should overcome at
least their Desire of *positive private Ad-*
vantages, either to themselves or their par-
ticular Favourites; so as to make them ab-
stain from any Action which would be
positively pernicious or hurtful to *Man-*
kind, however *beneficial* it might be to
themselves, or their *Favourites*. To un-
dergo *positive Evil* for the sake of *positive*
Good to others, seems some degree of Virtue
above *Innocence*, which we do not univer-
sally expect: But to reject *positive attain-*
able

SECT. able good, either for our selves or our particular Favourites, rather than occasion any considerable *Misery* to others, is requisite to obtain the Approbation of *Innocence*. The want of this Degree we condemn as positive evil ; and an Agent must rise above it by *positive Services* to Mankind, with some *Trouble* and *Expence* to himself, before we approve him as virtuous. We seem indeed universally to expect from all Men those good Offices which give the Agent no trouble or expence : Whoever refuses them is below *Innocence*. But we do not *positively condemn* those as evil, who will not sacrifice their private Interest to the Advancement of the *positive Good* of others, unless the private Interest be *very small*, and the publick Good *very great*.

BUT as the Desire of *positive private Good* is weaker than Aversion to *private Evil*, or Pain ; so our *Desire* of the positive Good of others, is weaker than our *Aversion* to their Misery. It seems at least requisite to *Innocence*, that the stronger *publick Affection*, viz. our Aversion to the Misery of others, should surmount the weaker *private Affection*, the Desire of positive private Good ; so that no prospect of

* In many Questions of this Nature we must have recourse with Aristotle to a *Sense*, which is the last Judge in particular Cases.

Good to our selves, should engage us to S E C T. that which would occasion præpollent Misery to others. It is in like manner requisite ~~to~~ to Innocence, that our Aversion to the Misery of greater or equal Systems, should surmount our Desire of the *positive Good* of these to which we are more particularly attached.

How far it may be necessary to the Character of Innocence to submit to smaller *private Pains* to prevent the *greater Sufferings* of others, or to promote some great *positive Advantages*; or how far the Happiness of *private Systems* should be neglected for the Happiness of the *greater*, in order to obtain the *Approbation of Innocence*, it is perhaps impossible precisely to determine, or to fix any *general Rules*; nor indeed is it necessary. Our busines is not to find out "at how *cheap* a Rate we can purchase "Innocence, but to know what is *most noble, generous and virtuous in Life.*" This we know consists in sacrificing all *positive Interests*, and bearing all *private Evils* for the publick Good: And in submitting also the Interests of all *smaller Systems* to the Interests of the whole: Without any other *Exception or Reserve* than this, that every Man may look upon himself as a *Part of this System*, and consequently not sacrifice an *important private Interest* to a *less*

S E C T. less important Interest of others. We may
VI. find the same sort of Difficulty about all
our other Senses, in determining precisely
what Objects are *indifferent*, or where Plea-
sure ends, and Disgust begins, tho' the
higher Degrees of the *grateful* and *un-
grateful* are easily distinguished.


IT is also very difficult to fix any pre-
cise Degree of Affection toward the DEITY,
which should be barely requisite to Inno-
cence. Only in general we must disapprove
that Temper, which, upon Apprehension
of the perfect Goodness of the DEITY,
and of his innumerable Benefits to Mankind,
has not stronger Affections of Love and
Gratitude toward him, than those toward
any other Being. Such Affections would
necessarily raise frequent Attention and
Consideration of our Actions; and would
engage us, if we apprehended any of them
to be offensive to him, or contrary to that
Scheme of Events in which we appre-
hended the DEITY to *delight*, to avoid them
with a more firm Resolution than what we
had in any other Affairs. *Positive Virtue*
toward the DEITY must go farther than a
resolute abstaining from Offence, by engag-
ing us with the greatest Vigor, to do what-
ever we apprehend as *positively pleasing*, or
conducive to those Ends in which we ap-
prehended the DEITY delights. It is
scarce

scarce conceivable that any good Temper can S E C T. want such Affections toward the DEITY, VI. when once he is known, as were above ~~ever~~ supposed necessary to *Innocence*. Nor can we imagine *positive Degrees* of Goodness of Temper above Innocence, where Affections toward the DEITY do not arise proportionably.

WHAT is here said relates only to the *Apprehensions of our moral Sense*, and not to those Degrees of Virtue which the DEITY may require by *Revelation*: And every one's Heart may inform him whether or no he does not *approve*, at least as *innocent*, those who omit many good Offices which they might *possibly* have done, provided they do a great deal of good; those who carefully abstain from every *apprehended Offence* toward the DEITY, though they might possibly be more frequent in Acts of *Devotion*. 'Tis true indeed, the *Omission of what we know to be required* is positively evil: so that by a *Revelation* we may be obliged to farther Services than were requisite previously to it, which we could not innocently omit, after this *Revelation* is known: But we are here only considering our *moral Sense*.

V. Now let us inquire how far *simple How far Ignorance of a DEITY*, or *unaffected Atheism* of DEITY is Evil.

*S E C T. ijm evidences an evil Disposition, or Defect
VI. of good Affections below Innocence.*



1. AFFECTIONS arising upon *apparent Causes*, or present *Opinions*, though false, if they be such as would arise in the *best Temper*, were these Opinions *true*, cannot argue any present *want of Goodness* in any Temper, of themselves: the *Opinions* indeed may often argue a *want of Goodness* at the time they were formed: But to a benevolent Temper there is no *Cause of Malice*, or of the ultimate Desire of the *Misery* or *Non-existence* of any Being for itself. There may be Causes of *Disslike*, and Desire of *Misery* or *Non-existence*, as the Means of greater *Good*, or of lessening *Evil*.

2. No Object which is entirely *unknown*, or of which we have no *Idea*, can raise *Affection* in the *best Temper*; consequently *want of Affection* to an *unknown Object* evidences no *evil*. This would be the Case of those who never heard even the *Report of a DEITY*, if ever there were any such: Or who never heard of any *Fellow-Creatures*, if one may make a Supposition like to that made by *Cicero* *. And this is perhaps the Case, as to the *DEITY*, of any unfortunate Children, who may have some

* *De Nat. Deor. Lib. 2. cap. 37. Ex Aristotle.*

little Use of Reason, before they are in-S E C T. structured in any Religion.

VI.



IF there really were an *Innate Idea* of a DEITY so imprinted, that no Person could be without it ; or if we are so disposed, as necessarily to receive this *Idea*, as soon as we can be called moral Agents : then no Ignorance of a DEITY can be innocent ; all Atheism must be affected, or an Opinion formed, either through *evil Affection*, or want of good *Affection* below Innocence. But if the *Idea of a DEITY* be neither imprinted, nor offer itself previously to any *Reflection*, nor be universally excited by *Tradition*, the bare *Want* of it, where there has been no *Tradition* or *Reflection*, cannot be called criminal upon any Scheme. Those who make *Virtue* and *Vice* relative to a *Law*, may say, " Men are required " to reflect, and thence to know a DEITY." But they must allow *Promulgation* necessary, before Disobedience to a Law can be criminal. Now previously to *Reflection* it is supposed impossible for the Agent to know the *Legislator*, or to know the *Law requiring him to reflect*, therefore this *Law requiring him to reflect*, was not antecedently to his *Reflection* published to him.

THE Case of *human Laws*, the Ignorance of which does not excuse, is not pa-

S E C T. rallel to this. No Person under any Civil
VI. Government can be supposed ignorant that
~~~~ there are *Laws* made for the whole State.

But in the present Supposition, Men antecedently to *Reflection* may be ignorant of the DEITY, or that there are *Laws of Nature*. If any Subject could thus be *unapprized*, that he lived under Civil Government, he should not be accounted *Compos Mentis*. The Supposition indeed in both Cases is perhaps wholly *imaginary*; at least as to Persons above Childhood. One can scarce imagine that ever any Person was wholly unapprized of a *governing Mind*, and of a *Right* and *Wrong* in Morals. Whether this is to be ascribed to *innate Ideas*, to *universal Tradition*, or to some *necessary Determination* in our Nature, to imagine a designing *Cause* of the beautiful Objects which occur to us, with a *moral Sense*, let the curious inquire.

3. SUPPOSE an Idea formed in a *benevolent Mind*, of other *sensitive Natures*, *Desire* of their Existence and Happiness would arise.

4. A *GOOD Temper* would incline any one to wish, that other Natures were *benevolent*, or morally Good, since this is the chief *Happiness*.

5. A

5. A good Temper would desire that the S E C T. Administration of Nature were by a benevolent or good Mind. VI. 

6. ALL Desire of any Event or Circumstance inclines any Mind to search into the Truth of that Event or Circumstance, by all the Evidence within its power to obtain.

7. WHERE there is such Desire, and sufficiently obvious Evidence given in proportion to the Sagacity of the desiring Mind, it will come to the Knowledge of the Truth, if its Desire be strong.

Now from these Propositions we may deduce the following Conclusions.

1. SUPPOSING the Idea of a good DEITY once apprehended, or excited either by Report, or the slightest Reflection; if there be objective Evidence in Nature proportioned to the Capacity of the Inquirer, for the Existence of a good DEITY, Atheism directly argues want of good Affection below Innocence.

2. IF there be only the simple Tradition or Presumption of a governing Mind once raised; and if there be Evidence as

SECT. before for his *Goodness*, to conclude the  
 VI. DEITY evil or malicious, must argue want  
 of good *Affection* as before.

3. SUPPOSE the Idea of an *evil Deity* once excited, and some Presumptions for his *Malice* from *Tradition*, or slight *Reflection* upon particular *Evils* in *Nature*; to rest in this Opinion without Inquiry, would argue *want of good Affection*; to desire to *reject* this Opinion, or *confute* it by contrary Evidence, would argue *good Affection*: Suppose such contrary *Evidences* obvious enough in *Nature* to one who inquired as diligently about it as about his own *Interest*; to continue in the *false Opinion* cannot be innocent.

*How Ignorance in human Affairs evi-*  
 VI. IN like manner concerning our Fellow-  
*dences a bad Temper.* Creatures, who are actually known to us.

4. To imagine Fellow-Creatures *morally Good*, either according to *Evidence* upon Inquiry, or even by a rash *Opinion*, evidences *good Affection*.

5. IMAGINING them *Evil* contrary to obvious *Evidence*, argues *want of good Affection* below *Innocence*.

6. RETAINING and *inculcating* an *Opinion* either of the *Causes of Love* in others,

others, or of the *Causes of Aversion*, induces an *Habit*; and makes the Temper prone to the *Affection* often raised. Opinion of ~~the~~ Goodness in the DEITY and our Fellows, increases good *Affection*, and improves the Temper: Contrary Opinion of either, by raising frequent *Aversions*, weakens good *Affections*, and impairs the Temper.

THIS may shew how cautious Men ought to be in passing Sentence upon the *Impiety* of their Fellows, or representing them as *wicked* and *profane*, or *hateful* to the DEITY, and justly given over to eternal Misery: We may see also what a wise *Mark* it is to know the *true Church* by, that "it pronounces Damnation on all others." Which is one of the Characters of the *Romish Church*, by which it is often recommended as the safest for Christians to live in.

THE same *Propositions* may be applied to our Opinions concerning the *natural Tendencies* of Actions. Where the Evidence is obvious as before, good Affection will produce *true Opinions*, and *false Opinions* often argue *want of good Affection* below Innocence. Thus, tho' in *Affent* or *Dissent* of themselves, there can neither be *Virtue* nor *Vice*, yet they may be *Evidences*

SECT. ces of either in the Agent, as well as his  
 VI. external Motions. It is not possible indeed  
 ~~~ for Men to determine precisely in many ca-  
 ses the *Quantity of Evidence*, and its propor-
 tion to the Sagacity of the Observer, which
 will argue *Guilt* in him, who contrary to
 it, forms a *false Opinion*. But Men are no
 better Judges of the *Degrees of Virtue and Vice* in external Actions. This therefore
 will not prove that all *false Opinions or Errors* are innocent, more than *external Actions*: The Searcher of Hearts can
 judge exactly of both. Human *Punish- ments* are only *Methods of Self-Defence*; in which the *Degrees of Guilt* are not the proper Measure, but the *Necessity of re- straining Actions for the Safety of the Pub- lick.*

How want
of Atten-
tion evi-
dences a
bad Tem-
per.

VII. IT is next to be considered, how far want of Attention to the DEITY can argue want of good Affections, in any Agent, to whom he is known.

EVERY good Temper will have strong Affections to a good DEITY, and where there is *strong Affection* there will be *frequent Reflection* upon the Object beloved, *Desire of pleasing*, and *Caution of offence*. In like manner every Person of good Temper, who has had the Knowledge of a Country

Country, a System, a Species, will consider **S E C T.** how far these great Societies may be affected by his Actions, with such Attention as ~~as~~ he uses in his own Affairs; and will abstain from what is injurious to them. **VI.**

ATTENTION to a DEITY apprehended as good, and governing the Universe, will increase the *Disposition to Beneficence* in any good Agent various ways; by Prospects of Reward, either present or future; by improving his Temper thro' Observation of so amiable a *Pattern*; or by raising Sentiments of *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, to whom we may imagine the publick Happiness to be acceptable. In like manner, the considering a *Species* or *System* may increase our *good Offices*, since *their Interests* are advanced by good Offices to *Individuals*.

BUT then from a like Reasoning to that in Art. II. it is plain, that in *equal Moments* of good produced by two Agents, the *Goodness of the Temper* is rather inversly as the several *additional Helps*, or *Motives* to it. So that where no more good is done, in *equal Abilities*, by one Agent who had presented to him the joint Motives of Piety toward God and Humanity toward Men, than is done by another from mere Humanity, the latter gives a better Evidence of a good

SECT. good Temper. And where higher Motives
 VI. of Gratitude to God are presented to one
 than to another, unless the Good done from
 these stronger Motives is greater, the Tem-
 per must be so much the worse.*

But an injurious Action which appear-
 ed to the Agent not only *pernicious to his*
Fellows, or to particular Persons, but *offen-*
sive to the DEITY, and pernicious to a *Sy-*
stem, is much more vicious than when the
 Agent did not reflect upon the DEITY, or
 a *Community*.

Nothing in this Scheme supercedes in order to produce greater Virtue in our Duty of selves, we should regard the DEITY no farther, than merely to abstain from Offences. Were it our sole Intention in beneficent Actions, only to obtain the *private Pleasure of Self-Approval* for the Degree of our Virtue, this might seem the proper Means of having *great Virtue* with the least *Expence*. But if the real Intention, which constitutes an Action *virtuous*, be the *promoting publick Good*; then *voluntarily* to re-*ject* the Consideration of any Motive which would increase the *Moment* of publick Good, or would make us more vigorous and stedfast in Virtue, must argue *want of good Af-*

* See Luke x. 12, 13, 14.

fection.

fection. Good Offices done from mere SECT. Humanity, while the Motives of Piety were VI. not present to the Mind, provided they were ~~W~~ not excluded by direct Design, or blameable Inadvertence, may in this particular Case be a better Indication of a good Temper, than Offices only of equal Importance done by another of equal Abilities, from the joint Motives of Piety and Humanity; yet the retaining designedly and frequently recalling all these Motives with a view to increase the Moment of publick Good in our Actions, if they really do so, argues Virtue equal to, or greater than that in the former Case: And the affected Neglect of these Motives, that so we may acquit ourselves virtuously with the least Expence to ourselves, or with the least Moment of publick Good, must evidence want of good Affections, and base Trick and Artifice to impose upon Observers, or our own Hearts. Therefore

SINCE Gratitude to the DEITY, and even Consideration of *private Interest*, tend to increase the Moment of our Beneficence, and to strengthen good Affections, the voluntary Retaining them with this View evidences Virtue, and affecting to neglect them evidences Vice.* And yet,

If

* This may sufficiently justify the *Writers of Morality* in their proving, "that Virtue is the surest Means of Happiness" to

S E C T. If the Moment produced by the Con-
 VI. junction of these Motives, be not greater
 than that produced with unaffected Neg-
 lect of these Motives, from particular good
 Affection, there is less Virtue in the former
 than in the latter.

MEN may use Names as they please, and may chuse to call nothing *Virtue* but “what is intended chiefly to evidence *Af- fection* of one kind or other toward the *Deity*.” Writers on this Scheme are not well agreed about what this *virtuous Intention* is; whether only to evidence *Submission*, or *Submission and Love*, or to express *Gratitude* by compliance with the Divine Will, or to express a disinterested *Esteem*, or to obtain our own Happiness by means of the Divine Favour. This last

“to the Agent.” ‘Tis also plain from universal *Experience*, that a *Regard to the Deity*, frequent *Reflection* on his Goodness, and consequent *Acts of Love*, are the strongest and most universally prevailing *Means* of obtaining a good Temper. Whatever *Institution* therefore does most effectually tend to raise Mens *Attention*, to recall their Minds from the Hurry of their common Affairs, to *instruct* them in the Ways of promoting publick Good farther than the busy Part of the World without Assistance would probably apprehend, must be so wise and good, that every honest Mind should rejoice in it, even though it had no other *Authority* than *human* to recommend it. Every one will understand that by this is meant a *publick Worship* on set Days, in which a stop is put to Commerce, and the busy part of Mankind instructed in the Duties of *Piety and Humanity*.

Intention

Intention may influence a very corrupt Mind ~~S E C T.~~
in some things. And the former more gene- VI.
rous Intentions must really increase the Good- ✓✓✓
ness of every Action, and are the highest Vir-
tues of themselves. But let them not assert,
against universal *Experience*, that we *approve*
no Actions which are not thus intended to-
ward the DEITY. 'Tis plain, a generous *com-
passionate* Heart, which, at first view of the
Distress of another, flies impatiently to his
Relief, or spares no Expence to accom-
plish it, meets with strong *Approbation*
from every Observer, who has not per-
verted his *Sense of Life by School-Divinity,*
or Philosophy. Joining frequently and ha-
bitually the Acts of Piety with those of Hu-
manity is, no doubt, the *Perfection* of Good-
ness and Virtue. But we must not deny the
Reality of Virtue in these Actions, which
are not of the most perfect Sort.

To be led by a *weaker Motive*, where a
Stronger is alike present to the Mind, to love
a Creature *more than God*, or to have *stronger*
Desires of doing what is grateful to Crea-
tures than to God, when we equally attend
to both, would certainly argue great *Perversion*
of our Affections; or to study the
particular Good of one, more than that of
a *System*, when we reflected on both: But
as no finite Mind can retain at once a
Multi-

S E C T. Multiplicity of Objects, so it cannot always
VI. retain any one Object. When a Person
therefore not thinking at present of the
DEITY, or of a Community, or System,
does a beneficent Action from particular
Love, he evidences *Goodness of Temper*.
The bare *Absence* of the Idea of a DEI-
TY, or of *Affections* to him, can evi-
dence no evil; otherways it would be a
Crime to fall asleep, or to think of any
thing else: If the bare *Absence* of this Idea
be no evil, the Presence of *kind Affections*
to Fellow-Creatures cannot be evil. If
indeed our Love to the DEITY excited to
any Action, and at the *same time* Love to
a *Creature* excited to the Omission of it,
or to a contrary Action, we must be ve-
ry criminal if the former do not prevail;
yet this will not argue all Actions to be
evil in which *pleasing the DEITY*, is not
directly and chiefly intended. Nay, that
Temper must really be very *deficient* in
Goodness, which ever needs to recall the
Thoughts of a Divine *Command* and its
Sanctions, or even the Thoughts of the Inter-
ests of greater Societies or *Systems*, before it
can be engaged into any particular Acts of
Kindness. Accordingly we find in Nature
that the particular kind *Passions* generally move
the Mind first. And upon Reflection, more
extensive Motives begin to occur, and Re-
gards to the great Head of the rational *Sys-
tem*.

tem. The frequent recalling these Thoughts, S E C T. indeed, does strengthen all good Affections, VI. and increases the *Moment* of Beneficence to U W W be expected from any Temper; and with this *View* frequently to recal such Thoughts, must be one of the best *Helps* to Virtue, and evidence high Degrees of it. Nay, one cannot call that Temper *entire* and *complete*, which has not the *strongest Affection* toward the greatest Benefactor, and the most worthy Object.

BEINGS of such Degrees of *Knowledge*, and such *Extent* of Thought, as Mankind are not only capable of, but generally obtain, when nothing interrupts their Inquiries, must naturally arise to the Knowledge of the DEITY, if their Temper be good. They must form *general Conceptions* of the whole, and see the *Order, Wisdom, and Goodness* in the *Administration of Nature* in some Degree. The Knowledge and Love of the DEITY, the *universal MIND*, is as *natural* a Perfection to such a Being as Man, as any Accomplishment to which we arrive by cultivating our natural Dispositions; nor is that Mind come to the *proper State and Vigor* of its kind, where *Religion* is not the main *Exercise* and *Delight*.

IX. THERE is one very subtle Argument on this Subject. Some alledge, " That Whether the DEI- TY is the sole proper Object of Love. since

SECT. " since the DEITY is really the *Cause* of
 VI. " all the Good in the Universe, even of all
 ~~~ " the *Virtue*, or good *Affection* in Creatures,  
 " which are the seeming *Causes of Love* to-  
 " ward them, it must argue strange Per-  
 " version of Temper to love those in whom  
 " there is no *Cause of Love*, or who are  
 " (as they affect to speak) *nothing*, or *Em-*  
 " *tiness of all Goodness*. The DEITY a-  
 " lone is amiable, in whom there is infinite  
 " *Fulness of every amiable Quality*. The  
 " DEITY, say they, not without some Rea-  
 " son, is the *Cause* of every *pleasant Sensa-*  
 " *tion*, which he immediately excites ac-  
 " cording to a *general Law*, upon the Oc-  
 " casion of *Motions* arising in our Bodies;  
 " that likewise he gave us that general *In-*  
 " *cination*, which we modify into all our  
 " different *Affections*; God therefore, say  
 " they, is alone *lovely*. Other Things are  
 " not to be beloved, but only the *Goodness*  
 " *of God appearing in them*; nay some make  
 " the *loving* of them, without considering  
 " God as displaying his Goodness in them,  
 " to be infinitely *evil*."

IN answer to this it must be owned, that  
 " God's being the Cause of all the Good  
 " in the Universe, will no doubt raise the  
 " highest Love to him in a good Temper,  
 " when it reflects upon it."

BUT 1st, had all Men this Apprehensi- SECT. on that " there was no good in any Crea- VI.  
ture," they really would not love them at all. But Men generally imagine with very good ground, that there are *good Beings* distinct from God, though produced by him: And whether this Opinion be true or false, it evidences no evil.

2. As upon this Scheme God is the Cause of all *pleasant Sensation*, so is he the Cause of all Pain: He is, according to them, the Cause of that *Inclination* which we modify into *evil Affection*, as well as into *good*. If then we are to love God only, for what we call *good Affection* in Creatures, and not the Creatures themselves, we must also only love God upon observing *evil Affections* in Creatures, and have no *Aversion* to the *basest Temper*, since God gave the general INCLINATION alike in both Cases.

3. IF we may suppose *real Beings* distinct from God, that *their Affections* are not God's Affections, if God is not the only *Lover* and *Hater*, if our moral Sense is determined to approve *kind Affections*, and our *Love* or *Benevolence* must arise toward what we *approve*; or if we find an *Instinct* to desire the Happiness of every sensitive Nature,

S E C T. Nature, we cannot avoid loving Creatures,  
VI. and we must *approve* any kind *Affections*  
~~seen~~ observed in others toward their Fellows.

'Tis true, we must *approve* the *highest Affections* toward the DEITY, and *condemn*, as a *Deficiency* of just *Affections* toward God any Degree which is not superior to our other *Affections*. But still, *Affections* towards Creatures, if they be *distinct Natures*, must be approved.

4. If to make a Mind virtuous, or even innocent, it be necessary that it should have such sublime Speculations of God, as the τὸ πᾶν in the *Intellectual active System* (if we call one *Agent* in many *Passive Organs* an *active System*, then God has placed the Bulk of Mankind in an absolute *Incapacity* of Virtue, and inclined them perpetually to infinite Evil, by their very *Instincts* and *natural Affections*. Does the *parental Affection* direct a Man to love the DEITY, or his *Children*? Is it the DIVINITY, to which our *Pity* or *Compassion* is directed? Is God the Object of *Humanity*? Is it a *Design* to support the DIVINITY, which we call *Generosity* or *Liberality*? Upon *Receipt of a Benefit*, does our Nature suggest only *Gratitude toward God*? *Affections* toward the DEITY may indeed often accompany *Affections* toward Creatures, and do so in a virtuous Temper: but these

these are distinct Affections. This Notion ~~S E C T.~~ VI.  
of making all virtuous Affections to be on-  
ly directed toward GOD, is not suggested to  
Men by any thing in their *Nature*, but a-  
rises from the long subtle *Reasonings* of Men  
at leisure, and unemployed in the natural  
Affairs of Life.

5. If there be no Virtue or Cause of Love in Creatures, it is vain for them to debate wherein their Virtue consists, whether in regard toward the DEITY, or in any thing else, since they are supposed to have none at all.

To conclude this Subject. It seems probable, that however we must look upon that Temper as exceedingly *imperfect, inconstant, and partial*, in which *Gratitude toward the universal Benefactor, Admiration and Love of the supreme original Beauty, Perfection and Goodness*, are not the *strongest and most prevalent Affections*; yet *particular Actions* may be innocent, nay, virtuous, where there is no actual *Intention of pleasing the DEITY, influencing the Agent.*









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